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NATURAL LAW & LAWLESSNESS: 
MODERN LESSONS FROM PIRATES, 
LEPERS, ESKIMOS, AND SURVIVORS 
Paul H. Robinson* 
The natural experiments of history present an opportunity to test 
Hobbes’s view that government and law are the wellspring of social 
order.  Groups have found themselves in a wide variety of situations 
in which no governmental law existed, from shipwrecks to gold min-
ing camps to failed states.  Yet, despite the wide variety of situations, 
common patterns emerge among the groups in their responses to their 
often difficult circumstances.  Rather than survival of the fittest, a 
more common reaction is social cooperation and a commitment to 
fairness and justice, although both can be subverted in certain pre-
dictable ways.  These absent-law situations also illustrate the depend-
ence of social order and cooperation on a group’s commitment to jus-
tice. 
The insights from the absent-law situations have implications for 
several modern criminal justice issues, including the appropriate dis-
tributive principle for criminal liability and punishment, restorative 
justice programs, the movement to promote non-incarcerative sanc-
tions, transitional justice and truth commissions, the limitations on 
use-of-force rules under international law, fairness procedures pro-
moting the legitimacy of criminal adjudication, and crime-control 
policies for fighting organized crime and terrorism. 
  
 
 *  Colin S. Diver Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania.  This project would not have 
been possible without Sarah Robinson’s extensive research on the project’s two dozen case studies.  
My thanks also go to Joseph Parsio and Merle Slyhoff of the University of Pennsylvania Law School 
library for their extensive efforts in locating sources.  Finally, thanks go to Robert Kurzban, Stephanos 
Bibas, Steve Garvey for comments on an earlier draft, to the students in my Fall 2011 criminal law 
theory seminar at Penn Law for helping me think through these ideas, to Michal Gilad for her research 
assistance, and to participants in a faculty workshop at Penn Law. 
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In Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes sets government and the legal system 
as the wellspring of social order.  Without them, in the “state of nature,” 
“every man is Enemy to every man,”1 and under the “[l]awes of 
[n]ature,” there is no right or wrong, only power and weakness.2  In Or-
der Without Law, Robert Ellickson challenges Hobbes’s view.3  His study 
of ranchers and farmers in Shasta County shows that groups commonly 
organize their lives with social rather than legal rules, even for those reg-
ular points of tension among people that the law purports to control.4  He 
describes substitute social rules for dealing with situations as diverse as 
damage to adjoining property when livestock stray, deciding who should 
bear the cost of fences to prevent straying, and collisions with cattle that 
stray onto roads.5   
On the other hand, one might argue that such instances of social co-
operation in place of legal rules are not truly undermining the Hobbesian 
view of governmental law as the wellspring of order.  The social accom-
modations that Ellickson cites may be possible only because the legal 
system created a situation in which such social accommodations are fea-
sible.  While the Shasta County ranchers and farmers may regularly use 
their own social arrangements in place of the legal system for some 
things, they still call the police when needed to protect the social order 
that makes such arrangements possible.6  Even just knowing they can call 
the police creates an atmosphere that would not exist without the legal 
system, or at least the criminal justice system.  Perhaps children at recess 
who play fabulously well together, as long as the playground monitor is 
standing by, might revert to Lord of the Flies without him. 
A better test of the contribution of governmental law would be to 
drop the Shasta County rangers and farmers on a large farmable island 
by themselves.  Without a criminal justice system of police, courts, and 
prisons, would they show the same degree of social cooperation?  Or, 
without external restraint, would the strong bully the weak? 
The difficulty, of course, is that there are not many volunteers for 
such an experiment.  (I am setting aside here the raft of reality television 
schemes that might seem to fit the bill.  Besides the obvious sampling 
dangers—who volunteers for such wacky public exposure?—there still 
exists in such schemes the playground monitor in the person of the pro-
ducers, standing by to assure that things don’t spin too far out of con-
trol.)  But Ellickson and others have shown that life can be rich with a 
 
 1. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 64 (Ernest Rhys ed., J.M. Dent & Sons & E.P. Dutton & Co. 
1914). 
 2. Id. at 63–64, 66.  
 3. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 10 
(1991) (“Hobbes is off the mark . . . .”). 
 4. Id. at 40, 52–64.  
 5. Id. at 9. 
 6. Id. at 59–60.  
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variety of natural experiments, many of which can produce significant in-
sights into modern problems.7 
This Article explores a collection of situations of lawlessness, in 
which people have been thrust into a world without governmental law or, 
in some instances, a world with formal law on the books that might as 
well not exist because it has no possibility of enforcement.  The term 
“lawlessness” has two quite different meanings.  It is used to refer to 
rampant misbehavior and also, less commonly, to situations in which 
there exists no governing legal system.  Does lawlessness in the latter 
sense produce lawlessness in the former sense?  Without the playground 
monitor, will each person advance his or her own immediate interests at 
the expense of others or will people organize themselves in ways that will 
benefit the group as a whole?  Without formal law, will the strong bully 
the weak to their own advantage, as Hobbes seems to assume? 
A review of how groups react to absent-law situations suggests that 
the short answer is not likely to surprise Ellickson: It commonly occurs 
that social forces within the group, and internalized by its members, ef-
fectively control individual behavior to promote social cooperation, even 
if it is not obvious to the individual actor at the moment that such coop-
eration has a payoff for him.  This should not surprise anyone, really.  
We are the living proof of such a human instinct toward a dynamic of so-
cial cooperation within groups.  If it did not exist, we would have disap-
peared as a species from the lawless Serengeti Plain.  Instead we flour-
ished.  What the absent-law cases reveal is a “natural law” of sorts—the 
rules that human groups construct for themselves to establish norms that 
will govern conduct among them, including the group’s response to viola-
tions of those rules of conduct—that gives a more optimistic view of hu-
man nature than Hobbes’s, and that has important implications for mod-
ern criminal justice. 
I. SITUATIONS IN WHICH LAW OR ITS ENFORCEMENT ARE ABSENT 
There exist a wide array of situations in which no legal system exists 
to control wrongdoing within a group, as seen in the cases described in 
Sections A through C below.  They involve small and large groups, as 
well as entire populations, but, as will become apparent, they share many 
dynamics. 
Not every instance of an apparent absent-law situation will, in fact, 
be uninfluenced by law.  That is, one can imagine a group going on a trip 
and knowing that there will be no immediate presence of law enforce-
ment during the trip, yet nonetheless act as if there were because any vio-
 
 7. Id. at 1; see also infra Part I.A. 
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lation during the time will be punished upon their return.8  To get a true 
absent-law effect, the group must see it as sufficiently unlikely that they 
will return to a situation of law enforcement or be prosecuted if they do, 
or, in any case, be beyond caring about either. 
A. Natural Experiments with Small Groups: Airplane and Ship Wrecks 
Natural experiments in absent-law situations can be found in histor-
ical and more modern times, and in a wide range of situations.  Consider 
several situations of small groups left on their own in isolation.  In 1972, a 
plane carrying rugby players and their families and fans crashed in the 
Andes mountains.9  Because the plane was off course, the air searchers 
never found it and the passengers were left to survive on their own for 
months.10  The difficult circumstances—freezing weather and limited 
food—certainly created incentives for the strong to increase their chanc-
es of survival at the expense of the weak.  In 1824, Samuel Comstock, a 
crew member on the whale ship the Globe, orchestrated a mutiny during 
which all the senior officers were killed.11  The mostly teenage crew then 
swore allegiance to Comstock, as the head mutineer, and followed his di-
rections in sailing the ship to a tropical island where they would live.12  
Without a legal system, do the groups develop a social accommodation 
with an enforcement mechanism that controls wrongdoing of one mem-
ber against another? 
In 1864, the sailing ship Grafton ran aground and wrecked in an in-
terior bay of an island in the Aucklands.13  Several months later, the In-
vercauld wrecked on the exterior coast of the same island.14  The two par-
ties never knew of one another.15  When the Grafton party finally 
managed to rescue themselves twenty months after wrecking, all five of 
the men had survived.16  When the Invercauld party was rescued after on-
 
 8. For discussion of a related point—of whether an absent-law group’s members might be influ-
enced by governmental law by carrying forward norms previously instantiated by those laws—see text 
accompanying notes 107–09 infra. 
 9. NANDO PARRADO WITH VINCE RAUSE, MIRACLE IN THE ANDES: 72 DAYS ON THE 
MOUNTAIN AND MY LONG TREK HOME 31–32 (2006); PIERS PAUL READ, ALIVE: THE STORY OF THE 
ANDES SURVIVORS 13 (1974). 
 10. READ, supra note 9, at 13–14.  
 11. WILLIAM COMSTOCK, THE LIFE OF SAMUEL COMSTOCK: THE TERRIBLE WHALEMAN 88 
(Boston, James Fisher 1840); THOMAS FAREL HEFFERNAN, MUTINY ON THE GLOBE: THE FATAL 
VOYAGE OF SAMUEL COMSTOCK 64–74 (2002).  
 12. COMSTOCK, supra note 11, at 88; HEFFERNAN, supra note 11, at 50, 74. 
 13. MADELENE FERGUSON ALLEN, WAKE OF THE INVERCAULD: SHIPWRECKED IN THE SUB-
ANTARCTIC: A GREAT-GRANDDAUGHTER’S PILGRIMAGE 19 fig.1 (1997); JOAN DRUETT, ISLAND OF 
THE LOST: SHIPWRECKED AT THE EDGE OF THE WORLD 28 (2007). 
 14. ALLEN, supra note 13, at 19 fig.1.  
 15. Id. at 22; F.E. RAYNAL, WRECKED ON A REEF; OR, TWENTY MONTHS AMONG THE 
AUCKLAND ISLES 324 (London, T. Nelson & Sons 1874).  
 16. ALLEN, supra note 13, at 19 fig.1. 
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ly twelve months on the island, only three of the nineteen were still 
alive.17  Why such different results in such similar physical conditions? 
In 1629, the Dutch East Indian company ship Batavia wrecked on a 
remote island group 2000 miles from Java.18  The 280 survivors split into 
different groups, and the two groups ended up being run quite different-
ly.19  When rescuers finally arrived, an aggressor group, which was re-
sponsible for more than one hundred deaths, was using the ship’s cannon 
to attack a second group, which had provided safety and support to any-
one who joined them.20  Why the different approaches of the two groups? 
B. Natural Experiments with Large Groups: Colonies, Camps, Wagon 
Trains, and Institutions 
Absent-law situations can occur in much larger groups as well.  
Some are created voluntarily.  In 1848, gold was discovered on the prop-
erty of a saw mill in Northern California.21  By 1852, the population of 
California had grown from 14,000 to 250,000 as people rushed to the 
state from all over the world to mine for gold.22  San Francisco, the port 
of entry for most miners, exploded from a sleepy 200 to 40,000 in just a 
few years.23  California was not yet a state, nor even a territory.24  Though 
the United States had no legal authority in the region, it eventually ap-
pointed a governor claiming that the area was an independent region se-
ceded from the chaotic Mexican government by an earlier group of resi-
dents.25  But whoever may have claimed legal authority to govern, there 
was no effective mechanism of law enforcement.  Yet each mining camp 
had a strong incentive to organize itself in some way so as to prohibit and 
punish aggressive conduct, for chaos interfered with gold mining.26 
Other examples of voluntarily created colonies include the 1840s 
wagon trains from Missouri to Oregon.27  They were essentially tempo-
rary moving colonies, with a shared goal.  The first successful European 
colony in America, at Jamestown in 1607, was similarly cut off from tra-
ditional law enforcement and the colonists had to establish for them-
 
 17. Id.  
 18. MIKE DASH, BATAVIA’S GRAVEYARD 13 (2002); HENRIETTA DRAKE-BROCKMAN, VOYAGE 
TO DISASTER: THE LIFE OF FRANCISCO PELSAERT 3 (1963). 
 19. DASH, supra note 18, at 119–29. 
 20. Id. at 185–86, 251; DRAKE-BROCKMAN, supra note 18, at 105–06, 240.  
 21. CHARLES HOWARD SHINN, MINING CAMPS: A STUDY IN AMERICAN FRONTIER 
GOVERNMENT 107–08 (1965). 
 22. Gold Rush Overview, CAL. DEP’T OF PARKS & RECREATION, http://www.parks.ca.gov/? 
page_id=1081 (last visited Feb. 17, 2013). 
 23. MARY FLOYD WILLIAMS, HISTORY OF THE SAN FRANCISCO COMMITTEE OF VIGILANCE OF 
1851, at 167 n.17 (1921). 
 24. Id. at 54–56. 
 25. Id.  
 26. SHINN, supra note 21, at 150–54; WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 68.  
 27. THOMAS A. RUMER, THE WAGON TRAINS OF ‘44: A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF THE 
INDIVIDUAL CARAVANS IN THE EMIGRATION OF 1844 TO OREGON 27, 51 (1990).  
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selves some means by which to control their members’ dealings with one 
another.28 
In some instances, the group creation and the need to organize it 
was not sought, or even planned, but rather thrust upon the group by the 
circumstances in which they found themselves.  In 1971, prisoners rioted, 
eventually taking over Attica prison for five days.29  Once they had con-
trol of the prison, the prisoners could rampage or they could organize.  
Certainly this particular population had already shown themselves to be 
willing to ignore law even when it did exist.30  In the 1700s, pirates formed 
into base camps, but of course were unable to call on legal authorities to 
maintain order within a colony.31  In the 1600s, escaped slaves in the Car-
ibbean formed themselves into groups in Jamaica, Cuba, and other loca-
tions, and became known as the Maroons.32  They could not rely on exist-
ing legal authorities, with whom they were typically in conflict.  If they 
were to organize themselves, they would have to do it on their own.33  In 
1967, the British withdrew from governing the Island of Anguilla.34  Its 
residents refused to be part of the British plan for a new country made 
up of many islands in the area, but instead went off on their own over-
night.35  In 1767, the mutineers from the H.M.S. Bounty fled to Pitcairn 
Island, essentially taking over the island and setting up their own socie-
ty.36  Again, many of the group’s members had already shown their will-
ingness to be law breakers.37 
Some groups ended up in new colonies only because they were bru-
tally forced into it.  In 1865, Hawaii dealt with its fear of a spread of lep-
rosy by rounding up all lepers, and often their families, and depositing 
them on Molokai Island from which they could not escape.38  The author-
ities provided few resources and little governance, hoping the island 
 
 28. JAMES HORN, A LAND AS GOD MADE IT: JAMESTOWN AND THE BIRTH OF AMERICA 46–47 
(2005); DAVID A. PRICE, LOVE AND HATE IN JAMESTOWN: JOHN SMITH, POCAHONTAS, AND THE 
START OF A NEW NATION 4, 30 (2003).  
 29. BERT USEEM & PETER KIMBALL, STATES OF SIEGE: U.S. PRISON RIOTS, 1971–1986, at 27–55 
(1991); TOM WICKER, A TIME TO DIE: THE ATTICA PRISON REVOLT, at x, 303 (1975). 
 30. See USEEM & KIMBALL, supra note 29, at 10.  
 31. COLIN WOODARD, THE REPUBLIC OF PIRATES: BEING THE TRUE AND SURPRISING STORY 
OF THE CARIBBEAN PIRATES AND THE MAN WHO BROUGHT THEM DOWN 1–2 (2007); see also 
WOODES ROGERS, A CRUISING VOYAGE ROUND THE WORLD, at xvii (London, A. Bell & B. Lintot 
1712).   
 32. MAVIS C. CAMPBELL, THE MAROONS OF JAMAICA 1655–1796: A HISTORY OF RESISTANCE, 
COLLABORATION & BETRAYAL 1, 14–15 (1988). 
 33. Richard Price, Introduction to MAROON SOCIETIES: REBEL SLAVE COMMUNITIES IN THE 
AMERICAS 1, 16–22 (Richard Price ed., 3d ed. 1996). 
 34. BRIAN DYDE, OUT OF THE CROWDED VAGUENESS: A HISTORY OF THE ISLANDS OF ST 
KITTS, NEVIS, AND ANGUILLA 267–68 (2005). 
 35. See id. at 268–70.  
 36. KATHY MARKS, LOST PARADISE: FROM MUTINY ON THE BOUNTY TO A MODERN-DAY 
LEGACY OF SEXUAL MAYHEM, THE DARK SECRETS OF PITCAIRN ISLAND REVEALED 14–16 (2009). 
 37. ROBERT W. KIRK, PITCAIRN ISLAND, THE BOUNTY MUTINEERS AND THEIR DESCENDANTS 
27–28 (2008); MARKS, supra note 36, at 223. 
 38. HILDE EYNIKEL, MOLOKAI: THE STORY OF FATHER DAMIEN 57 (Lesley Gilbert trans., 
1999); JOHN TAYMAN, THE COLONY 1, 96–98 (2006). 
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community would simply become self-sufficient.39  The new colony had 
no effective law enforcement system.40 
C. Natural Experiments with Large Populations: Eskimos, Occupied 
Areas, Riots, Hurricanes, and Failed States 
The absent-law problem also can arise in a larger population, even 
in a long-standing group.  Until the arrival and settlement of Europeans 
at the beginning of the 1900s, the Netsilik people of far Northern Canada 
faced essentially the same weather and resource challenges as the air-
crash survivors in the Andes, but had been doing so for generations.  
They did not have the luxury of establishing a governmental legal system; 
the harsh conditions essentially required that every family spend all its 
resources trying to survive.41 
Even if a functioning legal system exists, it may be unavailable to 
some groups within the society.  In 1945 Berlin, the Soviet Army was an 
occupying force that had little interest in the local population other than 
to abuse them.42  If there were to be unwritten rules governing the deal-
ing of one resident with another, the residents would have to develop 
and enforce them without governmental help.43  An analogous situation 
existed within the Nazi concentration camps,44 and within the Japanese 
camps for prisoners of war.45  The prisoners had to sort out for them-
selves how to regulate behavior. 
Some absent-law situations arose in which an existing criminal jus-
tice system became temporarily unavailable, as during the five days of ri-
oting in Detroit in July 1967,46 or after Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans 
caused levee failures and created an absent-law city for more than a 
week.47  On a larger scale, no effective criminal justice system exists in 
 
 39. TAYMAN, supra note 38, at 2, 47.  
 40. EYNIKEL, supra note 38, at 58; TAYMAN, supra note 38, at 2.  
 41. ASEN BALIKCI, THE NETSILIK ESKIMO, at xv (1970); GONTRAN DE PONCINS IN 
COLLABORATION WITH LEWIS GALANTIÈRE, KABLOONA 145–46 (1941).   
 42. See, e.g., ANTONY BEEVOR, THE FALL OF BERLIN 1945, at 259, 300 (Penguin Books 2003); 
see also generally ANONYMOUS, A WOMAN IN BERLIN: EIGHT WEEKS IN THE CONQUERED CITY: A 
DIARY (Philip Boehm trans., 2005).  
 43. See ANONYMOUS, supra note 42, at 34–44; BEEVOR, supra note 42, at 259.  
 44. See ISRAEL CYMLICH & OSKAR STRAWCZYNSKI, ESCAPING HELL IN TREBLINKA 36, 151–54 
(2007). 
 45. See ROBERT W. LEVERING, HORROR TREK: A TRUE STORY OF BATAAN, THE DEATH 
MARCH AND THREE AND ONE-HALF YEARS IN JAPANESE PRISON CAMPS 79–98 (1948); ROY H. 
WHITECROSS, SLAVES OF THE SON OF HEAVEN: A PERSONAL ACCOUNT OF AN AUSTRALIAN POW, 
1942–1945, at 79–86, 222 (2000).  
 46. SIDNEY FINE, VIOLENCE IN THE MODEL CITY: THE CAVANAGH ADMINISTRATION, RACE 
RELATIONS, AND THE DETROIT RIOT OF 1967, at 164–68, 193–95 (2007); VAN GORDON SAUTER & 
BURLEIGH HINES, NIGHTMARE IN DETROIT: A REBELLION AND ITS VICTIMS 218–24 (1968).  
 47. DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, THE GREAT DELUGE: HURRICANE KATRINA, NEW ORLEANS, AND 
THE MISSISSIPPI GULF COAST 185–91, 625–37 (2007); Sherri Fink, The Deadly Choices at Memorial, 
N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Aug. 30, 2009, at 28 (“The laws of man had broken down, . . . and only the 
laws of God applied.”).  
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failed states, such as Somalia beginning in 1991,48 and in parts of Pakistan 
since the 1990s and before.49  Absent enforcement also can be seen dur-
ing U.S. Prohibition of the 1920s and early 1930s.50 
An absent-law situation also can occur when the government itself 
becomes seriously corrupted.  From 1980 until 1993, Pablo Escobar exer-
cised increasing power in Colombia.51  Through bribery and intimidation, 
he subverted much of the executive branch and the judiciary.52  Eventual-
ly, he even took effective control of the legislative branch, dictating what 
legislation would and would not pass.53 
A study of this wide variety of absent-law situations can tell us 
something about what humans do when left to their own devices with no 
existing criminal law system.  What are the dynamics at work in such ab-
sent-law situations?  The case studies might make one more sympathetic 
in some ways to the Hobbesian view of the inherent badness of man and 
the essential role of government and law, or they might suggest a tenden-
cy toward cooperative action without governmental law, as Ellickson 
seems to suggest.  Part II considers what lessons we can learn. 
II. LESSONS FROM ABSENT-LAW SITUATIONS 
The absent-law situations in Part I present a wide range of groups in 
a wide range of contexts who had to sort out for themselves what to do 
without governmental law or, at least, without the possibility of its en-
forcement.  Do the members nonetheless arrange some kind of social or-
der?  Social order, rather than the destructive chaos of Hobbes’s “state 
of nature,” seems possible only through social cooperation.  Yet how 
likely is social cooperation in these circumstances, especially given that in 
many of them a person’s very survival is at stake?  While humans may 
find it useful, even pleasant, to cooperate when times are good, won’t 
impossible circumstances bring out the worst in people?  Won’t the in-
stinct for survival trump social norms, like the respectable gentleman 
who instinctively pushes the elderly lady off the ship’s ladder as he tries 
to save himself from drowning? 
 
 48. See I.M. LEWIS, A MODERN HISTORY OF THE SOMALI: NATION AND STATE IN THE HORN OF 
AFRICA 262–66 (James Currey 4th ed. 2002) (1965); PETER D. LITTLE, SOMALIA: ECONOMY WITHOUT 
STATE 1, 161–74 (2003).   
 49. See MALIK KHUDA BAKHSH AWAN, ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGIES IN PAKISTAN 14, 154–
57 (2004); Zubair Nawaz Chattha & Sanja Kutnjak Ivković, Police Misconduct: The Pakistani Para-
digm, in THE CONTOURS OF POLICE INTEGRITY 175, 176–80 (Carl B. Klockars et al. eds., 2004). 
 50. EDWARD BEHR, PROHIBITION: THIRTEEN YEARS THAT CHANGED AMERICA 91–92, 105–19 
(1996); MICHAEL WOODIWISS, CRIME, CRUSADES AND CORRUPTION: PROHIBITIONS IN THE UNITED 
STATES, 1900–1987, at 11–18 (1988).  
 51. MARK BOWDEN, KILLING PABLO: THE HUNT FOR THE WORLD’S GREATEST OUTLAW 21–22, 
30 (2001); JAMES MOLLISON WITH RAINBOW NELSON, THE MEMORY OF PABLO ESCOBAR 31, 62 
(2007). 
 52. BOWDEN, supra note 51, at 30–35, 52–53; MOLLISON, supra note 51, at 90.  
 53. BOWDEN, supra note 51, at 30–35, 96–99; MOLLISON, supra note 51, at 62. 
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While people sometimes revert to survival of the fittest, the cases 
noted in Part I show a surprising tendency of groups toward social coop-
eration, even in the most difficult of circumstances, and even when it is 
not apparent to the individual member that his or her own best interest 
lies in social cooperation.  Section A below illustrates this dynamic.  This 
odd but resilient tendency toward cooperation—the “cooperation princi-
ple,” as it is it might be termed—can be subverted by any number of 
forces, as Section B shows.  The apparent persistence of cooperation de-
spite these subversions might lead one to believe that it represents some 
kind of instinctive human default.  The diversions from social coopera-
tion seem explainable, even predictable; more puzzling is the appearance 
of social cooperation out of nothing and sometimes against the immedi-
ate self-interest of the individual as perceived at the time. 
The absent-law case studies speak to criminal justice issues in par-
ticular.  The obvious greatest challenge to social cooperation is wrongdo-
ing by members against other members, wrongdoing that in a legal sys-
tem would be seen as a crime—most importantly unjustified aggression, 
taking of property without consent, and deceit or fraud in exchanges.  
Similar to the persistent tendency toward social cooperation, the cases 
suggest a “justice principle,” an inherent interest in doing justice, even 
when doing so has costs to the individual and the group.  It is a commit-
ment seen not only in victims but also in unrelated third parties who will 
gain no benefit from the punishment.  This is the subject of Section C.1 
below. 
Just as social cooperation seems necessary for group survival and 
success, the case studies reviewed in Section C.3 suggest that doing jus-
tice is necessary for stable social cooperation.  Violation of key group 
norms must be punished in a way that the group sees as just—not too 
harsh, not too lenient—if the members of the group are to continue their 
commitment to cooperation.  This seems logical enough.  If a member is 
advancing group interests through cooperation with others, perhaps even 
at the expense of his or her own interests, it would be disheartening to 
see others violate the group’s norms to advance personal interests, yet 
not be sanctioned.  A failure to punish tends to undermine the group’s 
claimed commitment to the norms.  On the other hand, excessive pun-
ishment, beyond what is seen as deserved, becomes unjustified violence, 
and thus a violation of the group’s basic norms.  This is the subject of 
Section C.2.  Like the cooperation principle, there are a variety of forces 
that can subvert the justice principle, as Section D illustrates. 
The persistence of the desire for justice, even in difficult circum-
stances, makes it seem as if it is, like social cooperation, also a human de-
fault.  It is perhaps no surprise that cooperation and justice are tied to-
gether in this way, for the latter may be a prerequisite for the former.  
Whatever forces made social cooperation the human default—genetic 
predisposition or some form of universal social learning—if doing justice 
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is necessary for stable social cooperation, then it may be no surprise to 
see that those same forces would press toward making justice a similar 
human default. 
A. The Cooperation Principle 
Perhaps the most obvious lesson from the absent-law cases is that 
government and law are not necessary for social cooperation and order.  
Forces of social influence can create group norms and dynamics that can 
be as or more effective than formal law in this respect. 
1. Cooperation Bringing Order Without Law 
Consider the experience of the wreck of the Grafton.  Four men 
watch helplessly as their ship is pushed closer to the rocky coast of a re-
mote island.54  A fifth member lies helplessly sick in bed below decks, as 
he has been for weeks.55  In any case, he and the others do not know how 
to swim.56  During the night, the ship wrecks on the rocks some distance 
from shore.57  How do the members of the group react to the situation?  
It is clear to the healthy swimmers that their chances of survival are bet-
ter if they abandon the sick man.  In fact, they work together to get all 
men to shore safely, build a shelter, and care for the sick man.58  The 
group had internal tensions, but they agreed upon a set of rules that all 
would be bound by, selected a leader, and worked together to save all.  Is 
this a unique story of exceptional men acting heroically toward one an-
other?  No, the pattern of social cooperation appears regularly in a wide 
variety of situations of a Hobbesian “state of nature.”59 
When their plane crashes in the Andes, do the young rugby team-
mates and their fans not break into Lord of the Flies?  With such limited 
food and shelter, it must have been clear to the uninjured that they were 
better off trying to keep themselves alive.  Yet, they do the opposite.  
They organize themselves to free those trapped in the wreckage, tend to 
the injured, build a shelter, and organize themselves into different jobs to 
advance the interests of all in the group.60  After two and a half months, 
two members succeed in an astonishing trek out of the mountains to get 
help, and all who survived the crash are saved.61 
 
 54. DRUETT, supra note 13, at 10, 27–28. 
 55. Id. at 15, 23; RAYNAL, supra note 15, at 54, 57.  
 56. See RAYNAL, supra note 15, at 70–75.  
 57. DRUETT, supra note 13, at 28–29. 
 58. Id. at 29–49; RAYNAL, supra note 15, at 73.  They eventually built a seaworthy craft in which 
they could sail to safety.  Id. at 272–85. 
 59. See HOBBES, supra note 1, at 66.  
 60. See READ, supra note 9, at 45–60.  
 61. Id. at 298–301. 
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In the 1866 exile of lepers to Molokai Island, sixteen people are put 
ashore in the first wave.62  The group members are given a blanket and 
farm implements, and told to fend for themselves.63  There is little food, 
and firewood and water are miles away.64  Some are in quite advanced 
stages of the disease.65  It would make perfect sense for the strong to do 
what they needed to help themselves at the expense of the weak.  But 
when a government official arrives weeks later he finds that some people 
had taken charge of nursing the bedridden, others are scavenging and 
preparing food, and others are hauling firewood and water.66 
In the mining camps of California, the territory was not governed by 
any law, and each camp was a transitory group.67  A camp would disap-
pear overnight if the gold ran out.68  Yet in each camp, the miners formed 
a set of social norms, with an enforcement mechanism so powerful that a 
miner could leave all his worldly goods unattended for the entire day 
while he mined.69 
During the four days of riots in Detroit in 1967, neighborhood social 
groups that had previously put on teas and block parties reorganized into 
armed neighborhood-watch groups to discourage looting.70  They also 
provided protection to firefighters, who had been under attack.71  This is 
how one apartment building reacted to the chaos: 
The men in the building, would occasionally walk the halls to check 
on fellow neighbors.  By evening, the crowds had come closer to 
their location. . . . The men held a small meeting and discussed go-
ing on their roof with blankets and water buckets, to protect their 
building from sparks flying through the sky.  They took a vote and a 
majority agreed to go up.72 
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the Convention Center was 
used as a shelter by thousands of people who were herded there by the 
authorities.73  Street gangs turned civic-minded and provided security 
when city authorities did not (albeit after agreeing on each gang’s 
“turf”).74  As one eyewitness recalls: 
They were securing the area. . . . These guys were criminal.  They 
were.  But somehow these guys got together, figured out who had 
guns and decided they were going to make sure that no women 
 
 62. TAYMAN, supra note 38, at 37–38, 41–42.  
 63. Id. at 38.  
 64. Id. at 40. 
 65. Id. at 40–41. 
 66. Id. at 41. 
 67. SHINN, supra note 21, at 119.  
 68. WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 78. 
 69. SHINN, supra note 21, at 119. 
 70. SAUTER & HINES, supra note 46, at 191. 
 71. Id. at 21, 191. 
 72. 1967 Detroit Riot Victims, REOCITIES, http://www.reocities.com/michdetroit/riot1967.html 
(last visited Feb. 17, 2013). 
 73. BRINKLEY, supra note 47, at 473. 
 74. Id. at 476–77.  
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were getting raped . . . and that nobody was hurting babies [and 
children]. . . . They were the ones getting clothes for people who 
had walked through that water.  They were the ones fanning old 
people . . . .75 
When the British decolonized the small island of Anguilla in 1967 
over residents’ objections and residents rejected consolidation with other 
islands in the area, they were left overnight to govern their island 
through non-governmental institutions, such as churches, elders, and 
teachers.76  Being seen as a good neighbor was important enough to peo-
ple to provide the social order that the law did not.77 
When the SS was hunting down all those left in the Warsaw Ghetto 
to send them to camps, those who remained took refuge in cellars, attics, 
and behind false walls: 
The bunker grew increasingly crowded and stuffy.  Anyone who 
went to the water tap or toilet collided with others or stumbled over 
their neighbors in the darkness.  There was no end to the disputes 
and squabbling, fights over nothing, insults, name-calling.  Exhaust-
ed by the want of fresh air and the most elementary facilities, tor-
tured by incessant fear and uncertainty, people began losing their 
self-control.  The bunker became a real hell. . . . 
 Yet, in the midst of this suffering, there grew up a solidarity, a 
mutual understanding and sympathy.  It was no longer necessary to 
shout for quiet, lest the SS track us down, nor ask too long for 
neighborly help.  People helped one another, even shared the last 
drops of medicine, without caring whether someone was a relative 
or a stranger, a friend or unknown, poor or rich.  The differences 
between us disappeared.  In the end, our mutual and tragic fate had 
united us into one great family.78 
2. Social Cooperation As Part of Human Nature 
What explains the appearance of social cooperation even in these 
desperate circumstances?  As outside observers with perfect hindsight, 
we often can see that cooperation may be better for the group as a whole 
 
 75. Id.  
 76. Interview by Sarah Robinson with Colville Petty, (June 18, 2010) (notes on file with author). 
 77. Id.  The same tendency toward cooperation is seen in previously lawless societies where an 
opportunity for order is quickly embraced.  In the Gujranwala Range region of Pakistan, crime rates 
were high and the police corrupt and inept.  People avoided interaction with the police at all costs.  In 
1991, a new police inspector introduced reforms, which brought police arrests of criminals and the re-
turn of stolen property, instead of the usual bribes and complicity.  Although the people of the region 
had lived for generations under a corrupt police force, in took only a few months for them to begin 
helping police.  With a level of trust and cooperation, crime rates fell rapidly.  AZHAR HASSAN 
NADEEM, PAKISTAN: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LAWLESSNESS 215 (2002). 
 78. HALINA BIRENBAUM, HOPE IS THE LAST TO DIE: A COMING OF AGE UNDER NAZI TERROR 
60, 63 (M.E. Sharpe 1996) (1971). 
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and therefore for its members,79 but how realistic is it that the individual 
persons in these difficult circumstances can see that wisdom and be will-
ing to act on it, especially when doing so may carry immediate personal 
costs?  Cooperation is at best a risk—an immediate sacrifice for a poten-
tial longer-term payoff.  It is more likely that no such calculation is even 
made by the people in these desperate circumstances.  Few are probably 
reasoning at all, but rather just responding instinctively to their immedi-
ate predicament, be it hiding in a Warsaw Ghetto bunker or recovering 
from the shock of their recent wreck or crash.  Yet, despite the shock and 
fear, their instincts commonly lead them to cooperation. 
The tendency toward social cooperation and order sometimes ap-
pears in extreme forms and in unusual situations.  At the conclusion of 
World War II, the ordinary citizens of Berlin had been forbidden to 
leave the city in advance of the Russian Army.80  Trapped beneath the 
shelling were thousands of hungry and cold civilians who knew that their 
leaders had left the city or killed themselves.81  Yet, despite the desperate 
and chaotic circumstances, order was maintained.  With Russian bombs 
falling around them, residents did not scramble for rations, but rather 
stood in orderly lines waiting their turn.82  When a Russian bomb hit one 
line, the line simply moved up to fill in the space left by those killed.83  A 
woman who stood in the line talked about her life living in a basement: 
We’re no longer being governed.  And still, everywhere you look, in 
every basement, some kind of order always emerges.  When my 
house was hit I saw how even people who’d been injured or trauma-
tized or buried in the rubble walked away in an orderly manner.  
The forces of order prevail in this basement as well, a spirit that 
regulates, organizes, commands.  It has to be in our nature.  People 
must have functioned that way as far back as the Stone Age.  Herd 
instinct, a mechanism for preservation of the species.84 
During World War II, Japan transported prisoners from the camps 
in the Philippines to mainland Japan to use as slave labor.85  Men were 
packed into the holds of cargo ships by the thousands, with little food, 
water, medical care, or even toilet facilities.86  The transport ships have 
come to be referred to as the Hell Ships.87  Aboard one such ship, the 
 
 79. See generally discussion infra Part II.B.1 (documenting the importance of cooperation for 
group survival); see also Morris B. Hoffman, The Neuroeconomic Path of the Law, 359 PHIL. 
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1667, 1670 (2004) (explaining long-term advantages 
of cooperation). 
 80. Antony Beevor, Introduction to ANONYMOUS, supra note 42, at xiv–xv.  
 81. Id. at xiii–xiv.  
 82. ANONYMOUS, supra note 42, at 34. 
 83. BEEVOR, supra note 42, at 310. 
 84. ANONYMOUS, supra note 42, at 13.  
 85. MANNY LAWTON, SOME SURVIVED 135 (1984).  
 86. See id. at 102, 155–57; see also RICHARD M. GORDON, HORYO: MEMOIRS OF AN AMERICAN 
POW 134–36 (1999).  
 87. LAWTON, supra note 85, at 149, 182, 198.  
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Oryokko Maru, there were 1619 men baking in the hold.88  Insufficient 
air was spreading panic and chaos.89  A commander climbed half way up 
the ladder and addressed the men.  “If each man remains calm and still it 
will be better for all.  The more you move, the more energy you burn.”90  
He tells the men how to act for the common good and they do as he di-
rects: “Now hear this, . . . [t]he men in the far corners are suffocating.  
Take off your shirts and fan the air toward them.”91 
On a different ship, the same pattern is repeated: first panic then 
order.  
As a guy goes crazy he starts to scream—not like a woman, 
more like the howl of a dog. . . . We’re in there solid, wall to wall.  
Tight, so you couldn’t put your feet between people when you tried 
to walk. . . . We were all practically naked by that time, because we 
had taken off everything in order to cut down on the heat.  It must 
have been 120 or 125 degrees in that hold. . . . People running, peo-
ple screaming.92  
The prisoners were warned that the screaming was bothering their cap-
tors and that if it continued the hatches would be closed.93  To prevent 
the closure of the hatch, screamers were killed.94  “If they howled, they 
died.”95  The hatches were not closed.  “Many that went mad with the 
heat were knocked out, too, and some of them killed by their neighbors.  
The screaming, knifing, blood sucking, with feces and urine everywhere, 
the sick being trampled beyond recognition.”96  But even here social co-
operation eventually set in. 
The wooden hatch at the base of the ladder is filling up with men 
that a week ago looked as though they would stand the ordeal.  
Laff . . . a huge corpsman, is doing a fine job helping out at this 
temporarily set-up sick bay.  There are many more doing a fine job 
with what they have to work with.  Numerous men are dirtying their 
clothing but there isn’t anything they can do about it.97 
After the first two days, no one is killed.  Instead, new ways are found to 
deal with those who go crazy, including tying them up.98 
As Terrence Des Pres explains it in his classic book about the Holo-
caust, The Survivor: 
 
 88. Id. at 156. 
 89. Id. at 155–57. 
 90. Id. at 157.  
 91. Id. at 158. 
 92. DONALD KNOX, DEATH MARCH: THE SURVIVORS OF BATAAN 339 (1981). 
 93. Id.  
 94. Id. at 340. 
 95. Id.  
 96. George L. Curtis, 47 Days on the Hell Ship, JAPANESE WWII POW CAMP FUKUOKA 
#17OMUTA, http://www.lindavdahl.com/Bio%20Pages/George%20L%20Curtis%20Hellship%20 
Account.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2013) (quoting the December 15, 1944 entry). 
 97. Id. (quoting the January 15, 1945 entry). 
 98. See KNOX, supra note 92, at 342.  
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Nature itself—by which I mean the system of living creatures—
guards against dissolution and chaos; not through control by gov-
ernment, nor even by rational adherence to “laws of nature,” but 
through the emergence, during times of prolonged crisis, of struc-
tures of behavior whose purpose is to maintain the social basis of 
life.  Order emerges.  That, as biologists like to observe, is the first 
and most striking fact about life, since entropy or the tendency to 
dissolution characterizes all inorganic kinds of organization.  For 
survivors this is crucial.  Uprooted and flung into chaos, they do 
what they must to stay alive, and in that doing achieve enough soci-
ety to meet the crisis humanly, together.  After the period of initial 
collapse comes reintegration, a process which usually occurs gradu-
ally, in accord with the fact that all things human take time.  In 
some cases, however, it can happen remarkably fast . . . .99 
He describes the dynamics of ninety-six people jammed into a rail-
way boxcar during the mass deportations, partially quoting one of the 
people present. 
The “veneer” of cultivated behavior, which served well 
enough in normal times, was not equal to such stress.  Fear and 
panic were the initial response, and for a time all was chaos.  But 
then, as necessity bore down and hysteria gave way to realism, a 
more elementary kind of order, or at least a readiness, began to 
function.  A condition came into being which allowed the “cooler 
heads” to be heard.  Amid this mess they held an election, they 
came to agree on basic responsibilities, and settled down to face 
their common plight.  This achievement may have been but a “sem-
blance” of past order, but it was sufficient to keep the ninety-six 
people in that boxcar sane and alive and above the threshold of 
brutality. 
. . . . 
Civility disintegrates and disorder prevails.  Then slowly, in 
sorrow and a realism never before faced up to, the mass of flailing 
people grow quiet and neighborly, and in the end rest almost peace-
ful in primitive communion.  In this and other instances, 
 
 99. TERRENCE DES PRES, THE SURVIVOR: AN ANATOMY OF LIFE IN THE DEATH CAMPS 144 
(1976).  Des Pres quotes this account of an ordeal during mass deportation: 
Ninety-six persons had been thrust into our car, including many children who were squeezed in 
among the luggage. . . . As the first hour and then the second passed, we perceived that the sim-
plest details of existence would be extremely complicated.  Sanitary disposal was out of the ques-
tion. . . . As the journey stretched endlessly, the car jerking and jolting, all the forces of nature 
conspired against us ninety-six.  A torrid sun heated the walls until the air became suffocating. . . . 
The travelers were mostly persons of culture and position from our community. . . . But as the 
hours slipped away the veneers cracked.  Soon there were incidents and, later, serious quar-
rels. . . . The children cried; the sick groaned; the old people lamented. . . . As night fell we lost all 
concept of human behavior and the wrangling increased until the car was a bedlam. . . . Finally, 
the cooler heads prevailed and a semblance of order was restored.  A doctor and I were chosen 
captains-in-charge. 
Id. at 144–45 (omissions in original) (citation omitted). 
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the simple, shapeless agglomeration of human beings assembled 
by chance reveals a hidden structure of available wills, an aston-
ishing plasticity which takes shape according to certain lines of 
force, reveals plans and projects which are perhaps unfeasible 
but which lend a meaning, a coherence to even the most absurd, 
the most desperate of human acts. 
Order emerges, people turn to one another in “neighborly 
help.”  This pattern was everywhere apparent in the world of the 
camps.100 
These anecdotal observations are consistent with a large volume of 
empirical evidence that rejects the notion that humans are exclusively 
self-regarding and aspire only to maximize their own payoff.101  Experi-
mental studies show that most individuals are “strong reciprocators,” 
who are predisposed to cooperate with others, as long as others cooper-
ate.102  The human tendency toward cooperation is a complex and puz-
zling issue that evolutionary and social scientists have sought to explain 
for the past forty years.103  Studies show that humans take cooperative ac-
tions that are costly to them, even when there is no prospect of them be-
ing directly or indirectly repaid for the costs they endure.104  For example, 
humans will invest in cooperative acts that benefit the group at their own 
expense, even when interacting with complete strangers and even when 
there is no possibility they will have an opportunity to interact with the 
same group again.105  That is, they cooperate even if they have no possi-
bility of being repaid and have no expectation of gaining any indirect 
personal benefit such as improving their social status or reputation.106 
 
 100. Id. at 145–46 (citations omitted). 
 101. E.g., COLIN F. CAMERER, BEHAVIORAL GAME THEORY: EXPERIMENTS IN STRATEGIC 
INTERACTION (2003) (presenting behavioral game theory experiments that show results inconsistent 
with the notion that humans are selfish beings); Ernst Fehr & Herbert Gintis, Human Motivation and 
Social Cooperation: Experimental and Analytical Foundation, 33 ANN. REV. SOC. 43, 45 (2007) [here-
inafter Fehr & Gintis, Human Motivation] (noting that “a large body of experimental evidence [exists] 
that refutes an important assumption of mainstream economics, namely, that all or most people are 
exclusively self-regarding” and are only motivated by desire to maximize their own payoff); Herbert 
Gintis et al., Explaining Altruistic Behavior in Humans, 24 EVOLUTION HUM. BEHAV. 153 (2003) (pre-
senting empirical experiments that reject the notion that humans are purely selfish and motivated only 
by self-interest). 
 102. See infra text accompanying notes 255–63. 
 103. See Terence C. Burnham & Dominic D. P. Johnson, The Biological and Evolutionary Logic 
of Human Cooperation, 27 ANALYSE & KRITIK 113, 113–14 (2005). 
 104. Id. at 125.  
 105. Id. at 122–23.  
 106.  Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, Origins of Human Cooperation, in GENETIC AND 
CULTURAL EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 429, 429–33 (Peter Hammerstein ed., 2003); Burnham & 
Johnson, supra note 103, at 116; Fehr & Gintis, Human Motivation, supra note 101, at 45–46; Gintis et 
al., supra note 101, at 154; Herbert Gintis, Strong Reciprocity and Human Sociality, 206 J. 
THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 169, 169–70 (2000) [hereinafter Gintis, Strong Reciprocity]; Joseph Henrich 
et al., In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies, AM. ECON. 
REV., May 2001, at 73, 73 (2001); Stuart A. West et al., Sixteen Common Misconceptions About the 
Evolution of Cooperation in Humans, 32 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 231, 242 (2011). 
Although scholars generally agree that humans possess a predisposition to cooperate, there is 
currently no consensus as to the source of this form of behavior, and many theories are presented.  See 
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One might try to salvage governmental law as the wellspring of so-
cial order by arguing that the patterns of social cooperation and com-
mitment to justice that we see in the absent-law situations is a product of 
government law even though the members of the group see themselves, 
at the time, as being beyond the reach of that law.  While they no longer 
fear prosecution under it, they nonetheless carry with them into the ab-
sent-law situation internalized norms created by their earlier exposure to 
that governmental law. 
But the absent-law cases do not support this explanation.  First, 
some of the absent-law groups, such as the Netsilik people, had no prior 
governmental law that could be learned and internalized, yet they show 
the same patterns of cooperation and justice.107  Second, some of the ab-
sent-law groups adopted norms dramatically different from those that 
prior governmental law provided.  The legal rules taught to sailors on 
British ships were dramatically different from those that the pirates cre-
ated for themselves.108  The pirate rules were more like those of other ab-
sent-law groups and were in stark contrast to those of prior law.  Third, 
there is reason to doubt that some of the absent-law groups had internal-
ized the prior governmental rules.  Certainly this is an open question 
with regard to the Attica prisoners, for example.  But the most compel-
ling reason to reject the argument that the groups were simply carrying 
forward norms previously instantiated by governmental law is seen in the 
enormous diversity of the situations from which the groups are drawn.  
They are from many different centuries across many parts of the world 
and drawn from demographics of every sort.  Their prior formal law situ-
 
Burnham & Johnson, supra note 103, at 113–14; Henrich et al., supra, at 73; West et al., supra, at 231.  
One line of studies, comparing human behavior with that of apes, reveal that while a primate’s cogni-
tive development is driven primarily by social competition, a human’s is driven by cooperative social 
interaction.  Scholars conclude that regular participation in cooperative interactions during childhood 
leads humans to develop uniquely powerful traits and that these become entrenched because of their 
evolutionary advantage.  L.S. VYGOTSKY, MIND IN SOCIETY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF HIGHER 
PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES (Michael Cole et al. eds., 1978); Henrike Moll & Michael Tomasello, 
Cooperation and Human Cognition: The Vygotskian Intelligence Hypothesis, 362 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS 
ROYAL SOC’Y BIOLOGICAL SCI. 639, 639 (2007).  Another theory asserts that groups consisting of co-
operative individuals are more successful than groups that refrain from cooperation.  Groups with co-
operative attributes survived, while others did not.  This theory is supported by empirical studies 
showing that humans are inclined to engage in costly cooperative acts that contribute to the success of 
the group, even if not to the individual directly.  This is especially evident in situations of inter-group 
conflict.  These results led some scholars to conclude that it was the process of “group selection” (an 
evolutionary process through which traits that contribute to the success of the group and promote the 
chances of the group to survive, prevail through evolution), rather than individual evolutionary ad-
vantage, that contributed to the development of cooperative behavior in humans.  See Robert Boyd et 
al., The Evolution of Altruistic Punishment, 100 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 3531, 3531 (2003); Ernst Fehr 
& Urs Fischbacher, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 25 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 63, 
64–65 (2004); Gintis et al., supra note 101, at 165; Peter J. Richerson et al., Cultural Evolution of Hu-
man Cooperation, in GENETIC AND CULTURAL EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION, supra, at 357, 357.  
 107. GEERT VAN DEN STEENHOVEN, LEGAL CONCEPTS AMONG THE NETSILIK ESKIMOS OF 
PELLY BAY ch. 111, leadership item 2 (1959). 
 108. PETER T. LEESON, THE INVISIBLE HOOK: THE HIDDEN ECONOMICS OF PIRATES 7–19 
(2009). 
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ations could not be more different, yet we see common patterns of social 
cooperation and commitment to doing justice.  If it was governmental 
law’s prior normative influence at work, we would expect to see that 
same diversity in how the groups conduct themselves.109 
3. The First Natural Experiment of Humans in an Absent-Law 
Situation: The Serengeti Plain 
 One might challenge the notion of cooperation as a basic human 
trait on the ground that the absent-law situations examined here are all 
modern.  They involve not the basic stripped-down generic human, but 
rather a human socialized over centuries to act in a certain way.  Cooper-
ation is not basic to human nature but just the present state of humans, 
which can change as the human condition changes.  But consider the very 
first absent-law situation of prehistory: that of early human groups on the 
Serengeti Plain.110  They had nothing but themselves, not even a history 
of creating group norms, let alone social institutions.  How did they get 
along with one another?  Was it survival of the fittest, or some form of 
social cooperation?  The latter.  Indeed, many argue that it was just this 
capacity for social cooperation that led to the success of humans.111  And 
some would see the tendency toward cooperation as part of what it 
means to be human, as defining us as a species.112 
 
 109. Another complication for this kind of argument—that the groups’ conduct is simply an ex-
pression of norms previously instantiated by governmental law—is what we know about the limits of 
laypersons’ knowledge of governmental law.  It is more likely that intuitions of justice shared by hu-
mans across cultures, rather than governmental law, are accountable for the shared norm of justice, for 
example.  Indeed, in the context of doing criminal law, people appear to “assume that the law is as 
they think it should be.”  PAUL H. ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW: WHO 
SHOULD BE PUNISHED HOW MUCH 74 (2008) [hereinafter ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES].  A 
related complication is found in the fact that we know governmental law has a limited ability on its 
own to create internalized norms.  The U.S. Prohibition experience is an obvious illustration.  Gov-
ernmental law may play a role in the larger public conversation by which community norms are 
shaped, but government has a limited ability to create norms simply by legal enactment.  Paul H. Rob-
inson, Criminalization Tensions: Empirical Desert, Changing Norms, and Rape Reform, in THE 
STRUCTURES OF CRIMINAL LAW 186, 201 (R.A. Duff et al. eds., 2011).  
 110. ANN GIBBONS, THE FIRST HUMAN: THE RACE TO DISCOVER OUR EARLIEST ANCESTORS 89 
(2007); see also Leonard Jeffries, Africa: Birthplace of Humanity, NAT’L BLACK UNITED FRONT, 
http://www.nbufront.org/MastersMuseums/LenJeffries/BirthplaceOfHumanity.html (last visited Feb. 
17, 2013). 
 111. Fehr & Gintis, Human Motivation, supra note 101, at 46 (asserting that the establishment of 
modern order-producing institutions such as the state and codified law are the result of foregoing so-
cial cooperation); Moll & Tomasello, supra note 106, at 639 (explaining that cognitive skills that en-
abled humans to create complex technologies, cultural institutions, and systems of symbols are driven 
by, or even constituted by, their capacity for social cooperation).   
 112. On cooperation’s relationship to social institutions: 
Hobbes concluded that social order is the product of powerful social institutions, including prop-
erty rights, codified law, and a strong state.  Hobbes’s approach has been strongly espoused in 
modern times by neoclassical economic theory, which has applied general equilibrium and re-
peated game theory to show that these institutions permit large-scale cooperation among unrelat-
ed self-interested individuals.  However, in an evolutionary time frame, these order-producing in-
stitutions came into place only very recently.  Humans had to solve the problem of social order 
long before they invented and implemented these institutions.  In fact, the very existence of these 
order-producing institutions is itself a result of foregoing social cooperation.  We therefore must 
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Clearly, early human groups faced serious hurdles to social coopera-
tion.  At minimum, social cohesion requires some check on such basic 
conduct as physical aggression and taking of possessions without consent.  
In order to achieve its goals such as hunting or agriculture, a group re-
quires both cohesion and cooperation, and a member who is regularly 
victimized is unlikely to be an enthusiastic contributor.  Some basic pro-
tections must be assured if a high level of cooperation is to be achieved 
to give the comparatively small and weak humans an edge against preda-
tors and hardship.  Further, some shared understanding among the 
members must exist as to the basic rules of conduct that must be adhered 
to at minimum.  A group might come to agreement on minimum rules of 
conduct, yet the real challenge comes when the group must deal with a 
violation of those rules—it seems inevitable that at some point there will 
be physical conflict or unconsented-to takings.  If social pressures are in-
sufficient to gain compliance with the group’s rules, the most readily 
available means of punishing physical violence or an unconsented-to tak-
ing is, well, physical violence or an unconsented-to taking.113 
Thus, an effective enforcement practice requires a shared under-
standing of the difference between violence or taking as a violation ver-
sus violence or taking as justly deserved punishment.  That is, the group 
must have some shared understanding of the prohibitions as well as the 
circumstances under which the prohibitions can be set aside to punish vi-
olations.  Even that is not enough.  Cooperation is not likely to be main-
tained if trivial violations are punished brutally.114  There must be some 
shared understanding of how serious a violation is and when punishment 
reaches the point of being more than deserved, thereby crossing the line 
into prohibited violence.115 
Although it is prehistory, we can guess that early human groups did 
develop shared understandings of wrongs and their just punishment that 
could produce social cooperation, because the groups survived, indeed 
flourished.  We see cooperation not only in today’s human beings but in 
early humans as well.  Indeed, modern primatologists have amassed 
enough evidence to conclude that it exists not only in our current spe-
cies—“modern humans” in an evolutionary sense—but also existed in a 
more rudimentary form in our ancestors: 
Modern human beings are cooperative; and they would certainly 
never have become so had the biological underpinnings not already 
been present—not just in the hominid ancestor, but in a succession 
 
search for more basic mechanisms that could already generate social order in much simpler socie-
ties.   
Fehr & Gintis, Human Motivation, supra note 101, at 46.  
 113. Killing or expelling the violator is possible, but given that it would weaken the group’s over-
all strength, it may well be seen as a sanction of last resort.  
 114. Paul H. Robinson et al., The Origins of Shared Intuitions of Justice, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1633, 
1652 (2007). 
 115. Id. at 1636.  
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of precursor species among which, on average, behaviors we can at 
some level call cooperative had become more complex over time.116 
B. Subverting Social Cooperation 
While cooperation may have surprising persistence in even difficult 
circumstances, it is also true that a variety of forces can frustrate the cre-
ation of social cooperation.  That can lead to tragic results because social 
cooperation commonly is necessary for group success and sometimes, es-
pecially in the difficult circumstances common in absent-law situations, it 
is necessary for group survival. 
1. The Cost of Subversion 
When a group does not follow a path of social cooperation, the re-
sults commonly are tragic.  The failures of cooperation are instructive 
because they show the power of cooperation.117   
Compare the experience of the Grafton, described above, to that of 
the Invercauld.  When the Grafton wrecked, the five men aboard worked 
together from the first moment of danger, protecting the group’s weakest 
member, dividing jobs according to individual skill sets, and openly dis-
cussing the group’s plans.118  Two years later, all five men were healthy 
when rescued and returned to New Zealand.119  Recall that soon after the 
Grafton wrecked, the Invercauld wrecked on another part of the same 
island.120  This group showed little cooperation.  The officers held nomi-
nal authority but did not use it to effectively engage the group.  The 
weak were abandoned to die where they lay.121  Before a week passed, 
some starving members were plotting to eat others.122  No effort was 
made to build shelter.123  Of the twenty-five men who made it to shore 
alive, only three survived to be rescued.124  Those three had formed them-
selves into a cooperative group.125 
The same dynamic is seen in the two groups that formed after the 
wreck of the Batavia.  Jeronimus Cornelisz took control of the main 
group and sent smaller groups off to other islands supposedly to look for 
sustenance but in reality to remove competition for the ship’s stores, 
which he held.126  With a more manageable-sized group, Cornelisz ap-
 
 116. Ian Tattersall, Cooperation, Altruism, and Human Evolution: Introduction Part I, in ORIGINS 
OF ALTRUISM AND COOPERATION 11, 17 (Robert W. Sussman & C. Robert Cloninger eds., 2011).   
 117. The reasons for failures of cooperation are the subject of the next Section. 
 118. DRUETT, supra note 13, at 28–30, 73.  
 119. See id. at 209–29. 
 120. Id. at 105–06.  
 121. See id. at 280. 
 122. Id. at 116–17. 
 123. See id. at 111. 
 124. ALLEN, supra note 13, at 222. 
 125. See DRUETT, supra note 13, at 248. 
 126. DASH, supra note 18, at 119–21.  
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pointed lieutenants to help him consolidate his control by force.127  In 
contrast, one of the groups that Cornelisz sent to another island without 
stores adopted a more democratic and inclusive structure designed to ad-
vance group interests.128  It was led by a common soldier by the name of 
Wiebbe Hayes.129  All members shared the work and the food.130  Their 
island attracted people who had been sent to other islands, as well as de-
serters from Cornelisz’s group.131  All deserters were welcomed (except 
those who murdered at Cornelisz’s behest) and as Cornelisz’s island ran 
short of resources and people to coerce to produce more, Cornelisz at-
tempted, unsuccessfully, to take over by force the island of the more 
democratic group.132  A rescue party arrived soon thereafter.  Of the 130 
people who survived the wreck but did not live to be rescued, 120 were 
killed by Cornelisz or his henchmen.133 
Consider a similar dynamic in the Jamestown colony, which cycled 
several times in and out of cooperative periods.  The English gentlemen 
within the group claimed the privilege of not working, yet claimed a 
share of the food produced by others.134  Those doing the work saw little 
reason to support the gentlemen, so there was little incentive to plant 
crops, build shelter, or dig a well.135  People soon began dying.136  John 
Smith, the only non-gentleman who had been designated one of the sev-
en leaders by those who chartered the expedition, finally took charge of 
the colony and, among other things, required all to work, or not be fed.137  
During this cooperative period, crops were planted, houses were built, 
and a well was dug.138  When Smith left the colony to work out trade ar-
rangements with native tribes and to search for a water route to the Pa-
cific as directed by the colony’s charter, however, power reverted to the 
gentlemen leaders and the old ways, with members again pursuing their 
own self-interests.139  People again began dying.140  When Smith returned, 
he again required that everyone work and broke the colony up into 
smaller, more self-sustaining groups located away from the main colony, 
where more resources existed.141  He also forbade private, individual 
trading with the local natives, requiring that the trading be done as a 
 
 127. Id. at 122–23. 
 128. Id. at 177–79. 
 129. Id. at 121. 
 130. See id. at 176–79. 
 131. Id. at 145, 177.  
 132. Id. at 179–86.  
 133. Id. at 108, 111, 114, 190, 196, 210. 
 134. Karen Ordahl Kupperman, Apathy and Death in Early Jamestown, 66 J. AM. HIST. 24, 26 
(1979); see also HORN, supra note 28, at 57–58.  
 135. Kupperman, supra note 134, at 26. 
 136. Id.  
 137. PRICE, supra note 28, at 108. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 122–29.  
 140. Id. at 32, 129. 
 141. Id. at 109, 117. 
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group.142  Again, the dying stopped.143  When Smith later returned to Eng-
land, people again reverted to their old ways.144  The following winter has 
become known as the “starving time.”145  Of the 500 people Smith left in 
Jamestown, only sixty made it to the following spring.146 
On the other side of the world three centuries later, the same dy-
namic is seen in the Japanese prison camps in the Philippines.  One 
camp, Cabanatuan #1 was famous for its death rate.147  Hundreds of men 
died every month of disease, starvation, and abuse.148  The division be-
tween the officers and the men was wide.  Officers did not do manual la-
bor, yet ate more than the enlisted men, all of whom did manual labor.149  
When a Marine colonel named Curtis Beecher was transferred to Caba-
natuan #1, he insisted that everyone work, and undertook a number of 
public works projects and programs—from creating a sanitation system 
and a bathing regime to putting a bounty on flies—and held officers ac-
countable for their men.150  Within two months of Beecher’s arrival, the 
dying in Cabanatuan #1 had completely stopped, replaced by baseball 
games, variety shows, and a lecture series.151 
2. Forces that Can Subvert Cooperation 
The case studies show that, while cooperation may have surprising 
persistence in even difficult circumstances, it is also true that a variety of 
forces can frustrate the creation of social cooperation and the social or-
der and success it brings. 
For example, people’s natural deference to authority is usually a 
force supporting social cooperation.  Many of the absent-law stories 
would not have had a happy ending if people had not deferred to the au-
thority of leaders, as with Colonel Beecher in Japanese camp Cabanatu-
an #1 or with the captain and Raynal after the Grafton wreck.152  We see 
the same effect with the island leaders in Anguilla, the elected prisoner 
council in Attica, and leader Cudjoe in the Maroons.153  Sometimes, when 
the original leaders do poorly, the group turns to a different leader and 
defers to that person, as with John Smith at Jamestown, Wiebbe Hayes 
 
 142. See HORN, supra note 28, at 150.  
 143. See Kupperman, supra note 134, at 38.  
 144. PRICE, supra note 28, at 129.  
 145. Id. at 127. 
 146. Kupperman, supra note 134, at 24.  
 147. See KNOX, supra note 92, at 198–99.  
 148. See id.  
 149. See MICHAEL NORMAN & ELIZABETH M. NORMAN, TEARS IN THE DARKNESS: THE STORY 
OF THE BATAAN DEATH MARCH AND ITS AFTERMATH 294 (2009).  
 150. Id.  
 151. KNOX, supra note 92, at 244–47; NORMAN & NORMAN, supra note 149, at 294; TIM WOLTER, 
POW BASEBALL IN WORLD WAR II: THE NATIONAL PASTIME BEHIND BARBED WIRE (2002). 
 152. See supra text accompanying notes 13, 45.  
 153. See supra text accompanying notes 30, 33, 36.  
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after the Batavia wreck, and Father Damien on Molokai.154  In each in-
stance, the willingness, even eagerness, to defer to leadership promotes 
social organization and cooperation. 
However, that same tendency to defer can bring disastrous conse-
quences if the leader getting such deference acts in ways against the 
group’s interest.155  The tendency of Jews in Warsaw to defer to the legal 
but depraved German authority obviously hurt rather than helped them, 
but may illustrate the force of the human inclination to defer to authori-
ty.156  In Jamestown, we see deference to the officers appointed by the 
charter company, even though those gentlemen were ineffective and self-
interested157—so too with the indifferent superintendent of the Leper 
Colony on Molokai158 and the original prisoner officers at the Japanese 
camp Cabanatuan #1.159  Until a more effective and group-interested 
leader appears and takes charge, the group simply defers, and dies.  Of 
course, a more benevolent leader might never appear, as in the Inver-
cauld, where deference and dying simply continued.160 
In some instances, the malevolent leader takes control by force, as 
with Cornelisz in the Batavia, Comstock in the Globe, and Pablo Escobar 
in Colombia, and it often will be difficult to overcome such malevolent 
leaders once they are in power.161  It took the rise of the more democratic 
Hayes’s group in the Batavia, the murder of Comstock in the Globe, and 
the terrorism of Los Pepes in Colombia to break the malevolent rule.162 
Some factors may tend to insulate a group from the forces that 
would otherwise subvert social cooperation.  A prior close relationship 
among the group before encountering the absent-law situation is likely to 
 
 154. See supra text accompanying notes 18–20, 28, 38–40. 
 155. A related example of negative consequences from following others’ lead may be found in 
high-visibility looting, such as occurred in the Detroit riots of 1971 and in the aftermath of Hurricane 
Katrina.  See supra text accompanying notes 70–75. 
 156. There has been a good deal of discussion of the Jews’ willingness to defer despite the obvious 
evilness of the laws and directions.  For insight into this issue, see Jewish Resistance to the Nazi Geno-
cide, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBRARY, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/grobres.html 
(last visited Feb. 17, 2013). 
 157. See Kupperman, supra note 134, at 26.  
 158. See EYNIKEL, supra note 38, at 78. 
 159. NORMAN & NORMAN, supra note 149, at 294.  
 160. ALLEN, supra note 13, at 20–21 figs.2, 22.  
 161. See supra text accompanying notes 11–12, 18–20, 51–53.  
 162. The problem of the malevolent leader is illustrated too by the situation in Somalia, but in 
reverse.  Somalia certainly continues to have its difficulties, but since the last functioning government 
fell in 1991, the economy of the nation has improved.  With the “predatory government” gone, people 
retain more of what they work for and, as a result, some areas of Somalia are experiencing “unparal-
leled boom” times.  Peter T. Leeson, Better Off Stateless: Somalia Before and After Government Col-
lapse, 35 J. COMP. ECON. 689, 705–06 (2007).  Additionally, personal liberty has increased greatly.  
Gossip had been a capital offense.  “Twenty other basic civil freedoms involving speech, association 
and organization also carried the death penalty.”  Id. at 693.  People were not able to pursue com-
plaints against those who harmed them nor were they free to move about physically.  Now, free 
speech, a real ability to voice concerns, and even newspapers exist in Somalia.  Id. at 698.  Several at-
tempts have been made since 1991 to establish a functioning government.  Each time a transitional 
government is formed, the life indexes of the Somali people fall.  As the time without a government 
lengthens, key life indexes such as infant mortality and income improve.  Id. at 696, 708.  
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help.  Several of the success stories show this mark.  In the Andes crash, 
the group were members of a rugby team, their friends, families, and 
fans.163  On Anguilla, the group had already been living as a community 
before the British withdrawal.164  On the Grafton, the captain and Raynal 
had previously been good friends, and together hired the other crew 
members.165 
Also helpful in insulating a group from cooperation-subverting 
forces are the demands of a common goal.  The gold miners simply could 
not mine without group cooperation, because they could not leave their 
goods unattended unless they had some effective social rules in place 
that would protect them from theft.  The challenging task for pirates, to 
take a prize ship, or for wagon trains, to cross a dangerous country, could 
not have been achieved without cooperative action.  Sometimes the 
common mission was simply to stay alive.  The prisoners at Treblinka, 
the Eskimos, and the Maroons all lived in conditions in which their sur-
vival depended upon sustained cooperation, which made it more difficult 
for a malevolent leader to take control and undermine group interests.  It 
was common that the more difficult the conditions, the more likely the 
cooperation.166 
The ironic corollary to this is that the danger to social cooperation 
may increase as the group’s situation becomes more comfortable.  This 
may be why, in conflict with Hobbes’s claim that government and law are 
needed to produce social order and organization, one may sometimes see 
less social cooperation in an effective-law situation than in an absent-law 
situation, not more.  The existence of a legal system can provide a level 
of support and well-being that may seem to undermine the tendency to-
ward personal sacrifice in support of cooperative action. 
C. The Justice Principle 
A second recurring theme found in the case studies is the wide-
spread desire that serious wrongdoing be punished.  Both those who 
have been victims as well as those who are uninvolved third parties ap-
pear willing to make personal sacrifices to assure that justice is done, de-
spite difficult circumstances. 
  
 
 163. READ, supra note 9, at 23.  
 164. DYDE, supra note 34, at 43.  
 165. RAYNAL, supra note 15, at 36–37.  
 166. See Walter O. Weyrauch, The Experience of Lawlessness, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 415, 430 
(2007). 
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1. Altruistic Punishment 
In the gold mining camps, for example, wrongdoing was adjudicated 
before a congregation of the camp members even though this meant tak-
ing them away from their mining.167  This was at a time when mining fe-
ver was in full swing and nothing distracted the miners from their gold 
rush, not socializing, romance and marriage, sports or hobbies, educa-
tion, or any of the other normal non-work activities of a community.168  
Yet even gold mining was set aside for the adjudication of wrongdoing. 
This interest continued even after the development of governmental 
mechanisms for adjudications by the appointment of a local “Alcalde.”169  
In one case where a mining partnership broke up, one of the men, Sim, 
sought to cheat his partner, Sprenger, out of his half of the claim.170  The 
local Alcalde accepted a bribe from Sim to find in his favor.171  Upon 
hearing the verdict, the camp felt that justice was not served and called 
other camps in the area to come to help resolve the matter.172  The larger 
group assembled and demanded that the Alcalde reopen the case.173  
When he refused, they constituted themselves as a “court of appeals” 
and summoned the case records from the Alcalde.174  When he again re-
fused, they retried the case, overturned the original finding, found in-
stead for Sprenger, and found Sim guilty of perjury.175 
On the wagon trains going west, the distances were long and delays 
were costly.  The group had to keep moving to find fresh grass for their 
animals and to cross the Rockies before snow shut the mountain pass-
es.176  Groups sometimes moved on even though they had to leave behind 
sick or injured who needed a few days to recover before they could trav-
el.177  Yet, despite the cost, it was not uncommon for a wagon train to 
stop to conduct a trial of a wrongdoer.178  Even another wagon train, 
which had no prior involvement with the group, would delay travel so 
that their members could serve on a jury for the adjudication of a serious 
case.179 
In one of the barracks of the Nazi extermination camps, there was 
an unknown “bread thief.”180  The stronger people in the group were not 
 
 167. SHINN, supra note 21, at 193–94.  
 168. See id. at 132–49.  
 169. Id. at 83–104, 193–95.  
 170. Id. at 191–92. 
 171. Id. at 192.  
 172. Id. at 193–94. 
 173. Id. at 194. 
 174. Id. at 194–95.  
 175. Id. at 195–97. 
 176. Abigail Jane Scott, Journal of a Trip to Oregon, UNIV. OF OR. CENT. FOR ADVANCED TECH. 
IN EDUC., http://cateweb.uoregon.edu/duniway/notes/DiaryProof1.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2013). 
 177. Id.  
 178. Id.  
 179. Id.  
 180. DES PRES, supra note 99, at 141.  
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the ones who were being robbed but even they joined in a watch system 
to catch the thief, a watch system that required undernourished, exhaust-
ed people to give up hours of precious sleep.181  The watch was held until 
the thief was caught.182  The penalty for thievery was death and, as Des 
Pres explains, the community sanctioned the punishment.  “If a man 
stole your food you killed him.  If you were not strong enough to carry 
out the sentence yourself, there were other executioners . . . .”183 
In the Warsaw ghetto, an underground resistance movement even-
tually developed, which used its scarce resources to inflict casualties on 
the German units that came into the Ghetto.184  Many of the under-
ground’s members were caught, tortured, and killed.185  Despite the risks 
incurred in any action and the scarcity of ammunition, the group devoted 
some of its energies to killing Jews who had collaborated with the enemy, 
even though such actions diverted resources from more strategic actions 
against the enemy.186  They thought that doing justice, as they saw it, was 
worth the cost.187 
The members of the original San Francisco Vigilance Committee 
put themselves at risk by their undertaking, even though they had no 
personal stake in the cases the Committee sought to correct.188  While the 
legal authorities at the time were highly corrupt and worked for the crim-
inals rather than the public, they nonetheless controlled the official pow-
er of government and its agents.189  Several members of the Vigilance 
Committee were arrested and tried for their work in trying to do justice 
where the corrupt authorities had been bought off.190  After several 
members of the Vigilance Committee were held criminally liable, the 
Committee responded by publishing a list of all its members.191  “[A]ll the 
undersigned have been equally implicated, and are equally responsible 
with their above named associates.”192 
These experiences are consistent with social science research that 
shows the strong desire among lay persons that serious wrongdoing be 
punished.  This has been shown through a wide variety of methods: ques-
tionnaire studies,193 behavioral economic studies,194 and cross-cultural 
 
 181. Id. at 159. 
 182. Id. at 141. 
 183. Id. (citation omitted).  
 184. ISRAEL GUTMAN, RESISTANCE: THE WARSAW GHETTO UPRISING 167–70 (1994).  
 185. Id. at 156.  
 186. Id. at 169–70. 
 187. Id. at 170. 
 188. WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 217. 
 189. Id. at 140–43.  
 190. Id. at 214–16. 
 191. Id. at 217. 
 192. Id.  
 193. See Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict in Intuitions of Justice, 
91 MINN. L. REV. 1829, 1848–50 (2007) [hereinafter Robinson & Kurzban, Concordance] (reviewing 
Craig L. Boydell & Carl F. Grindstaff, Public Opinion Toward Legal Sanctions for Crimes of Violence, 
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studies.195  Neurobiological studies demonstrate the association of the 
punishment of violators with a direct positive hedonic impact through ac-
tivation of the human brain’s reward system.196  The intuition that wrong-
doing should be punished applies not only to those who have been 
wronged but also to uninvolved third parties, referred to in the literature 
as “altruistic punishment.”197  Cultural psychologist Paul Rozin and his 
colleagues conclude that “[m]oral judgment and the condemnation of 
others, including fictional others and others who have not harmed the 
self, is a universal and essential feature of human social life.”198  Similar 
sentiments have been expressed by developmental psychologist Jerome 
Kagan, who includes this intuition as one of “a limited number of univer-
sal moral categories that transcend time and locality.”199  Anthropologist 
Donald Brown, in his exhaustive review of the cross-cultural data, in-
cluded intuitions surrounding justice and punishing transgressors to be a 
“Human Universal.”200  In short, experts from multiple disciplines have 
been unambiguous in their assertion that, despite cultural differences, 
the intuition to punish is a key aspect of what it means to be a member of 
the human species. 
 
65 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 113 (1974) and MARVIN E. WOLFGANG ET AL., THE NATIONAL 
SURVEY OF CRIME SEVERITY (1985)). 
 194. Robinson & Kurzban, Concordance, supra note 193, at 1850–51 (discussing CAMERER, supra 
note 101; Fehr & Fischbacher, supra note 106; Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness and the Assumptions 
of Economics, 59 J. BUS. S285 (1986)). 
 195. Robinson & Kurzban, Concordance, supra note 193, at 1852–53 (discussing the Ultimatum 
Game); see also Joseph Henrich et al., “Economic Man” in Cross-Cultural Perspective: Behavioral Ex-
periments in 15 Small-Scale Societies, 28 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 795 (2005) [hereinafter Heinrich et al., 
Economic Man]; John R. Snarey, Cross-Cultural Universality of Social-Moral Development: A Critical 
Review of Kohlbergian Research, 97 PSYCHOL. BULL. 202, 213 (1985).   
 196. Dominique J.-F. de Quervain et al., The Neural Basis of Altruistic Punishment, 305 SCI. 1254, 
1256–57 (2004); see also Brian Knutson, Sweet Revenge?, 305 SCI. 1246, 1246–47 (2004).   
 197. Fehr & Fischbacher, supra note 106, at 85; Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Altruistic Punish-
ment in Humans, 415 NATURE 137 (2002); Frank W. Marlowe et al., More ‘Altruistic’ Punishment in 
Larger Societies, 275 PROC. ROYAL SOC’Y BIOLOGICAL SCI. 587, 587 (2008).  For an authorities re-
view, see John M. Darley and Thane S. Pittman, The Psychology of Compensatory and Retributive Jus-
tice, 7 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 324, 329–331 (2003); see also Paul H. Robinson & John 
M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implications For Criminal Law and Justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1, 59 (2007) [hereinafter Robinson & Darley, Implications].  
 198. Paul Rozin et al., The CAD Triad Hypothesis: A Mapping Between Three Moral Emotions 
(Contempt, Anger, Disgust) and Three Moral Codes (Community, Autonomy, Divinity), 76 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 574, 574 (1999).  For a discussion of some psychologists (and others) 
who want to abolish capital punishment, see STEVEN PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE: THE MODERN 
DENIAL OF HUMAN NATURE 181 (2002). 
 199. JEROME KAGAN, THE NATURE OF THE CHILD 118–19 (1984). 
 200. Donald E. Brown’s Human Universals represent perhaps the best anthropological account of 
cross-cultural similarities.  In his analysis of the Universal People (UP), his description of those fea-
tures that all people from all cultures share in common, he writes:  
The UP have law, at least in the sense of rules of membership in perpetual social units and in the 
sense of rights and obligations attached to persons or other statuses.  Among the UP’s laws are 
those that in certain situations proscribe violence and rape.  Their laws also proscribe murder—
unjustified taking of human life (though they may justify taking lives in some contexts).  They 
have sanctions for infractions, and these sanctions include removal of offenders from the social 
unit—whether by expulsion, incarceration, ostracism, or execution.  They punish (or otherwise 
censure or condemn) certain acts that threaten the group or are alleged to do so.   
DONALD E. BROWN, HUMAN UNIVERSALS 130, 138 (1991). 
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Existing studies also support the view that people agree not only 
that serious wrongdoing should be punished but also agree on the rela-
tive seriousness of wrongdoing, at least with regard to the core of wrong-
doing—physical aggression and taking property of another without con-
sent.  One recent study showed enormous agreement about the relative 
blameworthiness of offenses within the core of wrongdoing across de-
mographics.201  This suggests that something powerful is at work here, if it 
is beyond the influence of forces like gender, race, age, education, eco-
nomic status, marital status, and other such demographics that affect 
people’s life experience.  Again, a wide variety of studies, both domes-
tic202 and cross-cultural,203 support the conclusion.  In their review of the 
literature, Rossi and Berk suggest that the studies converge on the view 
that people share intuitions about the relative seriousness of wrongdo-
ing.204  A “[f]airly strong consensus exists on the seriousness ordering of 
crimes.”205  
 
 201. See Robinson & Kurzban, Concordance, supra note 193, at 1866–80. 
 202. See id. at 1854–61 (reviewing THORSTEN SELLIN & MARVIN E. WOLFGANG, THE 
MEASUREMENT OF DELINQUENCY (1964); Joseph E. Jacoby & Francis T. Cullen, The Structure of 
Punishment Norms: Applying the Rossi-Berk Model, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 245, 288 (1998) 
(“At the aggregate level (i.e., average responses), there is considerable structure, but among the indi-
vidual responses there is considerable variability.”); Alfred Blumstein & Jacqueline Cohen, Sentencing 
of Convicted Offenders: An Analysis of the Public’s View, 14 L. & SOC. REV. 223, 223 (1980) (conclud-
ing that there was “considerable agreement across various demographic groups on the relative severity 
of the sentences to be imposed for different offenses, but disagreement over the absolute magnitude of 
these sentences”); Peter H. Rossi et al., The Seriousness of Crimes: Normative Structure and Individual 
Differences, 39 AM. SOC. REV. 224, 230 tbl.2 (1974); V. Lee Hamilton & Steve Rytina, Social Consen-
sus on Norms of Justice: Should the Punishment Fit the Crime?, 85 AM. J. SOC. 1117, 1132 (1980) (not-
ing “a high level of consensus on the norm of just deserts”); Charles W. Thomas et al., Public Opinion 
on Criminal Law and Legal Sanctions: An Examination of Two Conceptual Models, 67 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 110, 116 (1976) (“[W]e find evidence of a remarkable level of consensus, even after 
separating the sample on the basis of their sex, race, age, income, occupational prestige, and educa-
tional attainment.”)). 
 203. See Robinson & Kurzban, Concordance, supra note 193, at 1862–1865 (reviewing Michael 
O’Connell & Anthony Whelan, Taking Wrongs Seriously: Public Perceptions of Crime Seriousness, 36 
BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 299, 302–05, 310 (1996)); Marlene Hsu, Cultural and Sexual Differences on the 
Judgment of Criminal Offenses: A Replication Study of the Measurement of Delinquency, 64 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 348, 350 (1973); GRAEME NEWMAN, COMPARATIVE DEVIANCE: PERCEPTION AND 
LAW IN SIX CULTures 140–45 (1976); David M. Bersoff & Joan G. Miller, Culture, Context, and the 
Development of Moral Accountability Judgments, 29 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 664, 666, 672–73 
(1993)). 
 204. See, e.g., PETER H. ROSSI & RICHARD A. BERK, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, A NATIONAL 
SAMPLE SURVEY: PUBLIC OPINION ON SENTENCING FEDERAL CRIMES 11 (1995) (concluding from 
their review of the literature up to this point that there is a strong consensus on how individuals rank 
the seriousness of crimes, “with those involving actual or threatened physical harm to victims generally 
considered to be the most serious”); Peter H. Rossi & Richard A. Berk, A Conceptual Framework for 
Measuring Norms, in THE SOCIAL FABRIC: DIMENSIONS AND ISSUES 77, 103 (James F. Short, Jr. ed., 
1986) (noting that present models on consensus have “attempted to lay the foundations for exploring 
normative structures based on both technical and conceptual tools”); Peter H. Rossi & J. Patrick Hen-
ry, Seriousness: A Measure for All Purposes?, in HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE EVALUATION 489, 
497 (Malcolm W. Klein & Katherine S. Teilmann eds., 1980); Peter H. Rossi & Richard A. Berk, Vari-
eties of Normative Consensus, 50 AM. SOC. REV. 333 (1985) [hereinafter Rossi & Berk, Varieties] (dis-
cussing sentencing, but in absolute, and not relative terms).  Rossi and Berk claim that “Model V more 
or less describes the majority of, if not most, normative domains in our society: People by and large 
agree on what the norms are but differ in their degrees of attachment to the normative structure so 
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2. Commitment to Justice Includes Avoiding Injustice 
The strong human commitment to doing justice produces not just a 
demand for punishment but also an intuition of justice that sets the ex-
tent of punishment to match the extent of the offender’s moral blame-
worthiness, including the seriousness of the offense, as people see it.206  
Furthermore, empirical studies confirm lay people’s specific and nuanced 
intuitions of justice on a wide array of criminal law issues—essentially all 
of the issues that can arise if one were drafting a criminal code.207 
Despite the difficult circumstances, the absent-law groups common-
ly adhere to such principles of justice: both the recognition of mitigations 
and exculpations and adherence to a principle of proportionality be-
tween punishment and blameworthiness.  In the mining camps, for ex-
ample, a minor infraction, such as deception in a horse sale, might be 
sanctioned with a fine.208  A more serious offense, such as moving tools 
that marked another’s claim, might prompt a more serious penalty, such 
as a whipping or banishment from the camp.209  The most serious offens-
es, large-scale theft or murder, were more likely punished with death.210  
Similarly, in Jamestown under John Smith, a man who would not work 
was not given food, a person who disobeyed orders was placed in chains, 
and a person found guilty of theft of stores was killed.211  Crews on pirate 
ships commonly wrote up articles by which they would govern them-
selves, and many of these codes set out punishments for offenses.212  One 
set of articles differentiated between theft from an individual—for which 
the punishment was “slitting the Ears and Nose of him that was Guilty, 
and set him on Shore, not in an uninhabited Place, but somewhere, 
 
defined.”  Id. at 340; see also id. at 339 (“Under this condition, individual members of the society need 
not agree on the specific judgments to be rendered on each moral application, but each individual can 
be different from the others by a specific constant . . . .”). 
 205. PETER H. ROSSI & RICHARD A. BERK, JUST PUNISHMENTS: FEDERAL GUIDELINES AND 
PUBLIC VIEWS COMPARED 12 (1997); see also SELLIN & WOLFGANG, supra note 202, at 323–24. 
 206. PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME: COMMUNITY 
VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 157–99 (1995). 
 207. See, e.g., id. at 53–155; Paul H. Robinson et al., Competing Theories of Blackmail: An Empir-
ical Research Critique of Criminal Law Theory, 89 TEX. L. REV. 291, 335–47 (2010); Robinson & Kur-
zban, Concordance, supra note 193, at 1854–65; Paul H. Robinson et al., Extralegal Punishment Fac-
tors: A Study of Forgiveness, Hardship, Good Deeds, Apology, Remorse, and Other Such Discretionary 
Factors in Assessing Criminal Punishment, 65 VAND. L. REV. 737, 768–805 (2012); Paul H. Robinson & 
John M. Darley, Objectivist Versus Subjectivist Views of Criminality: A Study in the Role of Social Sci-
ence in Criminal Law Theory, 18 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 409, 427–35 (1998); Paul H. Robinson & 
John M. Darley, Testing Competing Theories of Justification, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1095, 1115–28 (1998). 
 208. John Putnam, Gold Rush Justice, MY GOLD RUSH TALES (Sept. 11, 2011), http://mygold 
rushtales.com/2011/09/11/gold-rush-justice. 
 209. SHINN, supra note 21, at 119.  
 210. Id.  
 211. Edward Wright Haile, Introduction to JAMESTOWN NARRATIVES: EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS 
OF THE VIRGINIA COLONY: THE FIRST DECADE: 1607–1617, at 30, 31, 34 (Edward Wright Haile ed., 
1998); HORN, supra note 28, at 182; PRICE, supra note 28, at 108–47. 
 212. DON C. SEITZ, UNDER THE BLACK FLAG: EXPLOITS OF THE MOST NOTORIOUS PIRATES 
194–95 (2002). 
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where he was sure to encounter Hardships”—and theft from the group, a 
much more serious offense—for which the punishment was marooning, 
which meant death.213  The Netsilik Eskimos also made sure the punish-
ment fit the crime.  Insufficient sharing of stores might prompt a public 
scolding by the older women of the group, while excluding others from a 
hunting area might prompt a community-authorized beating, and taking 
another’s wife might merit being killed.214 
Also apparent in the case studies is the recognition of a variety of 
defenses and mitigations.  This may seem quite odd at first, as a refine-
ment one would not expect in the difficult circumstances common in 
many absent-law situations.  There are good utilitarian reasons to punish 
prohibited conduct, but recognizing defenses or mitigations to punish-
ment suggests that the decision makers are primarily concerned with de-
sert.  That is, providing defenses and mitigations to one who has engaged 
in prohibited conduct tends to undermine the general deterrent effect of 
the prohibition as well as the incapacitation of potential offenders.215  But 
if doing justice is the concern, it can be as easily offended by giving too 
much punishment as too little.216 
For example, one sees the use of culpability requirements giving rise 
to mistake defenses.  In the Andes plane crash, a man, Harley, was dis-
covered to have a private stash of toothpaste, which typically was part of 
the group’s food stores.217  At his “hearing” before the group, it was de-
termined that he was misled by another man, Delgado, who had told him 
that the toothpaste was not part of the group stores and that he could 
properly trade it to Harley.218  Harley’s plea, essentially one of honest 
mistake, was accepted and he was judged not liable.219 
In a pirate case, three officers aboard a ship removed clothing from 
the common loot to make themselves look good for the ladies in the 
town.  When they returned to the ship, they were brought before the 
group to answer for theft.  The officers were let go with a warning when 
the group was persuaded that they had meant only to borrow the cloth-
 
 213. Id. at 194.  
 214. BALIKCI, supra note 41, at 185–91; VAN DEN STEENHOVEN, supra note 107, at 37–39, 47–48. 
 215. ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES, supra note 109, at 73–97, 109–33. 
 216. Id. at 135–212. 
 217. READ, supra note 9, at 239–40.  
 218. Id. at 240.  
 219. Id.  
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ing for the night.220  This is consistent with the legal requirement that 
theft requires an intent to permanently deprive another of his property.221 
Justification defenses, such as lesser evils and self-defense, also were 
commonly recognized.  In a wagon train case, one man attacked another 
who defended himself with a knife strike.222  The attacker died within 
minutes.223  At a hearing before the group, the man was found not guilty, 
upon a claim of self-defense.224  Excuse defenses were also recognized.  
Aboard the Globe, Gilbert Smith helped the mutineers, even providing 
help to commit crimes against the non-mutinous crew.225  Yet when the 
non-mutineers were back in control, Smith was not punished in any way, 
apparently on the theory that he had been coerced to participate and 
would have been killed himself had he not.226  During the Attica prison 
uprising, the prisoners appointed a leadership committee to judge viola-
tions of the rules that the prisoners had set for themselves.227  When one 
of the prisoners, Michael Privitiera, violated the rules by attacking a hos-
tage, it was determined that he was mentally ill.228  Rather than kill him, 
 
 220. WILLIAM SNELGRAVE, A NEW ACCOUNT OF SOME PARTS OF GUINEA, AND THE SLAVE-
TRADE 257–58 (London, James, John, & Paul Knapton 1734).  For another example, from the mining 
camps, two men take a set of old and useless tools that seemed to them abandoned, they claimed.  
Tools are used to mark claims and taking them is considered claim jumping, a most serious, often capi-
tal offense.  In this case the men were whipped and told to leave the camp.  Their mitigated sentence 
was based upon their belief that the tools were so old and useless that they believed they were just 
abandoned, and did not mark a claim.  SHINN, supra note 21, at 172–73 (adding that camp members 
were told that in future they must leave higher-quality tools to mark their claim). 
 221. See PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW: CASE STUDIES & CONTROVERSIES 1217–18 (3d ed. 
2012) [hereinafter ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW]. 
 222. Scott, supra note 176.  
 223. Id.  
 224. Id.  For another example, during Hurricane Katrina, several well-organized, otherwise lawful 
groups participated in planned looting expeditions and took up residence in public buildings, yet were 
never prosecuted for their offenses.  See Stephen Kiehl, Some Stay to Save; Some Come to See, BALT. 
SUN, Sept. 11, 2005, at 1A.  Similarly, at Memorial Hospital, patients were given lethal injections of 
morphine, so that they might die peaceful painless deaths.  A New Orleans grand jury declined to in-
dict the doctor on second-degree murder charges, and the case “faded from view.”  See Fink, supra 
note 47.   
In one of the wagon train cases, the president of the group has commanded that the teams not 
cross a stream until direction is given for them all to cross together.  When one team moves to do so in 
violation of the order, men are sent with instructions to shoot the violators if they will not stop.  How-
ever, when the violators are confronted yet will not stop, the men sent decline to shoot them.  LLOYD 
W. COFFMAN, BLAZING A WAGON TRAIL TO OREGON: A WEEKLY CHRONICLE OF THE GREAT 
MIGRATION OF 1843, at 24 (1993). 
On Pitcairn Island an outsider by the name of Joshua Hill had been elected to be head of the island 
council.  He runs an ever more tyrannical government on the island, including flogging one man for an 
adultery act that occurred before Hill was even on the island.  When Hill tries to get the community to 
help him sanction two women guilty of spreading rumors about him, he ends the meeting with a pray-
er.  No one but Hill says “amen.”  Shortly after the prayer, Hill sentences a twelve-year-old to death 
for stealing yams.  The child’s father is commanded to kill her; he refuses.  Hill attacks the father with 
a sword.  Hill is disarmed, the father unharmed, and Hill finds that his authority on the island has dis-
appeared.  ROSALIND AMELIA YOUNG, MUTINY OF THE BOUNTY AND STORY OF PITCAIRN ISLAND 
1790–1894, at 78–85 (1894). 
 225. COMSTOCK, supra note 11, at 87. 
 226. Id. at 87–93. 
 227. USEEM & KIMBALL, supra note 29, at 34–36.  
 228. Id. at 49–50. 
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which was the punishment called for under the rules, they pursued their 
own form of civil commitment by detaining him in “D” block.229  When 
he subsequently left “D” block and assaulted a fellow prisoner, he is 
brought back before the committee and again sent to “D” block for de-
tention.230  Indeed, even an excuse of duress of circumstances seems to 
have been recognized, even though it goes beyond the excuses commonly 
available in modern criminal law, which may suggest the need to reeval-
uate this aspect of modern doctrine.231 
3. Just Punishment As a Necessary Condition for Stable Social 
Cooperation 
The commitment to doing justice and avoiding injustice, at least as 
the circumstances permitted and as the group viewed it, has a practical 
value, even if it is not apparent to the persons caught in the absent-law 
situations.  The case studies suggest that such attempts to do justice are 
probably a prerequisite to effective and stable social cooperation.  In the 
early years of the colony on Pitcairn Island, for example, the mutineers 
who settled there were unable to sort out a credible means of resolving 
disputes; killings among the group eventually left only one adult male 
alive.232 
It is the absence of a credible justice system that gives rise to vigi-
lantism.  In San Francisco, when legal authorities showed themselves to 
be unreliable—deciding liability and punishment on whim or for corrupt 
purposes—the citizens formed their vigilance committee, which took 
over criminal justice, even denying authorities access to suspects.233  The 
lack of credibility of the Pakistani criminal justice system meant that vigi-
 
 229. Id.  
 230. Id.  When he later attacked another prisoner, the council apparently concluded that he could 
not be controlled, so he was stabbed to death.  See Wicker, supra note 29, at 169. 
 231. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (1962) (allowing a justification defense whenever the 
offense conduct avoids a greater harm), with id. § 2.08 (allowing an excuse defense only for coercion 
applied by another person, not by natural circumstances); see also ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW, supra 
note 221, at 631–32 (duress defense will only apply if coercion is inflicted by a human source, rather 
than a force of nature).  
 232. MARKS, supra note 36, at 15–17.  Other examples similarly illustrate the point.  In the late 
1600s, the distinction between privateer work, where the crown authorized the taking of enemy ships 
for the profit of the owners of the ship, and illegal seizures became more and more difficult to discern, 
even to the courts.  As the courts and different nations debated the distinctions, the golden age of pi-
racy came into being.  The crews who took the risks and the prizes kept the income.  See LEESON, su-
pra note 108, at 11–13.  On the island of Molokai, many of the superintendents of the leper colony 
were criminals who used their power to abuse the residents.  These men were not able to control the 
lawful residents without withholding food or supplies and they could not control the unlawful exiles 
through any means.  See TAYMAN, supra note 38, at 108–09.  In Colombia, during the time of Pablo 
Escobar, corruption was so widespread as to make it appear that everyone was taking bribes and 
therefore to not take bribes was not morally upright, rather it was foolish.  Rensselaer W. Lee III & 
Francisco E. Thoumi, Drugs and Democracy in Colombia, in MENACE TO SOCIETY: POLITICAL-
CRIMINAL COLLABORATION AROUND THE WORLD 71, 72–94 (Roy Godson ed., 2003). 
 233. WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 205. 
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lantism was increasingly a problem in the 2008 incident in Karachi, three 
young thieves were “beaten and set afire by an angry mob.”234 
A situation in which injustices, as perceived by the group, are regu-
larly inflicted or in which failures of justice, as perceived by the group, 
are regularly tolerated, is a situation in which the group members are 
likely to have little allegiance to the group or its interests.  They may 
continue their membership as necessary to survive but are not likely to 
identify with the group and join in its goals as a joint enterprise.  Instead, 
their weak bond will mean their dropping out of the group when a better 
option presents itself—such as an opportunity to join a more just group, 
even if it has fewer resources.235 
Recall the Batavia case.  Once it was clear that Cornelisz was a cor-
rupt leader who punished only to advance his own interests, people be-
gan defecting.236  Cornelisz had to put guards on the boats to stem the de-
fections to the other, more democratic group.237  In contrast, no one on 
the other island ever attempted to join Cornelisz, even though he had the 
resources and they were at times near starving.238  On the whale ship 
Globe, when the mutineers under Comstock took over, the other sailors 
felt compelled to obey and all hands continued to sail the ship, following 
directions and fulfilling their usual duties.239  But when Comstock was 
killed and before a new strongman could establish himself, the crew 
members cut the anchor ropes and abandoned the mutineers on a remote 
tropical island.240 
Indeed, it was a history of unfairness and excess in the discipline 
systems aboard naval ships of the day that helped prompt the rise of pi-
racy.  Veterans offered new men on a naval ship this advice: “There is no 
justice or injustice on board ship . . . . There are only two things: duty and 
mutiny . . . . All that you are ordered to do is duty.  All that you refuse to 
do is mutiny.”241  Serving on a Spanish ship in 1693, during a voyage of 
serious mistreatment, Henry Every was among the first to incite mutiny 
among the crew and take the ship for pirating.242  The pirate crew often 
performed the same tasks as they had performed previously as the crew 
of an authorized privateer—taking other ships as lawful prizes—but now 
 
 234. RICHARD BLUE ET AL., USAID, PAKISTAN RULE OF LAW ASSESSMENT—FINAL REPORT 11 
(2008), available at http://www1.usaid.gov/pk/downloads/dg/Pakistan_ROL_11-26-08.pdf. 
 235. Others have talked in more detail about the “member exit problem” for groups.  See, e.g., 
Hoffman, supra note 79, at 1673–74. 
 236. See DASH, supra note 18, at 127, 145.  
 237. See id.  
 238. JOSEPH CUMMINS, CAST AWAY: LOST AND FOUND IN HISTORY: EPIC TRUE STORIES OF 
SHIPWRECK, PIRACY, AND MUTINY ON THE HIGH SEAS 73 (2008).  
 239. See COMSTOCK, supra note 11, at 87. 
 240. Id. at 106–07. 
 241. Peter Leeson, An-arrgh-chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization, 115 J. POL. 
ECON. 1049, 1060 (2007) [hereinafter Leeson, An-arrgh-chy]. 
 242. See DAVID CORDINGLY, UNDER THE BLACK FLAG: THE ROMANCE AND THE REALITY OF 
LIFE AMONG THE PIRATES 21–24 (2006); ANGUS KONSTAM, THE HISTORY OF PIRATES 130 (Mercury 
Books 2005).  
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worked under different financial and disciplinary regimes.243  The pirate 
crews created democratic communities.244  Elected captains remained in 
office only so long as they had the support of the crew.245  All understood 
that strong discipline was required, especially if the ship was to be suc-
cessful in its hunting and confrontations.246  But the needed discipline was 
created through means other than arbitrary and excessive punishment.247  
The disciplinary system had to be effective for the demands of successful 
pirating, yet viewed as sufficiently fair to attract a crew.  Most of the pi-
rate crews were volunteers, and could and would leave a ship if they were 
dissatisfied.248  Only a reputation for fair discipline would attract a crew 
for the ship’s next outing.249 
The available social science studies support the view that doing jus-
tice is necessary for social cooperation.  As previously noted, a substan-
tial body of evidence supports the notion that most humans are not self-
ish, as previously assumed, but rather are strong reciprocators.250  Strong 
reciprocators are predisposed to cooperate but not if others in their 
group refuse to and instead act only in self-interest.251  Moreover, strong 
reciprocators have a desire to punish uncooperative individuals who vio-
late social codes to promote their self-interest.252  They will punish viola-
tors even if it is personally costly to them and, indeed, even if they expect 
no personal direct or indirect benefit from their expenditure.253  For ex-
ample, experiments show that strong reciprocators will punish others, at 
a significant cost to themselves, even during their final interaction with 
the group, when it is clear there will be no repeat interaction that will al-
low them (the punisher) to be repaid or to otherwise benefit from their 
costly behavior.254 
There is a limit to what laboratory games with a few dollars at stake 
can tell us about human decision making in difficult real-world situations, 
where life or death may be an issue, but the games can be interesting and 
instructive.  For example, they suggest that in groups that consist of both 
self-interested individuals and strong reciprocators, punishment oppor-
tunities allow the group to create a system of checks and balances that 
encourages cooperation by all.255  Without punishment, selfish behavior 
 
 243. LEESON, supra note 108, at 12–19.   
 244. Id. at 29.  
 245. Id. at 29–30. 
 246. Id. at 52–53, 81.  
 247. See id. at 58–70. 
 248. See id. at 154. 
 249. See id. at 32. 
 250. See supra text accompanying notes 101–16. 
 251. Fehr & Gintis, Human Motivation, supra note 101, at 45. 
 252. Id. at 45, 47–49.  
 253. Burnham & Johnson, supra note 103, at 114; Fehr & Gächter, supra note 197; Gintis, Strong 
Reciprocity, supra note 106, at 169, 171; Fehr & Fischbacher, supra note 106, at 85. 
 254. Fehr & Gintis, Human Motivation, supra note 101, at 46–49.  
 255. As Fehr and Gintis explain it: 
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does not bear an obvious cost and thus there is little incentive for the 
self-interested to cooperate, and thus every reason for the strong recip-
rocators to stop cooperating to avoid being taken advantage of.  That is, 
the selfish will persist in taking advantage of the group to promote their 
own self-interest; and the strong reciprocators, once they see the unpun-
ished non-cooperative behavior, will cease to cooperate.  The introduc-
tion of punishment changes all this.  Given the threat of punishment, co-
operation becomes the best method for selfish individuals to promote 
their self-interest; and strong reciprocators also will cooperate because 
the punishment eliminates their fear of being taken advantage of.  Thus, 
the studies show, the introduction of punishment significantly increases 
the level of cooperation of all group members, and the absence of just 
punishment undermines the possibility for group cooperation.256 
D. Subverting Justice 
The case studies also suggest that, while people have a deep desire 
for justice and are willing to make personal sacrifice to see it done, there 
are limits to those willing sacrifices.  Justice is important, but survival is 
more important. 
1. Subversion 
If the situation is such that the success of the group requires letting 
wrongs go unpunished to preserve the group’s stability and strength, 
some failures of justice will be tolerated.  For example, the person who 
deserves punishment may have a central role in the group’s survival 
plans, which might be upset if punishment is imposed.  Or, giving de-
served punishment may be unwise because it may upset or create discord 
at a time when absolute harmony is essential.  The group must weigh the 
costs and benefits of discipline under the then-existing conditions. 
Among the survivors of the Andes crash, for example, one man was 
viewed as lazy and did not perform his share of the duties.257  The group 
decided that any person not doing their assigned work would not be al-
 
[When punishment opportunities are available] strong reciprocators can now punish the defectors 
directly, creating an economic incentive for the self-regarding subjects to cooperate.  Moreover, 
the strong reciprocators will also cooperate because they need not fear others’ defection, as the 
self-regarding individuals are disciplined.  Thus, the strong reciprocators induce the self-regarding 
subjects to cooperate in the presence of a direct punishment opportunity. 
Id. at 50; see also Armin Falk, Gift Exchange in the Field, 75 ECONOMETRICA 1501 (2007) (describing a 
study showing that gift exchange increases charitable donations); Thomas Dohmen et al., Homo Re-
ciprocans: Survey Evidence on Behavioural Outcomes, 119 ECON. J. 592 , 592–93, 596 (2009); Joseph 
Henrich et al., Costly Punishment Across Human Societies, 312 SCI. 1767, 1767 (2006); Henrich et al., 
Economic Man, supra note 195, at 812–23; Henrich et al., supra note 106, at 73, 77; Charles Bellemare 
& Sabine Krӧger, On Representative Trust (Apr. 2003) (discussion paper), available at http://arno. 
uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=4464. 
 256. Fehr & Gintis, Human Motivation, supra note 101, at 50. 
 257. READ, supra note 9, at 142.  
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lowed to eat.258  But when the man still did not work, the group relented 
and let him eat anyway.259  It was judged that denying him food would be 
too disruptive to the group’s morale at that point.260  In a later incident, 
the same man was caught sneaking food while helping to prepare it (cut-
ting in strips the flesh of passengers who had died).261  Again, it was de-
cided that, while food theft was a serious offense within the group, the 
offense should be overlooked because unity among the group was essen-
tial at that point.262  Such minor sneaking came to be tolerated among 
those who did the strip-cutting because the task was seen as so unpleas-
ant.263 
In the Attica Prison case, as noted previously, a mentally ill convict 
was segregated and detained after assaulting a hostage and another pris-
oner—the group’s form of an insanity defense leading to civil commit-
ment.264  But when the man assaulted yet another prisoner, the group felt 
they could not control the man and he was ultimately killed.265  Similarly, 
the Attica group agreed on a prohibition against sexual activity.266  Yet, 
when it became clear that the rule could not be successfully enforced, the 
persons engaging in sexual activities were simply told to do it in a speci-
fied, limited area.267  During U.S. Prohibition, many officials, including 
President Harding, regularly violated the liquor laws, yet were not prose-
cuted.268  The enforcement officials reasoned, probably correctly, that to 
expose the President’s and other officials’ violations would undermine 
the perceived legitimacy of Prohibition and sink any hope of effective en-
forcement.269 
In 2002, the descendants of the mutineers who took over Pitcairn Is-
land were revealed to outsiders as having regularly engaged in wide-
spread sexual abuse of children.270  It appeared that most of the women 
on the island had suffered abuse, but almost none were willing to press 
charges and none were willing to give testimony in aid of the prosecution 
of their abusers.271  While they might have agreed that the rapes were 
wrongful, they nonetheless believed that jailing the offenders would 
 
 258. Id. at 138–39, 143. 
 259. Id. at 143. 
 260. See id. at 143, 148–49, 2. 
 261. Id. at 240.  
 262. See id. at 219–20, 241–42.  
 263. Id. at 137–38.  When it becomes clear that they may be stranded for a long time, the group 
outlaws the practice whereby those who cut up the dead bodies, a dreaded task, get extra food.  While 
the group makes the rule, nothing is done to enforce it.  Id. at 214, 263. 
 264. USEEM & KIMBALL, supra note 29, at 49.  
 265. Id.  
 266. Id. at 35.  
 267. See id. at 36; WICKER, supra note 29, at 231. 
 268. BEHR, supra note 50, at 114–15.  
 269. Id. at 153. 
 270. MARKS, supra note 36, at 5, 68.  
 271. Id. at xxii, 22–24.  
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cause harm to the island community.272  The accused persons included 
many officials on the island—the mayor, the former magistrate, and the 
chairman of the “internal committee”—and others who ran the long 
boats that shuttled people and cargo between ships and the island, upon 
which the livelihood of the residents depended.273  The women judged 
that the island simply could not afford to have these men jailed.274 
Among the Netsilik hunters, there was some considerable sensitivity 
about personal insults.  An insult could prompt a lethal response, espe-
cially if it disparaged another’s hunting ability.275  The community saw 
such macho killings as unfortunate but typically would not involve them-
selves in them.276  The community could not afford to lose a good hunter, 
especially if another one had just been killed.277 
The reverse sort of subversion of justice also occurred—a group’s 
circumstances might lead them to impose more punishment that they re-
ally believed was deserved.  For example, in the early Maroon communi-
ties, death was the punishment for nearly all infractions.278  This was not 
because the community thought that all violations deserved the same 
punishment but rather, probably, reflected their view that there existed 
few possibilities for lesser sanctions and the community could not afford 
to have disaffected members in their midst if they were to survive their 
ongoing conflict with the British.279   
2. Reversion 
While circumstances sometimes caused a deviation from the justice 
principle, the case studies suggest that when circumstances changed, it 
was common for the principle of justice to reassert itself and for deserved 
punishment to be imposed.  After the Maroons came to terms with the 
British and other punishment possibilities became more easily available, 
they dropped their use of the death penalty for lesser offenses and substi-
tuted lesser sanctions, such as banishment, whipping, and removal from a 
position of responsibility.280  When, with access to guns, medicine, metal 
(for knives, sled runners, etc.), and standard trading goods, the Netsilik 
people were able to step back from the brink of starvation, they reverted 
 
 272. Id. at 24.  
 273. Id. at 14, 45, 103, 148, 248.  
 274. Id. at 103.  In fact, outside pressure forced the prosecution of the men, most of whom served 
their sentences (of two years or less) in the local jail, which the men themselves built.  Id. at xxii, 9, 
233–36.  
 275. BALIKCI, supra note 41, at 170–71, 180–82.  
 276. Id. at 181–82.  
 277. Id. at 182.  However, the community also would not punish the revenge killing by the victim’s 
family.  Id. at 185.  
 278. See Mildred M. Chang, The Jamaican Accompong Maroons: Continuities and Transfor-
mations 46, 88 (2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, State University of New York, University at 
Albany) (on file with ProQuest Information and Learning Company). 
 279. Id. at 46.  
 280. See Richard Price, Part Five: Jamaica, in MAROON SOCIETIES, supra note 33, at 227, 227. 
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to a punishment practice that more closely matched their notions of jus-
tice.281  For example, they no longer tolerated insult-killings.282  Similarly, 
the public (and family) tolerance of prostitution during the Soviet occu-
pation of Berlin ceased once food became available at regular markets.283  
When the soaring crime rate that gave rise to the popular San Francisco 
Vigilance Committee was tamed, the Committee disbanded itself of its 
own accord.284 
This pattern of reversion in the case studies is consistent with what 
we know from empirical studies.  For example, in one recent study, sub-
jects were asked to “sentence” an offender who assaulted another and, in 
some variations, remained dangerous because of a brain tumor.285  Ma-
nipulations allowed the researchers to tease out whether the subjects 
looked to desert criteria or to incapacitation-of-the-dangerous criteria in 
doing their sentencing.286  The authors concluded that the subjects’ de-
fault judgment was to look to desert.287  Some subjects could be diverted 
from desert, however, to take some account of dangerousness in sentenc-
ing, if they were made to feel sufficiently at risk by the dangerous person 
being released from all control.288  But they promptly reverted to pure 
desert criteria when the dangerousness threat receded, either because of 
a successful operation to remove the brain tumor or because of the avail-
ability of civil commitment.289 
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR MODERN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
The dynamics of cooperation and justice in the absence of law, dis-
cussed in Part II, as well as other aspects of the absent-law case studies 
that are introduced in Part I, can have implications for a variety of mod-
ern criminal justice debates, including those regarding the appropriate 
distributive principle for criminal liability and punishment, restorative 
justice and jury sentencing, the movement to promote non-incarcerative 
sanctions, transitional justice and truth commissions, the use-of-force 
rules under international law, fairness in criminal adjudication proce-
dures, and crime-control policy in fighting organized crime and terror-
ism. 
 
 281. Telephone Interview by Sarah Robinson with Anne Crawford, Dean, Akitsiraq Law Sch. 
(Oct. 19, 2011) (notes on file with author). 
 282. KNUD RASMUSSEN, THE NETSILIK ESKIMOS: SOCIAL LIFE AND SPIRITUAL CULTURE 21 
(1931); Telephone Interview by Sarah Robinson with Anne Crawford, supra note 281. 
 283. ANONYMOUS, supra note 42, at 220, 246, 258–59; see also Weyrauch, supra note 166, at 435 
(reporting that people previously released from prison by the Nazi regime were later re-arrested to 
serve sentences).  
 284. See WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 343–45. 
 285. John M. Darley et al., Incapacitation and Just Deserts As Motives for Punishment, 24 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 659, 663 (2000). 
 286. Id. at 661.  
 287. Id. at 671. 
 288. Id. at 674. 
 289. Id. at 674–75. 
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A. Distributive Principle for Criminal Liability and Punishment: The 
Utility of Desert 
In current debates about the proper principles for distributing crim-
inal liability and punishment, one proposal urges departure from the 
classic distributive principles of deterrence, incapacitation, or deontolog-
ical desert, in favor of tracking the shared intuitions of justice of the 
community it governs—what has been called “empirical desert.”290  It is 
argued that a criminal law whose rules predictably produce injustice or 
failures of justice, as perceived by the community, will inevitably lose 
moral credibility with that community, and thereby lose its power to gain 
deference and compliance and to help shape community norms.291  Writ-
ers have offered both support and criticism of this proposal.292  What, if 
anything, does the experience of absent-law situations tell us about the 
current empirical-desert debate?  The experiences tend to support many 
key points of the proposal, but also give reasons for pause. 
The absent-law case studies suggest that using empirical desert as a 
distributive principle for liability and punishment is not a new and revo-
lutionary development but rather a return, in a sense, to the natural state 
in which humans first made such judgments.  It seems likely that the 
wrongdoing and punishment rules that absent-law groups construct for 
themselves are primarily the product of the group’s shared judgments 
about wrongdoing and punishment.  They have little else to look to.  
Modern utilitarian analysis had not been invented at the time of all but 
the most recent case studies.  And recent studies suggest that even peo-
ple in modern criminal justice systems, who may seem more instrumental 
in their thinking than their ancestors, in fact look to their notions of de-
sert when deciding punishment, not to other instrumentalist factors, such 
as those relating to deterrence or incapacitation.293  That is, while de-
served punishment typically has a deterrent and incapacitative effect, 
where the three goals are not consistent—that is, where following deter-
rence or incapacitation would cause injustice or a failure of justice, as is 
 
 290. See ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES, supra note 109, at 139–40, 257–60; Paul H. Rob-
inson et al., The Disutility of Injustice, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1940, 1943 (2010); Paul H. Robinson, Empiri-
cal Desert, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 29 (Paul H. Robinson et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter 
Robinson, Empirical Desert]; Robinson & Darley, Implications, supra note 197, at 18.  
 291. Robinson, Empirical Desert, supra note 290, at 30.  
 292. See, e.g., CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS, supra note 290, at 39–61 (including commentary 
written by Mary Sigler, Adam J. Kolber, Michael T. Cahill, Alice Ristroph, Youngjae Lee, Matthew 
Lister, Joseph E. Kennedy, Andrew E. Taslitz, Adil Ahmad Haque, and Laura I. Appleman in re-
sponse to Robinson, Empirical Desert, supra note 290); see also Paul H. Robinson, Reply, in CRIMINAL 
LAW CONVERSATIONS, supra note 290, at 61. 
 293. Kevin M. Carlsmith, The Roles of Retribution and Utility in Determining Punishment, 42 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 437, 447 (2006); Kevin M. Carlsmith et al., Why Do We Punish?: De-
terrence and Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 284, 284 
(2002) (finding that individual sentencing decisions are motivated by just desert factors instead of by 
deterrence factors); Darley et al., Incapacitation, supra note 285, at 671 (finding that just deserts was 
the primary sentencing motive in two experiments looking at desert motives and incapacitation mo-
tives).  
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common294—people’s intuitions are to follow desert, to set the punish-
ment according to the extent of the offender’s perceived moral blame-
worthiness.295 
The experience of absent-law cases does seem to confirm recent 
empirical work suggesting that one could indeed construct and operate a 
criminal law based upon shared intuitions of justice.  That is, the absent-
law actors seem to feel quite confident and comfortable in their ability to 
create an ad hoc criminal law and enforcement system based solely upon 
the notions of justice shared among the group.  They commonly produce 
a criminal law based upon “empirical desert” without giving it much 
thought. 
Beyond setting a precedent for empirical desert as a distributive 
principle, the absent-law experiences also seem supportive of the ra-
tionale behind that principle.  That is, it seems to support the observation 
that lay people attach great importance to doing justice, even if it incurs 
significant personal costs.  Despite difficult circumstances, the absent-law 
groups show a strong interest in doing justice for wrongdoing among its 
members, even when that justice-doing is personally costly to the mem-
bers, and, even when it is personally costly for members not related to 
the offender or the victim.  Recall the examples recounted in Part II.C.1, 
regarding the costs willingly incurred by groups as diverse as gold miners, 
wagon trains, prisoners at Treblinka, Warsaw underground, and the San 
Francisco Vigilance Committee.  (This does not bode well for the aboli-
tion of punishment movement.)296 
In other words, the absent-law case studies help illustrate the cen-
tral point of the “utility of desert” argument that a lack of moral credibil-
ity in the system for punishing wrongdoing can have negative conse-
quences.  The cases seem to suggest that injustices or failures of justice 
may prompt at best vigilantism and at worst chaos.  Recall some of the 
examples given in Part II.C.3, such as the survivors of the Batavia, who 
were provoked to abandon Cornelisz and join together to form a more 
democratic group on another island; the nonmutinous members of the 
Globe, who rose to take the ship back from the mutineers; the sailors 
who were prompted by unjust treatment aboard privateers to join more 
 
 294. ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES, supra note 109, at 12–17. 
 295. While the absent-law cases provide historical support for reliance upon empirical desert, 
there are important differences between that proposal and the absent-law experiences.  Rather than 
ad hoc application, as the absent-law cases provide, the empirical-desert proposal would rely on empir-
ical studies of the community’s shared intuitions of justice, rather than on community adjudication of 
individual cases.  The study results would be used to construct rules—criminal codes, sentencing guide-
lines, and advice statements for the exercise of judicial sentencing discretion—that would be applied 
the same to all defendants.  In the absent-law situations, in contrast, the group directly applies its intui-
tions of justice to the case at hand, with the attendant dangers of bias and disparity in application 
among similar cases. 
 296. See Robinson & Darley, Implications, supra note 197, at 11–18 (arguing that societies should 
not abolish punishment because it conflicts with inherent human instinct to punish wrongdoers, and 
because availability of punishment greatly reduces the frequency of norm violations in society). 
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democratic pirate crews; or the San Francisco Vigilance Committee tak-
ing over when the legal authorities became corrupt. 
Additional case studies offer other examples of the crime-control 
costs of undermining the law’s moral credibility.  U.S. Prohibition may be 
the most obvious and compelling example.  The national prohibition of 
alcohol, which ran from 1920 to 1933, was a “noble experiment” meant to 
reduce crime and corruption, solve social problems, reduce the tax bur-
den created by prisons, and improve health and hygiene, yet it proved to 
be a “miserable failure on all counts. . . . Although consumption of alco-
hol fell at the beginning of Prohibition, it subsequently increased.  Alco-
hol became more dangerous to consume; crime increased and became 
‘organized’; the court and prison systems were stretched to the breaking 
point; and corruption of public officials was rampant.”297  In 1928, Presi-
dent Herbert Hoover made the issue of lawlessness central to his election 
campaign.  In his inaugural speech he declared, “Our whole system of 
self-government will crumble either if officials elect what laws they will 
enforce or if citizens elect what laws they will support.  The worst evil of 
disrespect for some law is that it destroys respect for all law.”298  The 1931 
report of the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforce-
ment (the Wickersham Commission), observed that “law will be ob-
served and may be enforced only where and to the extent that it reflects 
or is an expression of the general opinion of the normally law-abiding el-
ements of the community.”  “It is therefore a serious impairment of the 
legal order to have a national law upon the books theoretically governing 
the whole land and announcing a policy for the whole land which public 
opinion in many important centers will not enforce . . . .”299  The collapse 
of Prohibition came soon after the release of the Report.300 
The absent-law cases also provide some help in implementing a sys-
tem of empirical desert as a distributive principle, for they tell us some-
thing about the relative importance of different rules in the eyes of lay 
persons.  This may be relevant to implementing empirical desert because 
one might speculate that deviation from the most important rules, as the 
community sees them, is more likely to produce the alienation that would 
undercut deference and cooperation.  In judging the relative importance 
of different rules, one might guess that given the difficult situations of 
many absent-law groups, they were most likely to turn their attention to 
adopting the rules that they saw as the most important; they would not 
waste their limited time and energy sorting out rules of only collateral 
importance.  Thus, the rules most common among the absent-law groups 
 
 297. MARK THORNTON, CATO INSTITUTE POLICY ANALYSIS NO. 157: ALCOHOL PROHIBITION 
WAS A FAILURE 1 (1991).   
 298. Harry Gene Levine, The Birth of American Alcohol Control: Prohibition, the Power Elite, 
and the Problem of Lawlessness, 12 CONTEMP. DRUG PROBS. 63, 68 (1985). 
 299. H.R. DOC. NO. 722, at 49 (1931). 
 300. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII (repealed 1933). 
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may be those that a criminal law should consider as essential, and from 
which deviations from community views might be most costly. 
The prohibitions that seem to be near the top of all the lists in our 
case studies—sometimes the only items on the list—are those against 
physical aggression and taking property from another without consent.  
As it happens, these are the same wrongs that are shown by empirical 
study to have high levels of agreement across all demographics in judging 
their relative blameworthiness; they have been termed the “core of 
wrongdoing.”301  That the groups in absent-law situations look first to 
these would seem consistent with those empirical studies. 
What, if anything, can the absent-law cases tell us about the content 
of groups’ punishment judgments?  As already noted, the absent-law 
cases seem to confirm recent empirical research that people naturally 
look to principles of desert when imposing punishment, rather than to 
principles of general deterrence or incapacitation.302  For example, the 
case studies provide many examples of groups that, despite their difficult 
circumstances, relied upon a principle of proportionality to blamewor-
thiness in assessing punishment.  Recall the examples in Part II.C.2 of 
proportionality of punishments among groups such as mining camps, 
Jamestown, pirates, and Eskimos.303  Note that such a blameworthiness-
proportionality principle commonly conflicts with the modern crime-
control theories of general deterrence and incapacitation.304 
Similarly, the case studies provide many examples of groups that 
recognized a wide variety of blamelessness-based defenses and mitiga-
tions.  Recall the examples in Part II.C.2 of the Andes survivors giving a 
mistake defense to one of their group, the three pirate captains who bor-
rowed clothing from the common loot being let off because of lack of in-
tent, wagon train juries giving a self-defense justification, the Globe 
group recognizing a coercion excuse, and the Attica prisoner council 
providing an insanity defense to an inmate.305  The recognition of these 
defenses and mitigations, even in the difficult circumstances of the ab-
sent-law groups, suggests that adhering to justice is sufficiently important 
to lay persons that deviations from empirical desert are likely to under-
mine the criminal law’s moral credibility with them, and thus its ability to 
harness the powerful forces of normative influence. 
On the other hand, the absent-law cases do show that groups can be 
deflected from their focus on desert.  Recall the examples reviewed in 
Part II.D.1 of the Andes group forgoing punishment of the food theft to 
 
 301. Robinson & Kurzban, Concordance, supra note 193, at 1891. 
 302. See supra Part II.C.2. 
 303. See supra text accompanying notes 208–14. 
 304. See ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES, supra note 109, at 12–17.  Of course, it is also 
possible that the liability rules adopted may be distorted in some way by the difficult situations the 
groups commonly are in.  On the other hand, we see similar patterns of liability rules across many dif-
ferent situations suggesting that they are a product of something else, not just the unique situation. 
 305. See supra text accompanying notes 216–30. 
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avoid group upset, the Attica prisoner council ignoring violations of the 
sexual-activity ban, the women on Pitcairn forgoing punishment of their 
abusers because it would be difficult to manage the island without them, 
and the Netsilik failing to punish insult killings because they could not 
afford losing another hunter.306  But the cases also suggest that people re-
vert back to their default of just deserts when the immediate danger is 
removed or controlled.  Recall the examples in Part II.D.2 of the Maroon 
communities dropping the death penalty for nearly all offenses once they 
had made peace with the British, the Netsilik dropping their tolerance of 
insult killings once their living conditions had improved, the return to an 
intolerance of prostitution in Berlin as food became available, and the 
San Francisco Vigilance Committee disbanding itself.307  Recall that both 
of these dynamics—the distraction from desert by a threat to personal 
safety and a reversion to desert upon removal of the threat—are con-
sistent with recent studies on lay judgments in imposing punishment.308 
On the other hand, the absent-law case studies also illustrate some 
dangers in tracking community views.  In the Pitcairn case, for example, 
the male inhabitants might well argue that their sexual abuse of the 
women on the island, including the young girls, is conduct that was not 
socially prohibited in that isolated culture.  Recall that many women in 
the community supported the men, making it difficult for the outside au-
thorities to effectively prosecute them.309  In the end, the few men who 
were held criminally liable by the outside authorities served less than two 
years in prison as punishment for committing what the outside world saw 
as many serious offenses.310  Thus, tracking community views could pro-
duce an appalling result because community views can be seriously off 
track. 
One might look at the Pitcairn case and conclude that the men’s 
perverse view of the propriety of intercourse with young girls was not the 
community view but only the view of the males, and that the apparent 
community support was obtained only by social pressure.  That is, one 
might view the Pitcairn problem not so much as an example of a perverse 
community view but rather as a failure of democracy—the women’s 
views were ignored.  (Note that after the spotlight of outside scrutiny, the 
younger women generally left the island.  A recent count shows that 
while little girls and older adult women remain, only one woman be-
tween the ages of eleven and thirty-one still lives there,311 which would 
seem to undercut the view that the most sexually attractive women and 
girls shared the view that the intercourse was an acceptable norm.)  But 
 
 306. See supra text accompanying notes 257–63, 268–75. 
 307. See supra text accompanying notes 280–84. 
 308. See supra text accompanying notes 285–89. 
 309. See supra text accompanying notes 268–72. 
 310. See MARKS, supra note 36, at 143–54. 
 311. See Pitcairn Islands Study Ctr., Pitcairn’s Population, PAC. UNION C., http://library. 
puc.edu/pitcairn/pitcairn/population.shtml (last updated Feb. 1, 2013). 
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even if Pitcairn is not a case of a deviant norm being given deference, it 
does illustrate how such a situation could come about, which would seem 
to present a problem for the empirical desert proposal. 
B. Restorative Justice and Jury Sentencing 
The “restorative justice” movement seeks to promote alternative 
adjudication processes to the official criminal justice system.312  A variety 
of processes—such as victim-offender mediation, sentencing circles, or 
restorative conferences—seek to create a better understanding by both 
victim and offender of the causes and consequences of the offense, in an 
attempt to both heal the victim and reintegrate the offender back into 
law-abiding society.313  Most of the processes involve family and friends 
of both the victim and the offender, as well as community members.314  
The founders of the movement had an anti-punishment agenda, although 
that orientation has provoked resistance to the movement and commonly 
left its use limited to cases of minor offenses.315  I and others have argued 
that the potential benefits of restorative processes would support the use 
of such processes in much more serious offenses.316 
Do the absent-law cases have anything to say about the modern re-
storative justice debates?  One might first observe that what is happening 
in most restorative justice processes, especially those processes that in-
volve the larger groups, is the group sorting out for itself what punish-
ment it thinks is appropriate, without legal constraint or guidance.  That, 
of course, is exactly what absent-law groups do.  Further, the makeup of 
most restorative-process groups is not dissimilar to that of many absent-
law groups.  Both tend to include people who are acquainted with and 
involved in the lives of the offender and the victim.  One might conclude, 
then, that what we see happening in the absent-law groups may in some 
way approximate what is happening in many restorative-justice process-
es. 
The absent-law experiences would seem to support the use of re-
storative processes in that they seem to confirm that this sort of decision 
making is something that such groups can do and feel quite comfortable 
doing.  Also in support of restorative processes is the fact that what is go-
ing on there is not something untried and revolutionary but rather some-
thing that is not so different from what human groups have done for 
 
 312. Paul H. Robinson, Restorative Processes & Doing Justice, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 421, 421–22 
(2006) [hereinafter Robinson, Restorative Processes]. 
 313. Id. at 421 n.1. 
 314. Id.  
 315. Id. at 428; Paul H. Robinson, The Virtues of Restorative Processes, the Vices of “Restorative 
Justice,” 2003 UTAH L. REV. 375, 378 [hereinafter Robinson, Virtues & Vices]. 
 316. See Robinson, Restorative Processes, supra note 312, at 428; Robinson, Virtues & Vices, supra 
note 315, at 386; Heather Strang & Lawrence W. Sherman, Repairing the Harm: Victims and Restora-
tive Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 15, 40. 
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thousands of generations and what groups regularly continue to do when 
needed. 
On the other hand, some aspects of the absent-law experience may 
raise concerns, at least for some advocates of restorative justice—
although those same aspects may resolve concerns for some of its oppo-
nents.  As discussed above in the context of empirical desert, we know 
that laypersons, when left to their own devices, look to their notions of 
desert in making liability and punishment decisions (rather than to other 
more instrumentalist concerns such as general deterrence and incapacita-
tion of the dangerous)317 and care a good deal about justice being done.318  
What we have seen of groups in the absent-law situations is consistent 
with this tendency to look to deserved punishment. 
This stands in stark contrast, of course, to what the founders of the 
restorative justice movement wanted.  Their goal was in large part an an-
ti-desert program.319  John Braithwaite, perhaps the most well-known 
early advocate, eventually became more explicit and public about his an-
ti-desert agenda.  “One value of restorative justice is that we should be 
reluctant to resort to punishment. . . . [Restorative justice] involves rejec-
tion of a justice that balances the hurt of the crime with proportionately 
hurtful punishment.”320  These advocates, then, may be troubled by the 
tendency of absent-law groups to focus on deserved punishment, for it 
may suggest that restorative processes are not the path to undercutting 
deserved punishment that they had hoped for.  On the other hand, for 
those who see value in giving deserved punishment,321 whether for deon-
tological reasons or for the crime-control utility that “empirical desert” 
can bring, the tendency of lay groups to look to desert may make restora-
tive processes more attractive than its anti-desert reputation might sug-
gest.322  That insight may reduce resistance to such programs and help 
open the benefits of restorative processes to use with more serious of-
fenses. 
The examination of absent-law situations does, however, offer a 
ground for concern about restorative processes that many may share, no 
matter what their views on desert.  The potential for a perverted norm, 
as illustrated in the previous discussion of the Pitcairn case,323 may be 
even more problematic for restorative justice than for empirical desert.  
 
 317. See supra note 293 and accompanying text.  
 318. See supra notes 193–200, 293 and accompanying text. 
 319. Robinson & Darley, Implications, supra note 197, at 13.  
 320. John Braithwaite, A Future Where Punishment Is Marginalized: Realistic or Utopian?, 46 
UCLA L. REV. 1727, 1743 (1999).   
 321. Both those supporting empirical desert and those supporting deontological desert see the 
former as the best practical approximation of the latter.  See generally Paul H. Robinson, Competing 
Conceptions of Modern Desert: Vengeful, Deontological, and Empirical, 67 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 145 
(2008) [hereinafter Robinson, Competing Conceptions]. 
 322. See Robinson, Restorative Processes, supra note 312, at 426–28; Robinson, Virtues & Vices, 
supra note 316, at 380. 
 323. See supra text accompanying notes 268–72. 
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If the members of the restorative-process group share that perverted 
norm, then it will get full play in the group’s decision making.  What is 
worse, under a traditional legal system in which the liability and punish-
ment rules are public and explicit, shared perverse views are more likely 
to be exposed, and challenged.  But given the private nature of restora-
tive-process decision making and the absence of explicit rules, a pervert-
ed norm may be well hidden.  That lack of transparency reduces the 
chances of larger public scrutiny. 
Imagine the results in the Pitcairn case if restorative processes had 
been used.  The same social pressures that brought recantations by the 
complainants and community support for the offenders would likely have 
produced a restorative-justice result that minimized, if not trivialized, the 
wrongdoing, and allowed the abusers to escape all sanction.  That is, the 
use of restorative processes in place of traditional legal liability and pun-
ishment rules may help maintain perverted norms rather than challenge 
them. 
A second danger that restorative justice processes may share with 
the absent-law cases is the potential for lack of uniformity in application 
among different decision-making groups.  While shared intuitions may 
bring some similarity in treatment, the absence of guidelines or of any in-
formation about what has been done in other similar cases invites dispar-
ity in application that could be avoided.  Unlike the absent-law situa-
tions, this weakness can be fixed in the restorative justice context, simply 
by providing non-binding guidelines—reports of what was done in other, 
similar cases—that the group can include in its decision making. 
If one wanted to keep the community views of absent-law cases but 
keep it within tighter control of legal guidelines, one could adopt a sys-
tem of jury sentencing.  (It would not, of course, have the special benefits 
of restorative processes that engage offenders and their victims.)  That is, 
one can imagine a system in which community views on proper punish-
ment were given weight, but under the guidance of a criminal justice sys-
tem that assured greater transparency and uniformity in application.  
Today six states use forms of jury sentencing in non-capital felony cas-
es.324  Following a conviction, juries choose a sentence within a prescribed 
statutory range.325  Under current procedures, the sentencing discretion 
of juries is largely unguided; the trial judge is permitted to reduce a jury 
sentence but not increase it.326 
Current jury sentencing practice does raise some concerns.  Limita-
tions on the amount and type of information made available to juries and 
 
 324. The six states include: Arkansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas, and Virginia.  See 
Melissa Carrington, Note, Applying Apprendi to Jury Sentencing: Why State Felony Jury Sentencing 
Threatens the Right to a Jury Trial, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1359, 1360. 
 325. Id. at 1361 (noting that, in contrast to judges, sentencing juries are not permitted to sentence 
defendants to probation or to defer sentences). 
 326. Id.; see also Nancy J. King, How Different Is Death? Jury Sentencing in Capital and Non-
Capital Cases Compared, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 195, 195 (2004). 
ROBINSON.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/29/2013  2:15 PM 
480 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2013 
on the range of sentences from which juries can choose, in comparison to 
sentencing judges, limit their ability to impose a sentence that truly re-
flects the community’s views.327  At the same time, the inability of a jury 
to put the case at hand into the wider perspective of how similar cases 
have been dealt with in the past invites unfortunate disparity in applica-
tion among similar cases.  Still, one can imagine a reformed system of ju-
ry sentencing that avoids these problems by providing sentencing guide-
lines for a full range of punishments, as are now commonly given to 
sentencing judges. 
C. Non-Incarcerative Sanctions 
The past several decades have seen a growing interest in non-
incarcerative sanctions.  Some writers have even advocated the abolition 
of prisons,328 but more commonly there is support for using sanctions 
other than prison whenever possible.329  The absent-law situations offer a 
perspective on this issue because, given their circumstances, prison com-
monly is not a punishment option.  Ship or plane wreck groups have no 
means of jailing an offender, nor do wagon trains, gold miners, or the 
nomadic Eskimos.  Even where groups are more settled, incarceration as 
a form of punishment requires a central government to administer it, 
which was simply not available to pirate colonies, for example.  And 
where the absent-law groups are themselves already prisoners, they have 
insufficient control over their institutions to do so, as in Treblinka, the 
Japanese camps, or the leper colony on Molokai. 
The current interest in non-incarcerative punishments derives from 
a variety of reasons: alternatives to prison may be cheaper, they may 
avoid exposing the offender to other criminals, they may provide greater 
possibilities for rehabilitation, they may reduce the problem of subse-
quent reintegration into society and prevent the problem of social dis-
placement, and they are perceived by some as less degrading to the of-
fender; and currently there is little evidence to suggest that the 
alternatives are less effective than incarceration in deterring various 
crimes.330  Some people also support alternatives to incarceration because 
they see them as a useful path to avoid deserved punishment.331  But giv-
 
 327. See Nancy J. King & Rosevelt L. Noble, Felony Jury Sentencing in Practice: A Three-State 
Study, 57 VAND. L. REV. 885, 888–89 (2004); Carrington, supra note 324, at 1370–72. 
 328. Angela Y. Davis & Dylan Rodriguez, The Challenge of Prison Abolition: A Conversation, 27 
SOC. JUST. 212, 212 (2000).  
 329. See Developments in the Law—Alternatives to Incarceration, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1863, 1866 
(1998); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 592 (1996); 
Marsha Weissman, Aspiring to the Impracticable: Alternatives to Incarceration in the Era of Mass In-
carceration, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 235, 237–47 (2009). 
 330. Kahan, supra note 329, at 592; see also Developments in the Law—Alternatives to Incarcera-
tion, supra note 329, at 1969–74.   
 331. See, e.g., JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PHILIP PETTIT, NOT JUST DESERTS: A REPUBLICAN 
THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 6–7 (1990); Mirko Bagaric & Kumar Amarasekara, The Errors of Re-
tributivism, 24 MELB. U. L. REV. 124, 126 (2000); Braithwaite, supra note 319, at 1745–77; James Gilli-
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en the strength of people’s interest in having serious wrongdoing pun-
ished, this justification for alternatives to prison is likely to leave such al-
ternatives limited to use in only minor offenses, as with restorative jus-
tice. 
The real challenge for the movement is to broaden the use of non-
incarcerative sanctions to serious offenses, but that requires developing 
alternatives that will have sufficient punitive bite to serve as an adequate 
prison substitute.  The layperson’s demand for justice ought not be taken 
to discourage the movement.  One of the more obvious conclusions that 
one can draw from the absent-law experience is that a group can create 
what is seen as a morally credible system for responding to serious 
wrongdoing without the use of prison.  Whatever level of punishment is 
required, the cases show that it can be provided through non-
incarcerative means.  One would need to take account of the different 
levels of punitiveness inherent in different punishment methods,332 of 
course, but once this factoring has been done, there seems little reason 
that one could not provide the full deserved-punishment amount by us-
ing a non-incarcerative or combination of non-incarcerative sanctions.333 
If the proponents of alternative sanctions have a difficulty, it is that 
a sanction with sufficient punitive bite to substitute for prison may be 
unattractive or unavailable in a modern U.S. criminal justice system.  
There are serious constitutional limits to the use of non-incarcerative 
forms of punishment, even when used with the agreement of the offender 
as a means of avoiding or reducing prison time.334  Voluntary castration, 
for example, has been held unconstitutional by some courts, even when 
offered as an alternative to incarceration at the defendant’s option.335 
 
gan & Bandy Lee, Beyond the Prison Paradigm: From Provoking Violence to Preventing It by Creating 
“Anti-Prisons” (Residential Colleges and Therapeutic Communities), ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI., Dec. 
2004, at 300, 304–05. 
 332. See Robinson, Competing Conceptions, supra note 321, at 150–52; Paul H. Robinson, Desert, 
Crime Control, Disparity, and Units of Punishment, in PENAL THEORY AND PRACTICE: TRADITION 
AND INNOVATION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 93, 101–04 (Antony Duff et al. eds., 1994) [hereinafter Robin-
son, Units of Punishment].  
 333. Robinson, Units of Punishment, supra note 332, at 98.  
 334. See, e.g., People v. Murillo, 171 Cal. App. 4th 210 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (overturning a proba-
tion condition of mandatory consumption of prescribed medications as overly broad); State v. Living-
ston, 372 N.E.2d 1335 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976) (invalidating on appeal condition that the defendant not 
have another child for five years in a child abuse case); State v. Kline, 963 P.2d 697 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) 
(upholding on appeal a decision prohibiting a man from fathering children until the completion of an-
ger management counseling); State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200 (Wis. 2001) (prohibiting a man convict-
ed of intentionally refusing to pay child support from fathering/bearing child during a probation peri-
od—cert. denied); Krebs v. Schwarz, 568 N.W.2d 26 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (upholding probation 
condition prohibiting convicted party from engaging in sexual intercourse with any women without 
obtaining permission from parole officer); Janet F. Ginzberg, Compulsory Contraception As a Condi-
tion of Probation: The Use and Abuse of Norplant, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 979 (1992) (discussing People v. 
Johnson, No. 29390 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 2, 1991), which involved forced implanted contraception as a 
condition of probation—appeal withdrawn).  For analysis, see generally Michael P. Matthews, Caning 
and the Constitution: Why the Backlash Against Crime Won’t Result in the Back-Lashing of Criminals, 
14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 571 (1998). 
 335. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 326 S.E.2d 410, 411–12 (S.C. 1985). 
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The practices in the absent-law cases illustrate the problem.  Many 
if not most of the wide range of non-incarcerative sanctions would not 
work for us, such as whipping, branding, beating, mutilating (such as “ear 
cropping” in the mining camps and “splitting the nose and ears” among 
pirates), denying food, keeping in painful chains, or punishing relatives.336  
Even if an offender elected any of these punishments in lieu of prison, we 
presumably would not permit their use.  They probably violate prohibi-
tions on punishment in existing constitutional law or perhaps even in in-
ternational law.  The Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ment provision prohibits the use of forms of punishment that are beyond 
civilized standards and the evolving standards of decency.337  Under the 
provision, non-incarcerative sanctions such as hard labor,338 pillory,339 and 
revocation of citizenship340 have been found unconstitutional.341 
Might there be other non-incarcerative sanctions used by absent-law 
groups that might provide realistic alternatives in the modern United 
States?  Some absent-law cases use alternatives that are already common 
in the United States, such as fines, manual labor, and death.  But at least 
two other kinds of sanctions are not so common in current practice and 
might not be prohibited (or might) by our legal and moral limitations on 
punishment method: banishment and various forms of shaming. 
We see several forms of banishment in the absent-law cases.  In the 
mining camps, offenders were often ejected from the camp as their for-
mal punishment.342  When the San Francisco Vigilance Committee was in 
control of the city, they would send letters to people who they concluded 
were criminals, telling them to leave the city.343  The wagon trains ejected 
 
 336. JOHN BOESSENECKER, GOLD DUST AND GUNSMOKE: TALES OF GOLD RUSH OUTLAWS, 
GUNFIGHTERS, LAWMEN, AND VIGILANTES 30–31, 51 (1999) (discussing flogging, branding, and ear 
cropping); KONSTAM, supra note 242, at 186; MARKS, supra note 36, at 42; PRICE, supra note 28, at 
108. 
 337. See Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Let’s Make a Deal: Waiving the Eighth Amendment by Selecting a 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 32 CONN. L. REV. 615, 619–30 (2000). 
 338. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 382 (1910).   
 339. Id. at 377–78.  
 340. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103 (1958).   
 341. These same constitutional limitations constrain the conditions under which the state may 
confine persons convicted of crimes.  See Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 286 (1977) (stating that 
prison authorities may not “withhold from prisoners the basic necessities of life, which include reason-
ably adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, and necessary medical attention”).  The proscription 
also prohibits excessive use of force by prison officers and unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, 
even if the use of force does not cause a serious injury.  Some inference can be made from this body of 
case law to the constitutional permissibility of non-incarcerative sanctions.  See Rhodes v. Chapman, 
452 U.S. 337, 368 (1981); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978); Graves v. Tex. Dep’t of Corr. 
Emps., 827 S.W.2d 47, 48 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992); 60 AM. JUR. 2D Penal and Correctional Etc. § 24 
(2003). 
 342. SHINN, supra note 21, at 172–73.  
 343. WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 234.  
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members for some types of misbehavior.344  Some pirate groups adopted 
rules that specified various forms of abandonment.345 
No doubt there would need to be limitations on a modern form of 
banishment, although it is not entirely clear what they might be.  Both 
interstate and intrastate forms of banishment are practiced in several 
states,346 however, the latter is more commonly applied and some states 
explicitly prohibit the former.347  A few states theoretically ban the use of 
banishment, but permit incorporation of sentence conditions that essen-
tially achieve the same purpose, and exclude an individual from a defined 
geographical location.348  Banishment sentences have been challenged on 
constitutional as well as public policy grounds, and upheld by some 
courts,349 but banned by others.350  The issue has not yet been reviewed by 
the U.S. Supreme Court. 
As a thought exercise, one might imagine a program in which a non-
dangerous offender is set up in a remote small town, but one large 
enough to have a sheriff.  Obviously this could not be done without the 
consent of the town officials, but such consent might be easily induced 
with a municipal grant of an amount less than the cost of the offender’s 
imprisonment.  Twenty thousand dollars a year might be a significant 
windfall for a remote small town.  The offender would be obliged to sup-
port himself, as everyone else in town does, although one would not start 
such a placement without some initial employment arranged.  Not much 
happens in a small town that people don’t know about, and this variation 
on “it takes a village to raise a child” might, through the natural dynam-
ics that arise when people live together, provide the offender with useful 
supervision and guidance.  As the absent-law cases illustrate, when re-
 
 344. C.F. MCGLASHAN, HISTORY OF THE DONNER PARTY: A TRAGEDY OF THE SIERRA 49 (8th 
ed. 1907). 
 345. LEESON, supra note 108, at 61. 
 346. For example, Georgia, Mississippi, Florida, Wisconsin, Kentucky, and Oregon.  See Matthew 
D. Borrelli, Note, Banishment: The Constitutional and Public Policy Arguments Against This Revived 
Ancient Punishment, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 469, 473, 479 (2003). 
 347. For example Georgia, Wisconsin, and Mississippi.  See id. at 473. 
 348. See State v. Collett, 208 S.E.2d 472, 472–73, 474 (Ga. 1974); State v. Franklin, 604 N.W.2d 79, 
84 (Minn. 2000). 
 349. Thompson v. Ashe, 250 F.3d 399, 406–07 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that intrastate banishment 
does not affect freedom of movement); Collett, 208 S.E.2d at 473 (holding banishment permissive in 
Georgia); Adams v. State, 527 S.E.2d 911, 912 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000); Edwards v. State, 327 S.E.2d 559, 
561 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985) (holding banishment as a valid condition of probation); Parkerson v. State, 
274 S.E.2d 799, 799–800 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980); State v. Jacobs, 692 P.2d 1387, 1389 (Or. Ct. App. 1984) 
(acknowledging use of banishment for probation); State v. Nienhardt, 537 N.W.2d 123, 125–26 (Wis. 
Ct. App. 1995) (holding banishment permissive in Wisconsin). 
 350. Commonwealth v. Pike, 701 N.E.2d 951, 960 (Mass. 1998) (noting that a majority of courts 
consider interstate banishment to violate the freedom of travel); People v. Baum, 231 N.W. 95, 96 
(Mich. 1930) (stating that pushing criminals into other states does not comport with public policy, vio-
lates constitutional principles, creates a large burden on states’ societal and economic areas, and im-
pacts the relationships between states that support banishment and the ones that do not); Henry v. 
State, 280 S.E.2d 536, 536–37 (S.C. 1981) (reversing sentencing condition of banishment, holding it to 
be a constitutional violation).  
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mote groups have to live together, they tend to develop means by which 
they can all get along. 
Related to banishment is shunning—a kind of “banishment in 
place”—where members of the group simply will not converse with or 
deal with the offender.  This can be an attractive option for an absent-law 
group because it may allow the group to still get the benefit of the of-
fender’s labor, while nonetheless imposing some kind of punishment for 
his violation.  Shunning was used in the Maroons and in Anguilla.351  
Shunning also has a shaming quality to it, which is a form of punishment 
made more explicit in some sanctions. 
The absent-law cases show the use of a variety of shaming penalties.  
In the Japanese-run prison camps, for example, the prisoners used shame 
to sanction fellow prisoners.  When a cook stole a man’s shoes, he was 
required by the group to wear a sign around his neck that read “I AM A 
THIEF.”352  Among the Netsilik Inuit, derision and shame are common 
forms of correction.  In one form—formalized song duels (perhaps the 
first rap battles?)—two men compose and perform insulting songs about 
one another.353  Sung at public gatherings, the group expresses their views 
on the relative truth of the various insults through their laughs and 
jeers.354  In Somalia, the tribal group might let a car thief off with a sen-
tence of simply having to return the vehicle, but with all parties under-
standing that the real punishment would be the shame of the “convic-
tion,” which would change the man’s life by leaving him branded as 
untrustworthy by others in his tribal group.355  Some forms of shaming 
went beyond what we would find acceptable today.  For example, the pi-
rates used shame of a sort through their scarring punishments, such as 
splitting a man’s ears and nose to leave scars that advertised him to be a 
thief.356  And gold miners and vigilance committees used a similar ap-
proach, branding a man on his face, often with a “T” for thief or with an 
“HT” for horse thief.357 
Such use of shaming is all the more impressive because it is used in 
difficult circumstances in which the group cannot afford the luxury of a 
punishment that does not work.  That is, use in the absent-law situations 
suggests that shaming penalties really can be forms of punishment with 
 
 351. The people of Anguilla found that to voice opinions other than those of the majority quickly 
lead to ostracism.  Victor Banks, Twenty-Five Years Later: Time to Regroup, in COLVILLE L. PETTY & 
NAT HODGE, 25TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ANGUILLIAN REVOLUTION 1967–1992, at 17, 17–19 (1992).  
It also was used on Pitcairn—against the victims of child abuse because of their original decision to 
participate in the abuse prosecutions.  MARKS, supra note 36, at 268–69. 
 352. GENE S. JACOBSEN, WE REFUSED TO DIE: MY TIME AS A PRISONER OF WAR IN BATAAN 
AND JAPAN, 1942–1945, at 169 (2004). 
 353. BALIKCI, supra note 41, at 143, 186; VAN DEN STEENHOVEN, supra note 107, at 29–36.  
 354. BALIKCI, supra note 41, at 186. 
 355. Louisa Lombard, Elder Counsel: How Somalia’s Aged Tribal Justice System Keeps the Peace 
in a Country Known for Chaos, LEGAL AFFAIRS (Sept.–Oct. 2005), http://www.legalaffairs.org/ 
issues/September-October-2005/scene_lombard_sepoct05.msp.  
 356. See KONSTAM, supra note 242, at 186. 
 357. BOESSENECKER, supra note 336, at 31. 
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significant punitive bite, and thus might well provide an adequate substi-
tute for incarceration even in cases of serious offenses.  Some modern 
writers have come to a similar conclusion about the effectiveness of 
shaming, adding, for example that the “degradation ceremony” embed-
ded in shaming sanctions creates deep discomfort and unpleasantness for 
most people, and the offender is likely to be as “shunned in the market-
place as they are in the public square,” leading to possible financial con-
sequences.358  For some offenders and some offenses, public shaming may 
well have a very high punitive bite. 
Shaming is also supported because it is said to shape social prefer-
ences by unambiguously marking “the offender’s behavior as contrary to 
community moral norms.”359  “[T]hey send a clear signal about the types 
of preferences well formed persons should and shouldn’t have.”360  It is, 
they argue, a social expression of condemnation,361 and its flexible im-
plementation enables its adaptation to the specific circumstances of the 
offender.362  It provides the means “to express, reinforce, and even shape 
social norms.”363  They argue that, in comparison to incarceration, “sham-
ing an offender was less cruel, less publicly degrading, and less likely to 
interfere with an offender’s future prospects.”364  It can provide a cost ef-
fective alternative to mass incarceration, while producing “roughly equal 
punitive properties.”365 
On the other hand, opponents of shaming sanctions often view them 
as inordinately cruel, inhumane, and demeaning to the offender,366 since 
they frequently involve a loss of respect that can lead to a “crippling di-
minishment of self-esteem” and “serious financial hardship.”367  Further, 
some hypothesize a detrimental effect on an offender as it encourages 
him to view himself as an outcast, which can push him to associate with 
marginal deviant social groups, leading to continuing criminal involve-
ment.368  Finally, opponents note the chance of incidents of vigilantism 
against shamed defendants, which they believe promote a spirit of public 
indecency and brutality.369  Of course, a response to some of these criti-
 
 358. See Kahan, supra note 329, at 638. 
 359. Id. at 639. 
 360. Id.  
 361. Id. at 635–36. 
 362. Note, Shame, Stigma, and Crime: Evaluating the Efficacy of Shaming Sanctions in Criminal 
Law, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2186, 2190–91 (2003) [hereinafter Shame, Stigma, and Crime].  
 363. Id. at 2190–91. 
 364. Dan Markel, Wrong Turns on the Road to Alternative Sanctions: Reflections on the Future of 
Shaming Punishments and Restorative Justice, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1385, 1391 (2007). 
 365. NORVAL MORRIS & MICHAEL TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON AND PROBATION: INTERMEDIATE 
PUNISHMENTS IN A RATIONAL SENTENCING SYSTEM 90 (1990).  
 366. Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880, 
1942–43 (1991). 
 367. Kahan, supra note 329, at 638. 
 368. JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION 67 (1989).  
 369. Markel, supra note 364, at 1390; James Q. Whitman, What Is Wrong with Inflicting Shame 
Sanctions?, 107 YALE L.J. 1055, 1059 (1998). 
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cisms may be that, while shaming penalties may have some problems, 
those problems are less than the problems associated with incarceration. 
As to the effectiveness of shaming penalties, while the absent-law 
experience suggests that they can be quite effective, there may be rea-
sons to wonder whether that effectiveness would survive their transplan-
tation to the modern United States.  Shaming can provide punitive bite 
only if the offender values the respect of those who would see the public 
pronouncement as something shameful.  Such is commonly the case in 
the absent-law situations, but might not be the case in the modern Unit-
ed States, where there is often a high degree of anonymity and a lack of 
social interdependency.370  This is especially the case where the people 
whose views the offender cares about reject the norm at issue, as perhaps 
with gang members.  Nor is an attempt at shaming likely to have much 
effect when used for an offense for which there is only mixed support of 
the underlying norm, as perhaps with some drug offenses.  Given that in 
the federal system, in particular, a high proportion of the prison popula-
tion is incarcerated for drug offenses,371 shaming penalties as an alterna-
tive to incarceration may not be feasible.  Ironically, then, the less the 
support for the underlying norm, the more difficult it is to use shaming 
penalties as an effective alternative for prison.372  Further, the more 
anonymous an offender, the less an offender may care what others think 
of him.373 
On the other hand, the more people get used to anonymity, the 
more jolting it may be to be the center of attention for one’s bad deeds.  
Moreover, the past decade has marked the re-emergence of social status 
as a high-stakes asset, due to the proliferation of civic and professional 
communities and technological advancements that enhance the dissemi-
nation of social information.374  A modern example of the effect of sham-
ing punishments can be found in cases in which offenders risk long prison 
terms to avoid being listed on a public sexual offender registry.375  In an 
Arizona case, for example, a defendant rejected a plea agreement that 
limited his prison sentence to three and a half years, thereby risking a 
twenty-eight-year sentence after trial, when he learned that the plea 
agreement would have him listed on the public registry.376  In another 
case, a defendant accused of sexual offences initially agreed to plead 
 
 370. See Massaro, supra note 366, at 1932; Shame, Stigma, and Crime, supra note 362, at 2193–94.   
 371. Quick Facts About the Bureau of Prisons, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, 
http://www.bop.gov/news/quick.jsp#4 (last updated Jan. 26, 2013) (indicating that as of Jan. 26, 2013, 
inmates convicted of drug offenses accounted for 47.4% of the federal prison system population). 
 372. See Massaro, supra note 366, at 1884. 
 373. See id. at 1932. 
 374. Kahan, supra note 329, at 642.  Compare this with the older examples of shaming found in 
BRAITHWAITE, supra note 368, at 58–59. 
 375. Policymakers have expressed concern about this tendency of sex offenders to reject plea 
agreements to avoid the registration requirement.  Doron Teichman, Sex, Shame, and the Law: An 
Economic Perspective on Megan’s Laws, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 355, 390–92 (2005). 
 376. Id. at 392. 
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guilty to reduced charges, but withdrew and proceeded to trial after 
learning of the registration requirement.377 
No doubt there will remain reservations about the use of shaming 
penalties.  On the issue of efficacy, however, the absent-law cases suggest 
that there is good reason to believe that they can be an effective penalty 
with serious punitive bite in specific situations.  Whether the costs and 
risks of shaming should be tolerated may depend upon how they com-
pare to the costs and risks of incarceration. 
D. Transitional Justice and Truth Commissions 
Transitional justice commonly refers to the variety of mechanisms 
by which a country with a history of civil conflict—perhaps a dictatorship 
that has abused its citizens, a civil war, or ethnic or religious conflict—
deals with past wrongdoing in an attempt to transition to a stable post-
conflict society, commonly democratic.378  Typically this involves an 
agreement to do less than justice would require in punishing offenders in 
order to put the conflict behind it.  For example, a society might adopt a 
policy that gives amnesty to past offenders in return for giving public 
statements to “truth commissions.”  The most well-known example of 
this may be the Truth and Reconciliation Commission established in 
post-apartheid South Africa in 1995.379  People who work in the field give 
it an earlier starting date. 
The origins of the transitional justice field can be traced back to the 
post-World War II period in Europe with the establishment of the 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg and the various de-
Nazification programs in Germany and the trials of Japanese sol-
diers. . . . The field gained momentum and coherence during the 
1980s and onwards, beginning with the trials of former members of 
the military juntas in Greece (1975) and Argentina (Trial of the 
Juntas, 1983).380 
Absent-law situations naturally tend to create transitional justice is-
sues.  The difficult circumstances commonly produce strong personal mo-
tivations for opportunistic wrongdoing, and many such situations eventu-
ally transition into a law-ordered society.  Sometimes the end of the 
absent-law situation is simply a return to a previously-existing society, as 
with rescues after wrecks, in which the society’s existing rules govern 
what is to be done about past wrongdoing.  Sometimes the absent-law 
groups themselves create or help create the post-lawless society.  The 
 
 377. Id. 
 378. What is Transitional Justice?, INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUST., http://www.ictj.org/about 
/transitional-justice (last visited Feb. 17, 2013). 
 379. TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA REPORT (1998), available at 
http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/report/index.htm. 
 380. Transitional Justice, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transitional_justice (last modi-
fied Feb. 8, 2013); see also Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 69, 
70–72 (2003). 
ROBINSON.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/29/2013  2:15 PM 
488 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2013 
wagon trains that settled in Oregon formed a government of their own 
until the region became a territory and then a state.381  The gold eventual-
ly ran out in California but many miners stayed and were an important 
voice in the territory and eventually in the formation of California as a 
state.382  The pirates who accepted the king’s pardon often began new 
lives in the Bahamas,383 where, as people of wealth, they had influence in 
the new societies being created.  The Netsilik people and other Inuit of 
Canada now have their own territory, Nunavut, where the law of Canada 
and their traditional law are woven together.384 
When the absent-law situation passes, what, if anything, is to be 
done to punish past wrongdoing that had gone unpunished because of 
the limitations inherent in the absent-law situation?  Often a “transition-
al justice” approach is taken, in which past misdeeds are to be ignored 
and the focus is to be upon a stable and peaceful future.  The experiences 
of the absent-law cases offer both support and warnings to the practice of 
transitional justice, especially where, as with the use of truth commis-
sions, past serious wrongdoing is rather clearly not punished. 
The warning for transitional justice comes from the demonstration 
in many cases that doing justice is important to people, even people in 
difficult circumstances for whom doing justice has a direct personal cost.  
Recall from Part II.C.1 the absent-law operation of the justice principle: 
the miners of California gave up precious mining time to conduct crimi-
nal trials, as did the pioneers of the wagon trains; Nazi prisoners gave up 
precious sleep to capture bread thieves in the barracks; the Warsaw ghet-
to underground used precious ammunition and exposed themselves to 
personal risk to kill collaborators; the San Francisco Vigilance Commit-
tee risked prosecution and assault to try to bring order where a corrupt 
government had failed.385  Similarly, recall the examples in Part II.D.2 in 
which an absent-law society reverted to doing justice as soon as it could 
afford to do so.386 
It would be nice to think that all can be forgiven and a society can 
move ahead to a blissful future, but that belief can sometimes be mere 
wishful thinking.  Not doing justice can be a festering sore that poisons 
any chance of a stable future.  And the loss of moral credibility in a sys-
tem that appears to condone such past failures of justice can make it 
more difficult for that system to earn the moral authority that will be 
needed to bring peace and stability.  Recall from Part II.C.3 the exam-
ples of the need of moral credibility if a group is to have stable social co-
operation: the Batavia crew defected from Cornelisz—even though he 
 
 381. RUMER, supra note 27, at 48. 
 382. SHINN, supra note 21, at 279–86. 
 383. See WOODARD, supra note 31, at 230, 259.  For a discussion of the pirates’ transition process, 
see id. at 226–61. 
 384. Telephone Interview by Sarah Robinson with Anne Crawford, supra note 281. 
 385. See supra text accompanying notes 167–92.  
 386. See supra text accompanying notes 280–84. 
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had the resources—to join the other, weaker but more just group; on the 
Globe, the non-mutineers complied with orders only until they had a 
chance to escape; and the pirate crews were prompted to abandon the 
life aboard legal but abusive privateers to join illegal but more democrat-
ic pirate ships.387 
On the other hand, the absent-law experiences do in some ways 
lend support to the use of transitional justice.  First, it shows that transi-
tional justice is not a modern invention of untested value.  We think of 
the practice as post-World War II, but the absent-law cases remind us 
that it is an ancient practice.  The pirates were given a pardon in 1717 to 
integrate them back into lawful society.388  The Maroons too were par-
doned for their past warring against the British in exchange for an 
agreement to cease those activities.389  In Pakistan, where corruption 
among the police was a major obstacle to effective crime control, a re-
form program held a ceremony for a hundred admittedly corrupt police 
officers who swore to never take bribes again.390  In the 1990s, post-
Escobar Colombia ignored the deeds of both the officials whose corrup-
tion allowed Pablo Escobar to come to power and the members of Los 
Pepes whose terroristic means helped bring him down.391  There are many 
other examples of such pragmatic pardons throughout history, of course, 
in other than absent-law situations.392 
Indeed, the dynamic during the absent-law situations also shows the 
common reliance upon the basic trade-off at the root of transitional jus-
tice: absent-law groups sometimes ignored violations of their own rules 
to preserve the stability of the group.  Recall from Part II.D.1 the Andes 
wreck group ignoring the food theft during the preparation of body strips 
for eating, the Attica prisoner council ignoring the violations of their 
rules against attacking hostages or having sex, the Pitcairn Island women 
opposing the prosecution of their abusers, the Netsilik ignoring insult 
killings, and Prohibition agents’ unwillingness to publicly expose power-
ful persons who continued to drink, such as the President.393  This trading 
of justice for stability is not a novel practice but rather likely an integral 
part of the story of human group survival since the Serengeti Plain. 
On the other hand, as noted above, such compromises of justice 
have costs to the system’s credibility.  As common as the practice was in 
 
 387. See supra text accompanying notes 236–49. 
 388. LEESON, supra note 108, at 146. 
 389. CAMPBELL, supra note 32, at 113–15. 
 390. Tariq Butt, 100 Corrupt SHOs Take Oath Never to Take Bribes, PAK. DEFENCE (Aug. 2, 
2010), http://www.defence.pk/forums/current-events-social-issues/67851-gujranwala-model-punjab-
police.html. 
 391. See Lee & Thoumi, supra note 232, at 71, 81–82.  
 392. For example, at the end of the American Civil War, Lincoln and his successor, Andrew 
Johnson, issued a series of presidential pardons to help the country move past the war and toward rec-
onciliation and reunification.  Bill Long, Presidential Pardons I (1863–1868) (Sept., 12, 2007), http:// 
www.drbilllong.com/LegalEssays/Pardons.html. 
 393. See supra text accompanying notes 261–62, 266–67, 269, 273–74, 278. 
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absent-law situations to ignore wrongdoing, it was equally common that 
absent-law groups reverted to systems that punished wrongdoing when 
the group’s conditions improved to the point where they could afford to 
do so.  Recall from Part II.D.2, as life in the Maroon communities be-
came easier, they gave up execution as the main form of sanction; when 
the Netsilik stepped back from the brink of starvation, they no longer 
tolerated insult killings; when food markets reappeared in Soviet-
occupied Berlin, prostitution was no longer accepted by the community 
(or by families); and when the San Francisco authorities became more 
able and willing to control crime, the Vigilance Committee disbanded it-
self.394 
In other words, failures of justice were not comfortably accepted 
but only unhappily tolerated, often only grudgingly and temporarily.  
And one does not build a stable society by accumulating grudges to be 
satisfied in the future.  The lesson for proponents of transitional justice is 
to gauge the situation carefully.  Failures of justice might be acceptable 
by one community as a necessary price for “moving on” to a more stable 
and peaceful society, but such failures might not be acceptable to another 
community even in at apparently similar situation. 
The potential for pushing a bad fit is significant.  It is often the exist-
ing regime that uses its present control of the organs of power as lever-
age to get its members immunity from prosecution for their past mis-
deeds through some amnesty scheme.  But even when the transition is 
not dictated by the outgoing regime, as a condition to leaving, but rather 
organized by outsiders, as is commonly the case,395 there exists the danger 
that the resolution of the situation may be biased by the third party’s 
preferences—for forgiveness or for doing justice.  But the goal of future 
stability requires that it be guided instead by the preferences of those 
who are to live in that future society, however unattractive those prefer-
ences may seem to outsiders.  Only the future society’s members can 
judge whether past wrongs can be let go, or whether they will instead 
produce a festering discontent that will undermine the system’s credibil-
ity and increase the likelihood of future conflict. 
E. Use-of-Force Rules Under International Law 
The international law of today exists in what is essentially an ab-
sent-enforcement situation.  The current state of international legal insti-
tutions leaves states with essentially no effective protection: there is no 
international police force for victims to call when another state unlawful-
ly aggresses.396   
 
 394. See supra text accompanying notes 280–84. 
 395. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Transitional Justice As Ordinary Justice, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 762, 769–70 (2004). 
 396. Harrop A. Freeman, International Administrative Law: A Functional Approach to Peace, 57 
YALE L.J. 976, 987 (1948).  
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The United Nations Security Council can authorize the use of 
force to maintain international peace and security, but authoriza-
tion of such a “police action” can be blocked by any one of the Se-
curity Council’s five permanent members or by seven of its ten 
elected members, and member states can refuse to provide military 
or financial support for an authorized action.397   
Moreover, the process of obtaining such a resolution is both burdensome 
and time consuming.  The net effect is that in the sixty-eight years since 
the creation of the United Nations in 1945, such resolutions have been 
passed with respect to only four state-to-state conflicts,398 which is a trivi-
al fraction of the situations in which states have suffered unlawful aggres-
sion of one kind or another.399 
As Adil Haque and I have argued elsewhere,400 the absence of an ef-
fective enforcement mechanism has important implications for the for-
mulation of international law’s use-of-force rules.  Current law’s limita-
tions on the use of force to defend against unlawful aggression 
improperly advantage unlawful aggressors and disadvantage their vic-
tims.  For example, current law bars the use of force that is necessary to 
defend against illegal conduct short of an “armed attack,” bars the use of 
force against unlawful aggressors using another state as a base of opera-
tions, and bars the use of force that is necessary to defend against an im-
minent attack that has not yet begun, even where delay makes effective 
defense impossible.401  It also bars the use of force against states who 
support the unlawful aggression of armed groups, even if that is the only 
way the armed aggression can be stopped, bars the use of force against 
unlawful armed attackers during the period of time between their unlaw-
ful attacks, and bars the use of force against facilities that the unlawful 
attackers use, even if it is the only way to prevent the attacks.402 
No domestic criminal law system would tolerate such rules.  And 
the unjustness of the rules is something that international law should care 
about.  Given the lack of an effective international law enforcement 
mechanism, compliance depends in large measure on the moral authority 
with which international law speaks.  Compliance is less likely when its 
 
 397. Paul H. Robinson & Adil Ahmad Haque, Advantaging Aggressors: Justice & Deterrence in 
International Law, 3 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 143, 184 (2011) [hereinafter Robinson & Haque, Ad-
vantaging Aggressors]. 
 398. See S.C. Res. 678, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (Nov. 29, 1990) (authorizing use of force to compel 
Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait); S.C. Res. 84, U.N. Doc. S/1588 (July 7, 1950) (authorizing use of force 
to compel North Korean withdrawal from South Korea); S.C. Res. 83, U.N. Doc. S/1511 (June 27, 
1950); S.C. Res. 82, U.N. Doc. S/1501 (June 25, 1950); see also S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 
(June 10, 1999) (authorizing use of force to protect former Yugoslav province of Kosovo); S.C. Res. 
794, U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (Dec. 3, 1992) (authorizing use of force to stem civil war in Somalia). 
 399. A partial list of state-to-state invasions (64) since the signing of the U.N. Charter in 1945 is 
available at List of Invasions, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_invasions (last modified 
Jan. 17, 2013), and, of course, unlawful aggression can take many forms short of invasion. 
 400. Robinson & Haque, Advantaging Aggressors, supra note 397, at 183–85. 
 401. Id. at 147–63. 
 402. Id. at 191–201. 
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rules are perceived as obviously unjust.  As discussed in Part III.A, this 
commonsense perspective is supported by social science research show-
ing the importance of law’s moral credibility in gaining assistance and 
deference, in reducing resistance and subversion, and in helping to shape 
shared norms.  The current practice, in which victim states routinely ig-
nore the legal limitations, with studied indifference by the international 
community to such “violations,” only legitimizes and habituates law-
breaking, further undermining international law’s moral credibility.403 
International law limitations on responses to aggression are also 
improper for reasons beyond their conflict with principles of justice in-
stantiated in most countries’ domestic criminal law.  Most fundamentally, 
because international law lacks an effective law enforcement system, to 
effectively deter unlawful aggression, international law needs to have 
fewer limitations than criminal law on responses to unlawful aggression, 
not more limitations.  The current improper limitations have the unfor-
tunate effect of promoting aggression and instability by undermining ef-
fective deterrence.404 
The international law approach seems similar in theory to the ra-
tionale underlying transitional justice: we should sacrifice justice (disal-
lowing victim states from properly defending themselves against unlawful 
aggression) to promote peace and stability (which arguably will follow 
because, if victims do not use force, then there will be no escalation).  
The problem with the approach is similar to and worse than the problem 
with transitional justice, and the lessons from absent-law situations are 
similar. 
Whether a trade-off of justice-for-peace would be desirable and ef-
fective in the transitional justice context depends upon the complexities 
of the situation at hand and the feelings of the parties in conflict.  The 
failures of justice called for by a transitional justice “truth commission,” 
for example, might bring peace, or might simply assure continuing acri-
mony, festering until it boils into violence.  Each case must be judged 
separately.  But the international-law use-of-force rules apply the same 
in all situations, no matter the context or the feelings of the groups.  They 
simply give a permanent public advantage to unlawful aggressors.405 
Further, the international law limitations on defensive force are 
worse than the transitional justice failures of justice because the interna-
tional law rules can show neither a compelling need for, nor a significant 
payoff from, the failures.  In the transitional justice situations, the peace-
for-justice trade-off sometimes may well be the only way to move ahead.  
It is a one-time price that must be paid, and all parties may well see the 
need for it and accept it as a necessary price.  But the international law 
rules do not provide a one-time failure but rather a permanent, continu-
 
 403. Id. at 146–83. 
 404. Id. at 183–214. 
 405. Id. at 147–63.  
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ing failure.  And it is rarely clear that such rules are necessary to avoid a 
greater harm.  A victim state can always choose not to respond to unlaw-
ful aggression if it sees such restraint as being in its long-term interest.  
But the current rules take that decision out of the victim’s hands.  Nor is 
it clear that the current rules avoid a greater harm.  Sometimes using de-
fensive force—or at least having the legal option to use it—will more ef-
fectively avoid greater harm and better advance peace and stability than 
not using force.  Having just rules for resisting unlawful aggression may 
help avoid the aggression in the first place; unjust limitations on the right 
to resist may help encourage it.406 
Still further, recall the system-credibility problem in transitional jus-
tice.  If the failures of justice undermine the moral credibility of the sys-
tem, the system is weakened in its ability to gain the deference needed to 
bring the conflicting parties together.  The international law context 
shows a similar problem.  Without an effective enforcement system, in-
ternational law must rely on its moral authority to gain compliance, but it 
is exactly that moral authority that is eroded when international law sets 
limits on defensive force rules that are so obviously unfair to victims.407 
We know from the absent-law case studies that, with no law en-
forcement mechanism, the strong can abuse the weak.  The experience of 
the Invercauld and of the Cornelisz group from the Batavia illustrate this 
point horribly.408  The cooperation principle discussed in Part II.A.1, 
however, shows how social forces among a group can step in and keep 
the strong in check.409  But the moral authority that can promote such co-
operation can be lost if the rules imposed are viewed by the group as un-
just.  This was the point documented in Part II.C.3’s discussion of the jus-
tice principle.410  In the international context, an international law that 
 
 406. Id. at 163–73. 
 407. Id.  
 408. See supra text accompanying notes 120–33.  
 409. An example of this phenomenon was seen in the Detroit riots of 1971.  Neighborhood social 
groups that had previously put on teas and block parties, reorganized into armed neighborhood watch 
groups to keep rioters out of their neighborhoods.  See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text.  On 
the island of Molokai, the exiles were all sick and without power when seen as individuals.  TAYMAN, 
supra note 38, at 4.  On several occasions, the lepers formed into far more threatening mobs to get the 
attention of supervisors who withheld food or failed to meet the needs of the group.  Id. at 44–45, 65.  
After the wreck of the Grafton, the weakest man, Raynal, was the strongest force behind the social 
cooperation which saved them all.  See DRUETT, supra note 13, at 176–86.  
 410. Recall that in both the wreck of the Batavia, DASH, supra note 18, at 122, and the mutiny of 
the Globe, COMSTOCK, supra note 11, at 91, the leaders were only able to maintain control through 
threat.  San Francisco’s vigilantes only arose because the legal authorities would not act.  SHINN, supra 
note 21, at 230–21.  On Pitcairn, the men were unable to cooperate and in the end only one man was 
left alive.  MARKS, supra note 36, at 17.  While the democratically-run pirate ships found willing re-
cruits when they boarded merchant and naval ships where the men were treated unjustly, LEESON, 
supra note 108, at 11–19, see also text accompanying notes 241–49, Raynal seemed to understand this, 
and when dissent began to grow between the captain and his former crew, Raynal proposed a system 
of laws and sharing of responsibilities.  To emphasize the equity of the plan, Raynal placed himself 
first in line for the new duties.  RAYNAL, supra note 15, at 154.  In San Francisco, when there was no 
government the situation was better than a few months later when an unjust government had come 
into power.  When the citizens of the city realized that the judges were letting criminals go free in ex-
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gains moral credibility by earning a reputation for being just can have 
normative influence.  An international law perceived as unjust can only 
lose moral credibility, and normative influence along with it.  Peace and 
social order require either an effective enforcement power or strong so-
cial influence.  International law’s lack of an effective enforcement 
mechanism means that it, more than domestic criminal justice systems, 
must work to gain moral credibility if it is to have influence. 
F. Criminal Adjudication Procedures: The Practical Value of 
Legitimacy 
Section A notes the practical value that flows from a criminal law’s 
moral credibility derived from earning a reputation for imposing liability 
and punishment results perceived as just.  There is a growing literature 
that suggests a practical value to a criminal adjudication system that 
earns a reputation for fair procedures.411  “Specifically, perceptions of 
procedural fairness—resulting in perceptions of the system’s ‘legitimacy,’ 
as the term is used—may promote systemic compliance with substantive 
law, cooperation with legal institutions and actors, and deference to even 
unfavorable outcomes.”412  (The power of a system’s “legitimacy,” as de-
rived from its reputation for procedural fairness, and its “moral credibil-
ity,” as derived from its reputation for producing just results, are distinct 
dynamics, but they are probably related and may be overlapping.)413   
Two questions are central to the legitimacy debate.  First, does the 
perception of greater fairness in the adjudication process indeed have the 
beneficial “legitimacy” effects claimed: producing greater deference to 
the decision, whether one agrees with it or not?  Second, what are the 
features of an adjudication process that are essential to it being perceived 
as fair, that will best promote its “legitimacy?” 
 
change for bribes, they acted by forming a strong vigilance committee.  WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 
143, 203–07.   
 411. JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL 
ANALYSIS 118 (1975); TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC 
COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS, at xiv (2002); TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY 
THE LAW 161 (1996); Jonathan D. Casper et al., Procedural Justice in Felony Cases, 22 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 483, 486 (1988); Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy 
in Shaping Public Support for Policing, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 513, 534 (2003); Tom R. Tyler & John 
M. Darley, Building a Law-Abiding Society: Taking Public Views About Morality and the Legitimacy 
of Legal Authorities into Account When Formulating Substantive Law, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 707, 723 
(2000) [hereinafter Tyler & Darley, Morality and Legitimacy]; Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legiti-
macy and Cooperation: Why Do People Help the Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?, 6 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 231, 266–67 (2008); Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule 
of Law, 30 CRIME & JUST. 283, 286 (2003); Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy 
and Legitimation, 57 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 375 (2006) (reviewing literature on legitimacy). 
 412. Josh Bowers & Paul H. Robinson, Perceptions of Fairness and Justice: The Shared Aims and 
Occasional Conflicts of Legitimacy and Moral Credibility, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 211, 211 (2012) 
[hereinafter Bowers & Robinson, Legitimacy and Moral Credibility]. 
 413. Id. at 211–12. 
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As to the first question—does legitimacy produce the claimed bene-
ficial deference effect?—Josh Bowers and I have pointed out elsewhere 
that the empirical evidence is not as clear as one might guess, given the 
popularity of the concept.414  Most legitimacy research concerns itself 
with the second question—what will produce a perception of legitima-
cy?—rather than the first.  Nonetheless, the claimed deference effect has 
some empirical as well as commonsense and anecdotal support.415  A 
number of the absent-law situations add to that anecdotal evidence. 
Recall that it was in part the arbitrariness of the discipline systems 
aboard naval ships of the day that helped prompt the rise of piracy.416  In 
the mining camps of California, as noted previously, when a group felt 
that the Alcalde had been corrupted, they took the matter into their own 
hands.417  Similarly, in San Francisco, the official criminal justice system 
lost its legitimacy after accumulating revelations about corruption and 
other improprieties in prosecution or nonprosecution of offenses.418  Cor-
nelisz, in the Batavia case, was originally lawfully elected head of the is-
land committee, but when his arbitrariness led to a loss of legitimacy, his 
influence ended: when he sent a letter to the other island directing cer-
tain persons and equipment be turned over, his order was simply ig-
nored.419  These are all examples of a failure of legitimacy that translated 
into a lack of cooperation or deference. 
The conclusion that one can reach on these accounts is that absent-
law groups tend toward fairness in adjudication and enforcement not 
simply because people prefer fairness but because fairness has practical 
benefits that contribute to the success of the enterprise, which often was 
survival for an absent-law group.  Many of the groups were in such diffi-
cult situations that one might expect them to see fairness as a luxury they 
could not afford.  But it often prevailed despite the difficult circumstanc-
es because it had practical value. 
The absent-law experience also can offer anecdotal evidence to help 
answer the second question—what features of an adjudication procedure 
are the most important to earning a reputation for being fair?  Given the 
difficult circumstances, one may suppose that the fairness features that 
groups adopted were those that they saw as being most essential to fair 
adjudication.  Because of their difficult situations, commonly the groups 
were in no position to afford the luxury of fairness features that were not 
seen as essential.  Thus, the adjudication features that were common in 
absent-law situations might be taken as what one might call the “core” of 
perceived fair adjudication. 
 
 414. Id. at 230–31, 283–84. 
 415. Id. at 256–57.  
 416. LEESON, supra note 108, at 15, 18, 27. 
 417. SHINN, supra note 21, at 193–95. 
 418. WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 296–97. 
 419. DASH, supra note 18, at 179–80. 
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What are the common features of adjudication in absent-law situa-
tions?  While there was diversity among the groups in the specifics of 
their procedures, as one might expect given the diversity of their situa-
tions, one can identify some nearly universal features.  First, wrongdoing 
generally was resolved in public for all to see, not behind closed doors.420  
This was true even on pirate ships, for example, where most of the crew 
were hardly used to much due process under the standard naval disci-
pline system of the day from which they had come.421  Any system that 
did not provide a public adjudication would have difficulty establishing a 
reputation for fairness, one might guess, because people could not really 
know what the adjudication procedures were. 
A second common feature was an unbiased decision maker acting 
on the authority of the group.  This was sometimes the entire group it-
self, but more often was a subgroup or just an appointed leader.  Typical-
ly, the more serious the offense, the larger the decision-making group.  
The appointed leader might adjudicate minor offenses, a more serious 
offense might require a group, and the full group and even persons from 
other groups might be required for the most serious offenses.  This was 
done, for example, among the gold miners, where miners from other 
camps might be brought in for a serious offense.422  When a murder oc-
curred on a wagon train, the entire wagon train might leave off travel to 
hear the case, even bringing in members from another train in the area.423 
Relatedly, when the decision maker was less than the full group, 
that person or subgroup was seen as acting for and on the authority of 
the group.  The gold miners often elected a judge for a case.424  Some pi-
rate codes directed that the elected captain decide cases, or a majority of 
the company.425  This group-representation requirement, like the shift in 
 
 420. During the Attica Prison uprising, one of the group’s most emphatic demands was that all 
negotiations be done in full view of the group.  WICKER, supra note 29, at 229–30.  The San Francisco 
Vigilance Committee drafted specific rules of conduct, invited every member of the community to 
join, and held public trials for all persons brought before the committee.  WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 
205.  When a divisive element began to grow within the survivors of the Grafton, the crew discussed 
the rules that they needed, agreed to them, wrote them in a book, and read them out once a week.  
RAYNAL, supra note 15, at 154. 
 421. See Leeson, An-arrgh-chy, supra note 241, at 1057. 
 422. SHINN, supra note 21, at 194. 
 423. See Scott, supra note 176.  Note that this shift in group size parallels the U.S. practice that 
requires a twelve-member jury for felonies but permits a six-member jury for lesser offenses.  
ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 221, at 16. 
 424. In the case of Sim versus Sprenger, the case had been heard.  The group believed that it was 
a miscarriage of justice.  Before they retried the case, they brought everyone into the camp and debat-
ed as to whether they could and should form a court of appeals.  Once that had been agreed upon, the 
group elected a judge who would act as the head of the court of appeals in the current case, and in any 
future ones that arose.  No action took place until people from all over the district had time to arrive 
in the camp where the wrong occurred.  SHINN, supra note 21, at 194–95. 
 425. In some of the surviving pirate codes, the punishment is not stated.  Rather the punishment is 
to be decided upon when the need arises: “[The guilty] shall suffer what punishment the captain and 
majority of the company shall think fit.”  Pirates ships elected their captain and were free to depose 
him as they saw fit.  See V’léOnica Roberts, Captain George Lowther, http://www.vleonica.com/ 
lowther.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2013).  
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group size according to offense seriousness, seems consistent with an at-
tempt to build legitimacy in the decision-making process.  The more seri-
ous the offense, and therefore the more serious the penalty, the more 
important it was for the adjudication process to be one in which the 
group had faith in its fairness.  These requirements also seem consistent 
with a purpose to highlight the wrongdoing as not just a private wrong 
but as a violation of the group’s interests, which was to be punished by 
the group and under the group’s authority. 
When illegitimate authorities were attempting to legitimize their 
control over a group, it was common for them to stage public displays in 
an attempt to create an impression of legitimacy.  On both the Batavia 
and the Globe, the mutineers took the trouble to write up codes, have 
themselves elected leaders, and hold public trials as they sought to elimi-
nate their opposition.426  They apparently understood that rather than 
skipping the public jury trial, they were better off quietly perverting it, 
such as by stacking the jury.427 
A third common feature of absent-law adjudications was giving the 
defendant an opportunity to be publically heard and to present his side 
of the story, or perhaps to confess wrongdoing and ask for leniency.  Pi-
rate ships, wagon trains, gold miners, the group trapped in the Andes, 
many ship wreck crews, and the Vigilance Committee of San Francisco, 
all held trials at which the accused was given a chance to publically pre-
sent his side.428 
Finally, a fourth common feature was the use of a supermajority re-
quirement in the group’s decision making before punishment could be 
imposed.  In the wagon trains, for example, if there was significant disa-
greement among the jurors, the punishment would not go forward.429  
Similarly, the pirate codes defining offenses and setting punishments typ-
ically required unanimity, while only a majority vote was required for 
electing officeholders.430  This mirrors the modern U.S. practice of requir-
ing unanimity or near unanimity for conviction in criminal cases. 
One might speculate, then, that these features are essential to a per-
ception of fairness and that any compromise on these features would be 
costly in undermining the system’s legitimacy and the practical benefits 
that flow from it. 
 
 426. See COMSTOCK, supra note 11, at 91, 93; DASH, supra note 18, at 109, 114, 122–23, 130, 171. 
 427. See COMSTOCK, supra note 11, at 91; DRAKE-BROCKMAN, supra note 18, at 154. 
 428. See READ, supra note 9, at 239–40; SHINN, supra note 21, at 194; WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 
107; Leeson, An-arrgh-chy, supra note 241, at 1065; Scott, supra note 176. 
 429. One individual was tried twice for failure to perform his guard duties, but in both cases he 
was let off because the jury could not agree.  Medoram Crawford, Journal, in 1 SOURCES OF THE 
HISTORY OF OREGON 11 (F.G. Young ed., 1897).   
 430. LEESON, supra note 108, at 76–77. 
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Compare these common features to other features of an adjudica-
tion process that one might think important to fairness.431  A right to 
counsel, for example, commonly was not provided.432  One might argue 
that the right to counsel may not have been so important in such cases 
because the laws and the adjudication process were not so complex and 
technical as today, but rather the product of the group’s own intuitions 
about fairness and justice.  On the other hand, counsel might have been 
useful in providing advice on what argument strategies a defendant might 
best follow or in providing a more elegant articulation of the defendant’s 
arguments.  Another adjudication feature not typically given was a right 
against self-incrimination; the accused was expected, if not compelled, to 
speak up and provide an account of the relevant events.  Similarly, pre-
trial discovery of the prosecution’s evidence was not a common feature.  
(But this might have been because, given the smaller size of the group, 
the defendant might normally already know what the group knew.)  Nor 
was it common for a defendant to be granted delays in adjudication to 
better prepare his case. 
The fairness features commonly used and those not commonly used 
follow an interesting pattern: those commonly used are the features that 
not only provide fairness but also are likely to produce more accurate 
and just results; those not commonly used are those that may provide 
fairness to the defendant but are not so obviously essential to getting an 
accurate and just result.  If one imagines an adjudication system without 
the features common in absent-law situations—an adjudication that was 
not public or did not have an unbiased decision maker or in which the 
defendant lacked the opportunity to be heard or that allowed punish-
ment without at least a strong majority—one can easily imagine a system 
that frequently gets it wrong, where the results are likely to be regularly 
unreliable in assessing deserved liability and punishment.  In contrast, 
the fairness features not commonly used in absent-law adjudications 
might in one case or another advance accuracy and justness, but might 
not have that same devastating effect on accuracy as would the lack of 
the “core” of adjudication fairness. 
This pattern might have implications for modern adjudication sys-
tems.  If the features at the core of fairness are those essential to accurate 
results, one might speculate that the driving force is not an independent 
interest in fairness to defendants for its own sake as much as an interest 
in fair procedures as a means to reliable results.  To some extent, this 
conception conflicts with modern legitimacy scholarship, which tends to 
 
 431. For an elaborate account of public perception of fairness in criminal adjudication procedures 
see Tracey L. Meares, Everything Old Is New Again: Fundamental Fairness and the Legitimacy of 
Criminal Justice, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 105 (2005).  
 432. For an exception in the mining camps, see SHINN, supra note 21, at 170. 
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see fairness in adjudication as a value independent of just results.  In-
deed, some appear to argue that it is more important than just results.433 
The point becomes important because fair procedures and just re-
sults often conflict with one another.  As Josh Bowers and I point out: 
Consider, for example, such stalwarts of the American crimi-
nal justice system as the prohibition against allowing prosecutors to 
rely on illegally seized evidence, retry acquitted defendants, or de-
lay trials as best suits effective prosecution.  The rights against dou-
ble jeopardy and to a speedy trial, as well as the exclusionary rule, 
all have been constitutionally enshrined to some extent.  Yet it may 
well be that the virtues that drive these procedural rules are not ac-
curacy in truth finding or reliability in doing justice.  On the contra-
ry, each of these rules, and many others, can easily frustrate justice. 
The exclusionary rule can exclude reliable evidence that al-
lows the perpetrator of even a serious offense to go free, a result 
that cannot help but draw the criminal justice system into disrepute, 
at least with regard to its commitment for doing justice.  In the case 
of Larry Eyler, for example, police suspected Eyler of a string of 
gruesome killings of young gay men.  When a state trooper just 
happened upon Eyler parked on the side of the highway preparing 
for another kill of a young hitchhiker, he became suspicious, called 
headquarters and heard of prior suspicions, and took Eyler to the 
station, probably saving the hitchhiker’s life.  A search of Eyler’s 
vehicle turned up conclusive proof of his previous crimes, but the 
court excluded the evidence because the search was unlawful.  
Eyler was released to kill again, and indeed did so before subse-
quently being captured and convicted for the later crime.  Many 
may wonder whether this frustration of justice, together with its 
high cost in human life, is worth the benefits that the exclusionary 
rule offers. 
The double jeopardy bar may present a similar situation.  In 
the case of Melvin Ignatow, for example, Brenda Schaefer was bru-
tally raped, tortured, and killed by Ignatow and his former girl-
friend.  At trial, the girlfriend testified for the prosecution but came 
off as an unreliable witness, and Ignatow simply lied his way to rea-
sonable doubt.  He was acquitted.  Ten months later, as the new 
owners of Ignatow’s former house were putting down new carpet-
ing, they found film taped inside a floor duct.  When the film was 
developed, it provided a grisly record of Ignatow’s horrendous of-
fense, yet Ignatow could not be retried for the murder.  Again, this 
gross failure of justice is likely to undermine in many peoples’ 
minds the system’s commitment to doing justice. 
Or imagine that an Eyler or an Ignatow is released because of 
a speedy trial violation, a statute of limitations has run, or the text 
of an offense statute was ambiguous (even though the defendant 
 
 433. See Tyler & Darley, Morality and Legitimacy, supra note 411, at 723. 
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knew his conduct was wrong).  The fairness interests may be clear—
speedy trial rights, statutes of limitation, and the legality principle 
are common and well established—but the justice costs can be sig-
nificant.434 
When fairness and justice conflict, one must decide which of the two 
to advantage at the expense of the other.  If the justification behind 
building a reputation for legitimacy in adjudication and moral credibility 
in giving just results is to gain the practical benefits of deference that flow 
from those reputations, then presumably one would want to give prefer-
ence in a conflict to the one that had the greatest effect in producing 
those practical benefits.  If the absent-law experience is read to suggest 
that, at bottom, people perceive fair procedures as essential when and 
because they more reliably produce just results, it may suggest that when 
fairness procedures conflict with reliable justice, it is the fair procedures 
that ought to give way.  That is, if one is trying to maximize both legiti-
macy and moral credibility to gain the benefits of deference, then the 
greatest deference may come from advantaging just results over fair pro-
cedures. 
The point here is not to argue that interests of fairness ought not to 
be given weight.  Many fairness interests seem not only important but 
quite essential, and not only because they advance a perception of legit-
imacy and thus promote deference to the rules and to authorities.  They 
often are important, even essential, because they advance some other in-
terest.  The legality principle, for example, which prefers a prior, written, 
precise statement of what constitutes an offense no doubt is part of what 
people would perceive to be an important part of fairness.  Legality fre-
quently frustrates justice, however, by allowing an escape from deserved 
 
 434. Bowers & Robinson, Legitimacy and Moral Credibility, supra note 412, at 275–77.  The pas-
sage continues: 
 Nonetheless, there are good reasons to insist on adhering to the conventional standards 
and rules that are premised on fairness concerns.  First, and obviously, fairness is an important 
value in itself.  But there are practical crime-control reasons beyond this, as Parts II.A and III.A 
have shown.  But one can say more.  For example, the system’s adherence to these fairness rules, 
even in such costly cases, advertises the extent of its commitment to them.  Indeed, it is the costs 
of undermining justice in discrete cases that may do the most to advertise just how devoted the 
system is to these fairness interests.  If the system is willing to follow such rules, even when they 
undermine justice in such egregious cases, the message says, then citizens can have confidence 
that the rules certainly will be followed in the more common, less egregious cases.  That demon-
stration of high commitment enhances the system’s legitimacy, with its consequent benefits of 
greater deference and compliance. 
 However, one can imagine ways in which a society might strike a different balance be-
tween fairness and justice on these, and other, issues.  A system might limit application of the 
rules, perhaps by applying them less rigorously in cases of serious offenses, as some have suggest-
ed.  Or a system might shift to alternative procedures that could effectively advance fairness in-
terests without jeopardizing justice—for example, by replacing the exclusionary rule with a robust 
civil-compensation or administrative-disciplinary regime that could punish police for unlawful 
searches of any individual (and not just for unlawful searches of accused offenders).  Or a system 
might narrow application of rules and standards in circumstances where the threat of injustice is 
high, but the threat of unfairness is low.  For example, the system might bar application of double 
jeopardy when a defendant’s deceptive conduct helped generate the original acquittal.   
Id. at 277–78.  
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punishment of a person who has committed what the community, and 
even the offender, sees as wrongdoing, but where the statute has not 
been drafted in a way that is sufficiently clear in its coverage of the con-
duct at hand.435  (Consider the crematorium operator who throws hun-
dreds of bodies in his back yard to rot instead of cremating them, who is 
pleasantly surprised to learn that no criminal statute expressly and specif-
ically criminalizes such conduct.)436  Even though it frustrates deserved 
punishment, a society presumably would want a legality principle.  Its 
operation may well regularly undermine the system’s moral credibility 
and, thereby, its deference-inducing effect, but the independent virtues 
of the legality principle outweigh its costs to just punishment.  Those so-
cietal interests go beyond crime-control, and may include things such as 
the deontological value of fair notice, the equality value of promoting 
uniformity in application, and the democratic value of reserving the crim-
inalization decision to the more democratic legislative branch.437  In other 
words, even if the increase in legitimacy derived from following the legal-
ity principle were outweighed by the loss of moral credibility from the 
failures of justice it produced, that net loss of deference is not the only 
issue with which a criminal justice system must concern itself. 
G. Crime-Control Policy on Organized Crime and Terrorism 
Every liberal democracy has good reason to try to do justice and 
fight crime.  Most obviously, it has an obligation to protect its citizens, 
who have given up rights to the state—including giving the state a near 
monopoly on the lawful use of force—in exchange for a promise of pro-
 
 435. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 221, at 60–66.  One does not need the legality princi-
ple as a defense in cases in which the defendant has made a reasonable mistake of law because the law 
has not been made reasonably available beforehand.  Modern criminal law can provide an excuse de-
fense here.  Id. at 567. 
 436. See, e.g., id. at 51–58 (discussing the case of Ray Brent Marsh).  
 437. Id. at 62–63 (outlining the rationales behind the legality principle).  A related matter arises 
from the difference in “codification” practice in the absent-law situations.  When groups do reduce 
their rules to writings, they almost exclusively focus on liability and punishment rules, such as what 
conduct is prohibited and what punishment will follow for a violation.  Such writings rarely, if ever, 
concern themselves with adjudication-procedure matters.  One could look at this pattern and conclude 
that the liability and punishment rules were simply much more important to the group than the adjudi-
cation procedures, and this might be taken to support the proposition discussed above that just results 
are seen as more important than fairness in adjudication when the two conflict. 
  However, in this instance, it is not clear that the pattern of practice supports such a conclu-
sion.  The explanation for the pattern of practice may be that the liability and punishment rules serve 
an ex ante function, while the adjudication rules serve only an ex post function.  See generally Paul H. 
Robinson, A Functional Analysis of Criminal Law, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 857 (1994); Paul H. Robinson, 
Rules of Conduct and Principles of Adjudication, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 729 (1990).  That is, to be effec-
tive, conduct rules must be presented beforehand, and this would be intuitively obvious to the groups.  
People need to know what conduct they must avoid (and, to the extent that the threatened punish-
ment is needed for deterrent effect, they need to know the punishment that will follow from a viola-
tion).  In contrast, there is not the same need for a group to decide and announce its adjudication prac-
tices before there is to be an adjudication.  Given the difficulty of the circumstances, it might be 
efficient to delay the adjudication rules determination until after there has been a violation and the 
group is faced with the need for an adjudication. 
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tection.  As Part III.A explains, there is crime-control value in doing jus-
tice because it promotes the moral credibility of the criminal justice sys-
tem, which can in turn promote deference to the law.  Part of that dy-
namic is that a criminal justice system seen as doing justice is more likely 
to blunt the temptations of vigilantism. 
But the absent-law case studies suggest that there are other less ob-
vious reasons for a liberal democracy to be effective in fighting crime.  If 
crime-control is weak, organized criminals can build strength, and with 
those greater powers and resources can corrupt and control government.  
U.S. Prohibition offers an example.  It was that period of lawlessness that 
gave birth to organized crime in the United States,438 and allowed it to 
grow strong enough to be able to afford to buy local and state govern-
ments.  It has taken most of the century since Prohibition to bring orga-
nized crime under control, if that is where it arguably is now.439 
An even more compelling example is the experience of Colombia 
under Pablo Escobar.  Once criminal elements were allowed to reach a 
critical point of power where they could afford to corrupt officials, it was 
difficult to dislodge them.440  What became required were methods that 
liberal democracies normally would find abhorrent.  But once organized 
crime gets strong enough, there may be few, if any, acceptable means by 
which a democracy under the control of criminal elements can regain its 
footing.  One option is for the state to give up some of its sovereignty to 
a “big brother” that will come in and use its strength to overpower the 
criminal elements.  Not all democratic governments will be willing to 
compromise their sovereignty, for both ethical and nationalistic reasons.  
That approach also requires a “big brother” willing to undertake the 
risks and costs of such intervention.  It was only by luck for Colombia 
that the United States saw Pablo Escobar’s criminal enterprise as endan-
gering U.S. interests, thus creating a willingness to intervene.441  This may 
not be the case with many if not most criminal enterprises that come to 
control governments. 
The other method available to fight criminal elements who have be-
come so strong as to take control of government is the adoption of the 
brutal methods of the criminals.  The targeted killings of Pablo Escobar’s 
lieutenants and associates by Los Pepes were highly effective, probably 
more effective than U.S. help, but it is not something that most liberal 
democracies would be willing to bring themselves to do.  Even when 
faced with an alternative of their own destruction, and the abuse and kill-
ing of its citizens, many liberal democracies might simply find such meth-
ods too inconsistent with their basic principles. 
 
 438. ANNELISE GRAEBNER ANDERSON, THE BUSINESS OF ORGANIZED CRIME: A COSA NOSTRA 
FAMILY 11 (1979); MARK THORNTON, THE ECONOMICS OF PROHIBITION 111–38 (1991).  
 439. HOWARD ABADINSKY, ORGANIZED CRIME 363–411 (9th ed. 2010); ANDERSON, supra note 
438, at 136–46. 
 440. BOWDEN, supra note 51, at 24.  
 441. Id. at 59.  
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The conclusion here is that if the ultimate goal is to protect liberty, 
government must be vigilant to never allow organized criminals to gain a 
power sufficient to corrupt government, thereby requiring intervention 
that demands extreme measures.  In other words, when making the cal-
culations in balancing effective crime fighting against personal liberties, a 
democratic society must include in the calculation the need to avoid at all 
cost criminal groups reaching the “critical power point” at which they can 
control government, which may be a point of no return (without the use 
of unacceptable methods). 
This twist in crime-control calculations may help explain the will-
ingness of many to ignore some of the traditional principles of criminal 
law in the creation of the peculiar RICO offenses that were designed to 
fight organized crime families in the United States.442  It is hard to deter-
mine the real harm being described when reading the extremely complex 
RICO offenses.  The offensive conduct may be something as simple as 
investing monies when connected with certain background conditions.443  
RICO laws have been criticized as improperly broad in scope, lacking a 
coherent definition of the criminal conduct, and providing an expansive 
evidentiary scope that permits the introduction of character evidence and 
prior bad acts.444  But traditional criminal law had proved itself ineffective 
at curbing the power of criminal groups.445  While the new RICO statutes 
seemed a bit odd by traditional standards, they were ultimately effective 
in stopping the rise of organized crime and in breaking its power to sub-
vert government.446 
Government responses to terrorism may reflect a similar calcula-
tion.447  Just as the terroristic methods of Pablo Escobar in Colombia 
proved quite effective in gaining power, many countries in the world 
have been destabilized by the effectiveness of suicide bombers and polit-
ical assassinations.  The governmental response to terrorism has been 
controversial with many civil libertarians,448 but the lesson of Colombia 
and other similar absent-enforcement situations suggests that, while 
many of the anti-terror measures may be unattractive and ought to be 
scrutinized, in the end they may be the better path to a liberal democratic 
 
 442. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2006).  
 443. Id. § 1962(a).   
 444. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 221, at 12.4; Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of 
Being a Criminal, Parts I & II, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 661 (1987); Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of 
Being a Criminal, Parts III & IV, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 920 (1987). 
 445. G. Robert Blakey, Foreword: Debunking RICO’s Myriad Myths, 64 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 701, 
703 (1990); Stephen S. Smith, Proportionality and Federalization, 91 VA. L. REV. 879, 909 (2005). 
 446. Lesley Suzanne Bonney, Comment, The Prosecution of Sophisticated Urban Street Games: A 
Proper Application of RICO, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 579, 580 (1993). 
 447. See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, 
LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 5–10 (2007); Oren Gross, Security vs. Liberty: On Emotions and Cogni-
tion, in THE LONG DECADE: HOW 9/11 HAS CHANGED THE LAW (David Jenkins et al. eds., forthcom-
ing) (manuscript at 1112), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1952344.  
 448. M. Shamsul Haque, Government Responses to Terrorism: Critical Views of Their Impacts on 
People and Public Administration, 62 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 170, 170–71 (2002). 
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society than letting organized terror gain power over governments that 
cannot be countered except by an even greater intrusion on liberties. 
On the other hand, the terrorism threat is somewhat different from 
the organized-crime threat.  The former influences through intimidation 
alone, while the latter does so through corruption, with intimidation of 
officials as an add-on.  One might argue that U.S. history suggests that, 
while the threat of influence through corruption is real, it would be hard 
to imagine a U.S. government cowed by intimidation, as the Colombian 
government was by Pablo Escobar.  If the U.S. government can be 
bought but not cowed, it suggests that arguments for curbing civil liber-
ties to prevent criminals from reaching the “critical power point” at 
which they can control government, may be relevant to fighting orga-
nized crime but not to fighting terrorism.  On the other hand, terrorists 
with a weapon of mass destruction might change the assumptions and 
provide a real basis by which even a U.S. government can be ruled by in-
timidation. 
One other implication of this analysis is that the liberty-vs.-crime-
control balance that one strikes necessarily depends on the context.  The 
balance that the United States strikes may not be the best balance for 
another society if it stands in a different situation than the United States 
with regard to threats of corruption or intimidation.  The lesson here is 
that U.S. reformers ought to be careful about what they export, and re-
formers in other countries ought to be careful about what they import 
from the United States.  Note, for example, that other countries have 
considered adopting the U.S. exclusionary rule and its entrapment de-
fense,449 both of which strike a balance between protecting liberties and 
fighting crime.450  Yet the propriety of the balances reflected in those doc-
trines may depend upon the crime-threat context.  While the United 
States might be able to afford such a balance, this might not necessarily 
be a good balance for another society facing different threats.  Perhaps it 
is for this reason than many U.S. non-exculpatory defenses, such as the 
 
 449. See, e.g., Binyamin Blum, Doctrines Without Borders: The “New” Israeli Exclusionary Rule 
and the Dangers of Legal Transplantation, 60 STAN. L. REV. 2131, 2135–39 (2008) (noting that the Is-
raeli Supreme Court ruled that the most suitable rule for the Israeli justice system is a discretionary 
exclusionary rule, which allows courts discretion to exclude evidence in appropriate cases and repaid 
injustices caused by police misconduct); Harry M. Caldwell & Carol A. Chase, The Unruly Exclusion-
ary Rule: Heeding Justice Blackmun’s Call to Examine the Rule in Light of Changing Judicial Under-
standing About Its Effects Outside the Courtroom, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 45, 57–66 (1994) (England, Can-
ada, Australia, and New Zealand adopted a discretionary exclusionary rule that does not mandate 
automatic exclusion); Paul W. Valentine, To Catch an Entrapper: The Inadequacy of the Entrapment 
Defense Globally and the Need to Reevaluate Our Current Legal Rubric, 1 PACE INT'L. L. REV. ONLINE 
COMPANION 2, §§ I, III (2009) (discussing the development of variations of the entrapment defenses in 
various countries internationally subsequent to its establishment in the United States); Jacqueline E. 
Ross, Tradeoffs in Undercover Investigations: A Comparative Perspective, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1501, 
1521 (2002) (describing entrapment in European countries as a form of complicity on the party of in-
volved crime investigators). 
 450. PAUL H. ROBINSON & MICHAEL T. CAHILL, LAW WITHOUT JUSTICE: WHY CRIMINAL LAW 
DOESN’T GIVE PEOPLE WHAT THEY DESERVE 137–85 (2006). 
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exclusionary rule, have been rejected by other countries, including other 
liberal democracies.451 
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Humans have been working in groups without government or law 
for more than 100,000 years and have not only survived but flourished.  
That success has been in large part a product of the natural tendency of 
humans toward social cooperation.  The several dozen examples of ab-
sent-law situations discussed in Part I give a glimpse of what the opera-
tion of the original human groups on the Serengeti Plain might have 
been.  Rather than the strong exploiting the weak, Part II demonstrates a 
tendency of humans toward social cooperation, even when it is not obvi-
ous to a person at the time that such is in his or her individual interest.  
Cooperation can be derailed, but it seems to have a surprising persis-
tence. 
Cooperative action is possible, the absent-law situations illustrate, 
only when a group establishes norms against basic wrongdoing and a sys-
tem of punishment to enforce them.  Having a system of punishment in 
itself does not provide the needed foundation for social cooperation, 
however.  It is justness in punishment—which takes account of a viola-
tor’s moral blameworthiness as the group perceives it—that serves as the 
foundation for cooperative action.  Regular injustices or failures of jus-
tice tend to produce alienation and discord, rather than cooperation.  
The desire for justice can be overborne by immediate circumstances, but 
seems to be the human default to which the group will revert when con-
ditions permit. 
The intuitions about wrongdoing and punishment that humans 
share may well have been necessary for our success in an earlier age, but 
times have changed.  Perhaps we now have the means to create through 
government and law an organization of society that does not rely upon 
the group dynamics of justice and cooperation that seem so essential to 
success in the absent-law situations?  Yet, the lessons from the absent-
law situations, especially an appreciation for our inherent desire for jus-
tice and its role as a foundation for social cooperation, continue to have 
relevance in a modern legal world, as Part III spins out. 
Whether they like it or not, those who shape our modern world 
must accept human nature as it exists.  Civilization has done much and 
can do more to educate and socialize humans toward views that promote 
social good.  But there are limits to what can be done to change human 
nature.  There seems little doubt that human success will always demand 
a high degree of social cooperation, which in turn may require the just 
 
 451. Adam Liptak, U.S. Stands Alone in Rejecting All Evidence When Police Err, N.Y. TIMES, July 
19, 2008, at A1 (noting that the U.S. non-discretionary exclusionary rule has been rejected by all other 
countries, including Canada, Australia, England, and the European Court of Human Rights). 
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punishment of wrongdoing—not only because such encourages coopera-
tion but because doing justice has come to be seen by humans as a value 
in itself without regard to its practical benefits. 
